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## On the Leakage of Information in Biometric Authentication

Citations: | 1 - 0 self |

### Citations

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Citation Context ...mpute the distance d(b, b′) ≤ τ OutAS ∈ {accepted, rejected} C IDb′ OutASOutAS S AS E(b′) ĨD Fig. 1: Authentication phase in a two-party biometric authentication system. using homomorphic encryption =-=[20]-=-, garbled circuits [21] or oblivious transfer [22]. Figure 1 depicts the authentication phase of a biometric authentication system in a two party setting, between a client C and an authentication serv... |

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Citation Context ... b′) ≤ τ OutAS ∈ {accepted, rejected} C IDb′ OutASOutAS S AS E(b′) ĨD Fig. 1: Authentication phase in a two-party biometric authentication system. using homomorphic encryption [20], garbled circuits =-=[21]-=- or oblivious transfer [22]. Figure 1 depicts the authentication phase of a biometric authentication system in a two party setting, between a client C and an authentication server AS. The client prese... |

509 | How iris recognition works,”
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Citation Context ... authenticated; otherwise she is rejected. Many biometric authentication protocols use straightforward choices for the distance, such as the Hamming distance [3, 4], the normalised Hamming distance ( =-=[5]-=- for iris recognition) and the Euclidean distance [6–9]. In these cases the matching process leaks information that could be exploited by an adversary to recover the stored template. More precisely, t... |

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Citation Context ...stance 2τ from each other. This corresponds to covering the space Zn2 with the smallest number of balls of radius τ . This corresponds to an instance of the well-known set-covering problem in a space =-=[25,26]-=-. More precisely, the optimal biometric sample recovery attack would involve the adversary covering Zn2 with a family F of balls of radius τ . At this point, the adversary needs to query the oracle (i... |

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Citation Context ...ances has also been investigated in other areas not relevant to biometric authentication. For example, the Hamming weight model has been employed in order to successfully perform side channel attacks =-=[16, 17]-=- (e.g. differential power analysis). It has been shown [16,17] that the power consumption of a device (e.g. a smart card) directly depends on the Hamming On the Leakage of Information in Biometric Aut... |

188 |
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Citation Context ...lar, it is always possible to disclose the original b given a matching b1. For instance, consider the case [4] where b, b1 P Zn2 , d “ dH is the Hamming distance and E and D are the Goldwasser-Micali =-=[23]-=- encryption and decryption functions, respectively. Then, dHpb, b1q “ HWpb ‘ bq1 “ HW pDpEpb‘ b1qqq “ HW pDpEpbq ˆ Epb1qqq, where HW denotes the Hamming weight of a vector, i.e. HWpxq “ řni“1 xi. In t... |

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Citation Context ... rejected} C IDb′ OutASOutAS S AS E(b′) ĨD Fig. 1: Authentication phase in a two-party biometric authentication system. using homomorphic encryption [20], garbled circuits [21] or oblivious transfer =-=[22]-=-. Figure 1 depicts the authentication phase of a biometric authentication system in a two party setting, between a client C and an authentication server AS. The client presents her fresh biometric and... |

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Citation Context ...n a predefined threshold, then the user is authenticated; otherwise she is rejected. Many biometric authentication protocols use straightforward choices for the distance, such as the Hamming distance =-=[3, 4]-=-, the normalised Hamming distance ( [5] for iris recognition) and the Euclidean distance [6–9]. In these cases the matching process leaks information that could be exploited by an adversary to recover... |

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Citation Context ...n a predefined threshold, then the user is authenticated; otherwise she is rejected. Many biometric authentication protocols use straightforward choices for the distance, such as the Hamming distance =-=[3, 4]-=-, the normalised Hamming distance ( [5] for iris recognition) and the Euclidean distance [6–9]. In these cases the matching process leaks information that could be exploited by an adversary to recover... |

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Citation Context ...ances has also been investigated in other areas not relevant to biometric authentication. For example, the Hamming weight model has been employed in order to successfully perform side channel attacks =-=[16, 17]-=- (e.g. differential power analysis). It has been shown [16,17] that the power consumption of a device (e.g. a smart card) directly depends on the Hamming On the Leakage of Information in Biometric Aut... |

22 | Optimal iris fuzzy sketches,
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Citation Context ...3. Firstly, 8 E. Pagnin, C. Dimitrakakis, A. Abidin, A. Mitrokotsa we consider biometric templates as binary vectors. This is for instance the case for iris recognition based biometric authentication =-=[5, 24]-=-. We begin by proving that any binary leaking distance can be written in terms of the Hamming distance. Theorem 1. Let d : Zn2 ˆ Zn2 Ñ Rě0 be a leaking distance on Zn2 . Then every d-ball corresponds ... |

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Citation Context ... (i.e. one client C and one authentication server AS, as depicted in Figure 1). However, our analysis naturally applies when more than two parties are involved in the biometric authentication process =-=[4, 18, 19]-=-. Due to privacy concerns, the biometric templates should be protected and not sent in the clear over the network. This implies that often the matching procedure is performed in the encrypted domain. ... |

11 | New analysis of the sphere covering problems and optimal polytope approximation of convex bodies
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Citation Context ...stance 2τ from each other. This corresponds to covering the space Zn2 with the smallest number of balls of radius τ . This corresponds to an instance of the well-known set-covering problem in a space =-=[25,26]-=-. More precisely, the optimal biometric sample recovery attack would involve the adversary covering Zn2 with a family F of balls of radius τ . At this point, the adversary needs to query the oracle (i... |

11 | Vulnerabilities in biometric encryption systems. In: Audio-and VideoBased Biometric Person Authentication. Volume 3546 of LNCS, Springer 1100–1109 A Appendix Below we provide the proof of Theorem 1: Proof. By hypothesis d is a leaking distance, hence it i - Adler |

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Citation Context ... (i.e. one client C and one authentication server AS, as depicted in Figure 1). However, our analysis naturally applies when more than two parties are involved in the biometric authentication process =-=[4, 18, 19]-=-. Due to privacy concerns, the biometric templates should be protected and not sent in the clear over the network. This implies that often the matching procedure is performed in the encrypted domain. ... |

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7 |
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Citation Context ...ecisely, the adversary could run an iterative process where he progressively changes the components of an arbitrary biometric template until acceptance. This strategy is known as hill-climbing attack =-=[10]-=-, due to similarity with the synonymous optimisation technique. When the initial template is an acceptable biometric trait (e.g. a fresh sample) this process is called centre search attack [10]. Recov... |

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5 |
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Citation Context ...ometric template may have serious impact since users cannot change their biometric features and biometric data may reveal very sensitive information (e.g. genetic [1] information and medical diseases =-=[2]-=-). 2 E. Pagnin, C. Dimitrakakis, A. Abidin, A. Mitrokotsa Biometric authentication protocols involve comparing fresh biometric data with a stored biometric template. The process is essentially perform... |

2 |
Dermatoglyphic topology. Nature 205
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...formed, any attack that recovers a biometric template may have serious impact since users cannot change their biometric features and biometric data may reveal very sensitive information (e.g. genetic =-=[1]-=- information and medical diseases [2]). 2 E. Pagnin, C. Dimitrakakis, A. Abidin, A. Mitrokotsa Biometric authentication protocols involve comparing fresh biometric data with a stored biometric templat... |

2 | M.: GSHADE: Faster Privacy-preserving Distance Computation and Biometric Identification - Bringer, Chabanne, et al. - 2014 |

1 |
K.: Blackbox security of biometrics
- Bringer, Chabanne, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...oy different matching processes. Furthermore, a recovered stored template could be used to find a match in criminal biometric template databases or even compromise health records [11]. Bringer et al. =-=[12]-=- presented a hill-climbing strategy that is successful even when a dedicated secure access module (e.g. smartcard) is used to perform the biometric authentication process. The matching process conside... |