DMCA
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses (2006)
Cached
Download Links
| Venue: | IN: PROCEEDINGS OF ESORICS |
| Citations: | 56 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Shmatikov06timinganalysis,
author = {Vitaly Shmatikov and Ming-Hsiu Wang},
title = { Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses},
booktitle = {IN: PROCEEDINGS OF ESORICS},
year = {2006},
pages = {18--33},
publisher = {}
}
Share
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
OpenURL
Abstract
Mix networks are a popular mechanism for anonymous Internet communications. By routing IP traffic through an overlay chain of mixes, they aim to hide the relationship between its origin and destination. Using a realistic model of interactive Internet traffic, we study the problem of defending low-latency mix networks against attacks based on correlating inter-packet intervals on two or more links of the mix chain. We investigate several attack models, including an active attack which involves adversarial modification of packet flows in order to “fingerprint” them, and analyze the tradeoffs between the amount of cover traffic, extra latency, and anonymity properties of the mix network. We demonstrate that previously proposed defenses are either ineffective, or impose a prohibitively large latency and/or bandwidth overhead on communicating applications. We propose a new defense based on adaptive padding.
Keyphrases
low-latency mix network mix network popular mechanism active attack new defense realistic model adversarial modification packet flow interactive internet traffic extra latency overlay chain cover traffic anonymity property anonymous internet communication several attack model large latency bandwidth overhead adaptive padding inter-packet interval mix chain ip traffic
