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Truthful Low-Cost Unicast in Selfish Wireless Networks
| Citations: | 19 - 8 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Wang_truthfullow-cost,
author = {WeiZhao Wang and et al.},
title = {Truthful Low-Cost Unicast in Selfish Wireless Networks},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
Much of the existing work in wireless ad hoc networking assumes that each individual wireless node (possibly owned by selfish users) will follow prescribed protocols without deviation. In this paper, we address the issue of user cooperation in selfish and rational wireless ad hoc networks using an incentive approach. Each node has a cost (known only to itself) of relaying unit data for other nodes. In our protocols, each wireless node declares a cost for forwarding a unit data for any other node. When a node wants to send data to the access point, it first computes the least cost path to the access point and computes a payment to each node on the path. We present a strategyproof pricing mechanism such that the profit of each wireless node is maximized only when it declares its true cost. We also give a time optimal method to compute the payment in a centralized manner. We then discuss in detail how to implement the algorithm in the distributed manner. We conduct extensive simulations to study the relation of the total payment of a node to the total cost incurred by all relay nodes and found that the ratio of the total payment over the total cost is small. Our protocol works when the wireless nodes will not collude and we show that no truthful mechanism can avoid the collusion of arbitrary two nodes. We also give truthful mechanism when a node only colludes with its neighbors.
Keyphrases
truthful low-cost unicast selfish wireless network wireless node access point truthful mechanism unit data total payment total cost user cooperation wireless ad hoc rational wireless ad hoc network individual wireless node distributed manner strategyproof pricing mechanism cost path true cost incentive approach prescribed protocol centralized manner extensive simulation relay node time optimal method selfish user
