An efficient protocol for secure two-party computation in the presence of malicious adversaries

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An efficient protocol for secure two-party computation in the presence of malicious adversaries (2007)

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by Yehuda Lindell , Benny Pinkas

Venue:	In Proceedings of the annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Citations:	120 - 15 self

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@INPROCEEDINGS{Lindell07anefficient,
    author = {Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas},
    title = {An efficient protocol for secure two-party computation in the presence of malicious adversaries},
    booktitle = {In Proceedings of the annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology},
    year = {2007}
}

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Abstract

Abstract. We show an efficient secure two-party protocol, based on Yao’s construction, which provides security against malicious adversaries. Yao’s original protocol is only secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Security against malicious adversaries can be obtained by applying the compiler of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (the “GMW compiler”). However, this approach does not seem to be very practical as it requires using generic zero-knowledge proofs. Our construction is based on applying cut-and-choose techniques to the original circuit and inputs. Security is proved according to the ideal/real simulation paradigm, and the proof is in the standard model (with no random oracle model or common reference string assumptions). The resulting protocol is computationally efficient: the only usage of asymmetric cryptography is for running O(1) oblivious transfers for each input bit (or for each bit of a statistical security parameter, whichever is larger). Our protocol combines techniques from folklore (like cut-and-choose) along with new techniques for efficiently proving consistency of inputs. We remark that a naive implementation of the cut-and-choose technique with Yao’s protocol does not yield a secure protocol. This is the first paper to show how to properly implement these techniques, and to provide a full proof of security. Our protocol can also be interpreted as a constant-round black-box reduction of secure two-party com-putation to oblivious transfer and perfectly-hiding commitments, or a black-box reduction of secure two-party computation to oblivious transfer alone, with a number of rounds which is linear in a sta-tistical security parameter. These two reductions are comparable to Kilian’s reduction, which uses OT alone but incurs a number of rounds which is linear in the depth of the circuit [18]. 1

Keyphrases

malicious adversary secure two-party computation efficient protocol oblivious transfer cut-and-choose technique common reference generic zero-knowledge proof kilian reduction asymmetric cryptography full proof secure two-party com-putation ideal real simulation paradigm original protocol black-box reduction standard model sta-tistical security parameter random oracle model protocol combine technique efficient secure two-party protocol new technique statistical security parameter naive implementation secure protocol perfectly-hiding commitment first paper gmw compiler original circuit constant-round black-box reduction input bit yao construction semi-honest adversary

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