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Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluraliste
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BibTeX
@MISC{Talisse_whypragmatists,
author = {Robert B. Talisse and Scott F. Aikin},
title = {Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluraliste},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
Contemporary pragmatists often maintain that their doctrine is intrinsically allied with pluralism.1 This claim has become so common that it has taken on the lively hue of self-evidence. We contend that pragmatism and pluralism are in fact not compatible, that pragmatists cannot be pluraliste. Our demonstration of this thesis will proceed in an ordinary way: We shall first identify three distinct types of pluralism.2 We shall then identity two general styles of pragmatism.3 Then we shall demonstrate that although certain varieties of pluralism are logically consistent with pragmatism, no pluralism is compatible with pragmatism; that is, we will argue that in cases where pragmatism and pluralism are consistent there are good pragmatic reasons to reject pluralism. Thus the lively hue of selfevidence that once attended the thought that the two are deeply connected should turn to a sickly pall of implausibility. Our mission is not simply negative or polemical. We do not seek merely to refute a self-conception popular among pragmatists. Rather, we aim to further the positive agenda of encouraging pragmatists to make more explicit the nature
