DMCA
Harvard Business School, Harvard (2009)
Cached
Download Links
by
Itai Ashlagi
,
Avinatan Hassidim
,
Mark Braverman
BibTeX
@MISC{Ashlagi09harvardbusiness,
author = {Itai Ashlagi and Avinatan Hassidim and Mark Braverman},
title = {Harvard Business School, Harvard},
year = {2009}
}
Share
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
OpenURL
Abstract
We show that the the unit demand auction introduced by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [5] is incentive compatible even when bidders have budget constraints. Furthermore we show that myopic bidding is an ex post equilibrium. Finally, we show that any other incentive compatible which always outputs a competitive equilibrium (envy free) must coincide with the DGS auction. 1
