Abstract

Reading this text on the application of game theory to two-sided matching problems, I relived an experience shared by many readers of this journal-the process known as &dquo;resident match.&dquo; At a prescribed moment, over 90 % of sen-ior medical students frantically tear open an envelope that holds the name of the hospital at which they will train. Some go into the resident match kicking and screaming. Others are so trusting of the process (or so weak of conviction) that they let it decide whether they will be internists or surgeons. Fighting off the vivid image of the great mechanical maw chewing up our preference lists and spitting out one of the more crucial decisions in our lives, some of us sought as-surances that the algorithm, named NIMP (the National In-tern Matching Program), was fair and just. We were told, or maybe we rationalized, that it was of no use to lie to NIMP.