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Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9495-2 The nature of intuitive justification
BibTeX
@MISC{Chudnoff_philosstud,
author = {Elijah Chudnoff and Ó Springer and Science+business Media B. V},
title = {Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9495-2 The nature of intuitive justification},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
Abstract In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology— and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions.
