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Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users (2003)

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by Richard Cole , Yevgeniy Dodis , Tim Roughgarden
Venue:Proc. of STOC
Citations:113 - 9 self
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BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Cole03pricingnetwork,
    author = {Richard Cole and Yevgeniy Dodis and Tim Roughgarden},
    title = {Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users},
    booktitle = {Proc. of STOC},
    year = {2003}
}

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Abstract

We study the negative consequences of selfish behavior in a congested network and economic means of influencing such behavior. We consider the model of selfish routing defined by Wardrop [30] and studied in a computer science context by Roughgarden and Tardos [26]. In this model, the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to selfishly route traffic on minimum-latency paths. The quality of a routing of traffic is measured by the sum of travel times (the total latency). It is well known that the outcome of selfish routing (a Nash equilibrium) does not minimize the total latency and can be improved upon with coordination. An ancient strategy for improving the selfish solution is the principle of marginal cost pricing, which asserts that on each edge of the network, each network user on the edge should pay a tax offsetting the congestion effects caused by its presence. By pricing network edges according to this principle, the inefficiency of selfish routing can always be eradicated. This result, while fundamental, assumes a very strong homogeneity property: all network users are assumed to trade off time and money in an identical way. The guarantee also ignores both the algorithmic

Keyphrases

network edge    network user    heterogeneous selfish user    selfish routing    total latency    marginal cost pricing    travel time    network traffic    congested network    nash equilibrium    congestion effect    route traffic    strong homogeneity property    ancient strategy    economic mean    minimum-latency path    negative consequence    computer science context    identical way    selfish solution    selfish behavior    edge congestion   

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