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Performance pay and top-management incentives’’,

by Michael C Jensen , Kevin J Murphy , Stephanie Jensen , Natalie Jensen , Mary Rojek , Mike Stevenson , George Baker , Carliss Baldwin , Ray Ball , Gary Becker , Joseph Bower , James Brickley , Jeffrey Coles , Harry Deangelo , Robert Gibbons , Gailen Hite , Clifford Holderness , Robert Kaplan , Steven Kaplan , Edward Lazear , Richard Leftwich , John Long , Jay Lorsch , Paul Macavoy , John Mcarthur , Kenneth Mclaughlin , Kenneth Merchant , Andrall Pearson , Sherwin Rosen , Ronald Schmidt , G William Schwert , Robert Simons , Jerold Warner , Ross Watts , Jerold Zimmerman - Journal of Political Economy, , 1990
"... Abstract Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1137 (19 self) - Add to MetaCart
and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of their firm's stock and ownership levels have declined over the past 50 years. We hypothesize that public and private political forces impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity. Declines in both the pay-performance relation

Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy

by Robert J. Barro, David B. Gordon - JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS , 1983
"... In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect. But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymakor's incentives and form their ..."
Abstract - Cited by 812 (9 self) - Add to MetaCart
In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect. But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymakor's incentives and form

The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons

by Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny - JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS , 1997
"... When should a government provide a service in-house, and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost. If contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quali ..."
Abstract - Cited by 402 (6 self) - Add to MetaCart
quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has. However, the private contractor’s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality. The model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison

How Social Security and Medicare Affect Retirement Behavior in a World of Incomplete Markets

by John Rust, Christopher Phelan - ECONOMETRICA , 1997
"... This paper provides an empirical analysis of how the U.S. Social Security and Medicare insurance system affect the labor supply of older males in the presence of incomplete markets for loans, annuities, and health insurance. We estimate a detailed dynamic programming (DP) model of the joint labor ..."
Abstract - Cited by 371 (11 self) - Add to MetaCart
that the DP model is able to account for wide variety of phenomena observed in the data, including the pronounced peaks in the distribution of retirement ages at 62 and 65 (the ages of early and normal eligibility for Social Security benefits, respectively). We identify a significant fraction of “health

Memory access buffering in multiprocessors

by Michel Dubois, Chrlstoph Scheurich, Faye Briggs - In Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture , 1986
"... In highly-pipelined machines, instructions and data are prefetched and buffered in both the processor and the cache. This is done to reduce the average memory access la-tency and to take advantage of memory interleaving. Lock-up free caches are designed to avoid processor blocking on a cache miss. W ..."
Abstract - Cited by 254 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
issued by different processors. Buffering, however, can cause logical problems in multipro-cessors. These problems are aggravated if each processor has a private memory in which shared writable data may be present, such as in a cache-based system or in a system with a distributed global memory

Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Saving Plans

by Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler - American Economic Review , 2001
"... There is a worldwide trend toward defined contribution saving plans and growing interest in privatized Social Security plans. In both environments, individuals are given some responsibility to make their own asset-allocation decisions, raising concerns about how well they do at this task. This paper ..."
Abstract - Cited by 243 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
There is a worldwide trend toward defined contribution saving plans and growing interest in privatized Social Security plans. In both environments, individuals are given some responsibility to make their own asset-allocation decisions, raising concerns about how well they do at this task

Embeddedness in the making of financial capital: How social relations and networks benefit firms seeking financing

by Brian Uzzi - American Sociological Review , 1999
"... I investigate how social embeddedness affects an organization’s acquisition and cost of financial capital in middle-market banking—a lucrative but un-derstudied financial sector. Using existing theory and original fieldwork, I develop a framework to explain how embeddedness can influence which firms ..."
Abstract - Cited by 219 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
level, firms are more likely to get loans and to receive lower interest rates on loans if their network of bank ties has a mix of embedded ties and arm’s-length ties. These network effects arise because embedded ties motivate network partners to share private resources, while arm’s-length ties

Private Bag X6001, Potchefstroom 2520,

by G. G. Nyambuya, Republic Of South Africa , 2008
"... ���We consider an azimuthally symmetric solution to Poison’s equation, ∇ 2ϕ=4πGρ, for empty space and so doing, a gravitational potential dependent on both r and θ is obtained, that isϕ=ϕ(r,θ). From this potential it is possible to explain qualitatively why Pioneer 10/11 detected an anomalous accele ..."
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���We consider an azimuthally symmetric solution to Poison’s equation, ∇ 2ϕ=4πGρ, for empty space and so doing, a gravitational potential dependent on both r and θ is obtained, that isϕ=ϕ(r,θ). From this potential it is possible to explain qualitatively why Pioneer 10/11 detected an anomalous acceleration of (8.74±1.33)×10 −10 ms−2 directed radially toward the Sun. The derived potential has implications for planetary motions in the solar system such as the advance of the perihelion of planetary orbits and also the tilt of some of the planetary orbits. The equation for the planetary orbits are derived but not explored here.

Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and NEGATIVE FRAMING ON COOPERATION IN EXPERIMENTS

by James Andreoni , 1994
"... This paper considers the standard linear public goods game under two experimental conditions. The positive-frame condition is the regular public goods game that experimental economists have studied in the past. This frames the subject's choice as contributing to a public good, which will have ..."
Abstract - Cited by 202 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
will have a positive benefit to other subjects. The second condition is the negative-frame condition. The incentives of this game are identical to the positive-frame condition. However, this time a subject's choice is framed as purchasing a private good which, since the opportunity cost is the purchase

2003, Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more

by Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, René M. Stulz - Journal of Financial Economics
"... At the end of 1997, the foreign companies listed in the U.S. have a Tobin’s q ratio that exceeds by 16.5 % the q ratio of firms from the same country that are not listed in the U.S. The valuation difference is statistically significant and largest for exchange-listed firms, where it reaches 37%. The ..."
Abstract - Cited by 174 (16 self) - Add to MetaCart
%. The difference persists even after controlling for a number of firm and country characteristics. We propose a theory that explains this valuation difference. We hypothesize that controlling shareholders of firms listed in the U.S. cannot extract as many private benefits from control compared to controlling
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