@MISC{Sturzenegger_pabloe., author = {Federico Sturzenegger}, title = {PABLO E. GUIDOTTI}, year = {} }
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Abstract
Money... has oppressed nearly all people in one of two ways: either it has been abundant and very unreliable, or reliable and very scarce. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Age of Uncertainty Sudden stops in capital flows—and the ensuing current account reversals they induce—have been at the center of economic policy discussions since the outbreak in the mid-1990s of the series of financial crises that plagued emerging market economies. Sudden stops spared no region and have been particularly prevalent in both Asia and Latin America. As a result of these crises, policymakers and researchers alike directed their attention toward identifying the causes and designing policies to prevent crises. 1 In fact, policy circles placed substantial effort into the development of a system of early warning signals, under the presumption that some key country fundamentals would be sufficient for identifying future crises. 2 The reality of capital market behavior soon showed, however, that a number of institutional and regulatory factors might easily spur contagion across seemingly unconnected economies, often with little relation to the Guidotti and Sturzenegger are with the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Villar is with the Bank for International Settlements.