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Functional dissociations of risk and reward processing in the medial prefrontal cortex
- Cereb. Cortex
, 2009
"... Making a risky decision is a complex process that involves evaluation of both the value of the options and the associated risk level. Yet the neural processes underlying these processes have not so far been clearly identified. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and a task that simulates ris ..."
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Cited by 20 (3 self)
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Making a risky decision is a complex process that involves evaluation of both the value of the options and the associated risk level. Yet the neural processes underlying these processes have not so far been clearly identified. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and a task that simulates risky decisions, we found that the dorsal region of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) was activated whenever a risky decision was made, but the degree of this activity across subjects was negatively correlated with their risk preference. In contrast, the ventral MPFC was parametrically modulated by the received gain/loss, and the activation in this region was positively correlated with an individual’s risk prefer-ence. These results extend existing neurological evidence by showing that the dorsal and ventral MPFC convey different decision signals (i.e., aversion to uncertainty vs. approach to rewarding outcomes), where the relative strengths of these signals determine behavioral decisions involving risk and uncertainty.
Third-generation prospect theory
, 2008
"... ... prospect theory (PT³). This retains the predictive power of previous versions of prospect theory, but extends that theory by allowing reference points to be uncertain while decision weights are specified in a rank-dependent way. We show that PT 3 preferences respect a state-conditional form of s ..."
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Cited by 19 (2 self)
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... prospect theory (PT³). This retains the predictive power of previous versions of prospect theory, but extends that theory by allowing reference points to be uncertain while decision weights are specified in a rank-dependent way. We show that PT 3 preferences respect a state-conditional form of stochastic dominance. The theory predicts the observed tendency for willingness-to-accept valuations of lotteries to be greater than willingness-to-pay valuations. When PT³ is made operational by using simple functional forms with parameter values derived from existing experimental evidence, it predicts observed patterns of the preference reversal phenomenon.
Fairness and Cooperation Are Rewarding Evidence from Social Cognitive Neuroscience
"... ABSTRACT: To motivate their consumers or employees, corporations often offer monetary incentives, such as cash-back deals or salary bonuses. However, human behavior is not solely driven by material outcome; fairness and equity matter as well. In a recent neuroimaging study, fair offers led to higher ..."
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Cited by 14 (0 self)
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ABSTRACT: To motivate their consumers or employees, corporations often offer monetary incentives, such as cash-back deals or salary bonuses. However, human behavior is not solely driven by material outcome; fairness and equity matter as well. In a recent neuroimaging study, fair offers led to higher happiness ratings and increased activity in several reward regions of the brain compared with unfair offers of equal monetary value. Other neuroimaging studies have similarly shown activation in reward regions in response to cooperative partners or cooperative play. Here, we review these findings and discuss the implications for organizational settings.
Neural affective decision theory: Choices, brains, and emotions
- PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COGNITIVE MODELLING, ICCM’04
, 2008
"... We present a theory and neurocomputational model of how specific brain operations produce complex decision and preference phenomena, including those explored in prospect theory and decision affect theory. We propose that valuation and decision making are emotional processes, involving interacting br ..."
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Cited by 12 (6 self)
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We present a theory and neurocomputational model of how specific brain operations produce complex decision and preference phenomena, including those explored in prospect theory and decision affect theory. We propose that valuation and decision making are emotional processes, involving interacting brain areas that include two expectation-discrepancy subsystems: a dopamine-encoded system for positive events and a serotonin-encoded system for negative ones. The model provides a rigorous account of loss aversion and the shape of the value function from prospect theory. It also suggests multiple distinct neurological mechanisms by which information framing may affect choices, including ones involving anticipated pleasure. It further offers a neural basis for the interactions among affect, prior expectations and counterfactual comparisons explored in decision affect theory. Along with predicting the effects of particular brain disturbances and damage, the model suggests specific neurological explanations for individual differences observed in choice and valuation behaviors.
Is a bird in the hand worth two in the future? The neuroeconomics of intertemporal decision-making
, 2008
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On Framing Effects in Decision Making: Linking Lateral versus Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex Activation to Choice Outcome Processing
"... & Two correlates of outcome processing in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) have been proposed in the literature: One hypothesis suggests that the lateral/medial division relates to representation of outcome valence (negative vs. positive), and the other suggests that the medial OFC maintains stead ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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& Two correlates of outcome processing in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) have been proposed in the literature: One hypothesis suggests that the lateral/medial division relates to representation of outcome valence (negative vs. positive), and the other suggests that the medial OFC maintains steady stimulus–outcome associations, whereas the lateral OFC represents changing (unsteady) outcomes to prepare for response shifts. These two hypotheses were contrasted by comparing the original with the inverted version of the Iowa Gambling Task in an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. Results showed (1) that (caudo) lateral OFC was indeed sensitive to the steadiness of the outcomes and not merely to outcome valence and (2) that the original and the inverted tasks, although both designed to measure
The evolution of decisionmaking under risk: framing effects in monkey risk preferences.
- J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.
, 2010
"... When making choices between risky options, human decision-makers exhibit a number of framing effects. One of the most prominent framing effects is the tendency for decision makers to evaluate gambles relative to a reference point, and to act risk-seeking when prospects are framed as losses but risk ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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When making choices between risky options, human decision-makers exhibit a number of framing effects. One of the most prominent framing effects is the tendency for decision makers to evaluate gambles relative to a reference point, and to act risk-seeking when prospects are framed as losses but risk-averse when identical prospects are framed as gains. This tendency for risk-preferences to reverse between loss and gain frames has been termed the reflection effect, and is one of the primary predictions of Prospect Theory. Here, we explore whether non-human primates exhibit a similar reflection effect. Using a token-trading task, we show that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) exhibit an analogous reversal of risk preferences depending on whether outcomes are presented as gains or losses, suggesting that similar framing effects also influence choice in nonhuman primates. This finding suggests that the mechanisms that drive framing effects in humans may be evolutionarily ancient, extending broadly across the primate order.
Hormonal and Genetic Influences on Processing Reward and Social Information
"... ABSTRACT: Social neuroscience is an emerging interdisciplinary field that combines tools from cognitive, cellular, and molecular neuroscience to understand the neural mechanisms underlying human interactions, emphasizing the complementary nature of different organization levels in the social and bio ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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ABSTRACT: Social neuroscience is an emerging interdisciplinary field that combines tools from cognitive, cellular, and molecular neuroscience to understand the neural mechanisms underlying human interactions, emphasizing the complementary nature of different organization levels in the social and biological domains. Previous studies focused on the molecular/neuronal substrates of a variety of complex behaviors, such as parental behavior and pair bonding. Less is known about the various factors influencing interindividual differences in reward processing and decision making in social contexts, both relying upon the dopaminergic system. This review concerns (1) basic electrophysiological findings and recent neuroimaging findings showing that reward processing and social interaction processes share common neural substrates and (2) genetic and hormonal influences on these processes. Recent research combining molecular genetics, endocrinology, and neuroimaging demonstrated that variations in dopamine-related genes and in hormone levels affect the physiological properties of the dopaminergic system in nonhuman primates and modulate the processing of reward and social information in humans. These findings are important because they indicate the neural influence of genes conferring vulnerability to develop neuropathologies such as drug addiction and pathological gambling. Taken together, the reviewed data start to unveil the relationships between genes, hormones, and the functioning of the reward system, as well as decision making in social contexts, and provide a link between molecular, cellular, and social cognitive levels in humans.
The effects of one-night of sleep deprivation on known-risk and ambiguousrisk decisions.
- Journal of Sleep Research,
, 2007
"... ABSTRACT Sleep deprivation has been shown to alter decision-making abilities. The majority of research has utilized fairly complex tasks with the goal of emulating 'real-life' scenarios. Here, we use a Lottery Choice Task (LCT) which assesses risk and ambiguity preference for both decisio ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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ABSTRACT Sleep deprivation has been shown to alter decision-making abilities. The majority of research has utilized fairly complex tasks with the goal of emulating 'real-life' scenarios. Here, we use a Lottery Choice Task (LCT) which assesses risk and ambiguity preference for both decisions involving potential gains and those involving potential losses. We hypothesized that one night of sleep deprivation would make subjects more risk seeking in both gains and losses. Both a control group and an experimental group took the LCT on two consecutive days, with an intervening night of either sleep or sleep deprivation. The control group demonstrated that there was no effect of repeated administration of the LCT. For the experimental group, results showed significant interactions of night (normal sleep versus total sleep deprivation, TSD) by frame (gains versus losses), which demonstrate that following as little as 23 h of TSD, the prototypical response to decisions involving risk is altered. Following TSD, subjects were willing to take more risk than they ordinarily would when they were considering a gain, but less risk than they ordinarily would when they were considering a loss. For ambiguity preferences, there seems to be no direct effect of TSD. These findings suggest that, overall, risk preference is moderated by TSD, but whether an individual is willing to take more or less risk than when well-rested depends on whether the decision is framed in terms of gains or losses.
