Attacking and fixing helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy

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Attacking and fixing helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy (2010)

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by Véronique Cortier , Ben Smyth

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36 - 16 self

BibTeX

@MISC{Cortier10attackingand,
    author = {Véronique Cortier and Ben Smyth},
    title = {Attacking and fixing helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy},
    year = {2010}
}

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Abstract

Helios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-toend verifiable electronic voting system, suitable for use in lowcoercion environments. In this paper, we analyse ballot secrecy and discover a vulnerability which allows an adversary to compromise the privacy of voters. This vulnerability has been successfully exploited to break privacy in a mock election using the current Helios implementation. Moreover, the feasibility of an attack is considered in the context of French legislative elections and, based upon our findings, we believe it constitutes a real threat to ballot secrecy in such settings. Finally, we present a fix and show that our solution satisfies a formal definition of ballot secrecy using the applied pi calculus.

Keyphrases

ballot secrecy applied pi calculus lowcoercion environment french legislative election mock election current helios implementation formal definition real threat

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