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OURS: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems in Non-Cooperative Wireless Networks (2006)
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| Venue: | MOBICOM'06 |
| Citations: | 23 - 2 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Wang06ours:optimal,
author = {Weizhao Wang and Stephan Eidenbenz and Yu Wang and Xiang-Yang Li},
title = {OURS: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems in Non-Cooperative Wireless Networks},
year = {2006}
}
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Abstract
We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS). Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service requestor is not selfish, we propose a
Keyphrases
optimal unicast routing system non-cooperative wireless network service requestor main contribution nash equilibrium selfish terminal traditional strategyproofness unicast routing principal model first paper novel solution relay terminal inevitable over-payment problem economic inefficiency destination node dominant strategy wireless network proved performance guarantee
