Elections Can be Manipulated Often

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Elections Can be Manipulated Often

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by Ehud Friedgut , Gil Kalai , Noam Nisan

Citations:

66 - 1 self

BibTeX

@MISC{Friedgut_electionscan,
    author = {Ehud Friedgut and Gil Kalai and Noam Nisan},
    title = {Elections Can be Manipulated Often },
    year = {}
}

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Abstract

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method between 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.

Keyphrases

single random voter neutral voting method non-negligible probability non-trivial voting method quantitative version gibbard-satterthwaite theorem random manipulation gibbard-satterthwaite theorem state

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