Documents
Authors
Tables
Log in
Sign up
MetaCart
DMCA
Donate
Documents:
Advanced Search
Include Citations
Authors:
Advanced Search
Include Citations
Tables:
DMCA
Mechanism Theory (2001)
Cached
Download Links
[eecs.harvard.edu]
[www.eecs.harvard.edu]
[www.eecs.harvard.edu]
[www.stanford.edu]
[www.hss.caltech.edu]
[masada.hss.caltech.edu]
Save to List
Add to Collection
Correct Errors
Monitor Changes
by Matthew O. Jackson
Citations:
168 - 1 self
Summary
Citations
Active Bibliography
Co-citation
Clustered Documents
Version History
Citations
4224
Game Theory
- Fudenberg, Tirole - 1991
1605
Optimal auction design.
- Myerson - 1981
976
Multipart Pricing of Public Goods
- Clarke - 1971
786
Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players
- Harsanyi - 1968
778
Incentives in teams
- Groves - 1973
691
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Myerson, Satterthwaite - 1983
402
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Gibbard - 1973
360
Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem
- Myerson - 1979
307
Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods
- Green, Laffont - 1977
305
Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making,
- Moulin - 1988
282
Multiple-Object Auctions,”
- Weber - 1983
281
An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects.
- Ausubel - 1997
227
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation»,
- Mirrlees - 1971
219
Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Cr¶emer, McLean - 1985
216
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’
- Ledyard, Groves - 1977
213
Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Holmström, Myerson - 1983
192
Incentives and incomplete information
- d’Aspremont, Grard-Varet - 1979
184
Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
- Bagnoli, Lipman - 1987
176
Multiproduct nonlinear pricing.
- Armstrong - 1996
163
Full Extraction of Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Cr¶emer, McLean - 1988
142
On informationally decentralized systems
- Hurwicz - 1972
126
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Jehiel, Moldovanu
122
Asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents,”
- Mailath, Postlewaite - 1990
120
The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete
- Arrow - 1979
117
Dissolving a partnership efficiently
- Cramton, Gibbons, et al. - 1987
115
Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers,
- McAfee - 1993
106
Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design,”
- McAfee, McMillan - 1988
104
A dominant strategy double auction,
- McAfee - 1992
102
Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange”,
- Papai - 2000
81
Auctions and Privatization,”
- Maskin - 1992
78
Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness.
- Moulin - 1999
76
Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules,”
- Mookherjee, Reichelstein - 1992
69
An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions”, Social Choice and Welfare
- Barberà - 2001
67
Implementation in differential information economies.
- Postlewaite, Schmeidler - 1986
60
Correlated Information and Mechanism Design
- McAfee, Reny - 1992
57
Voting by committees
- Barberà, Sonnenschein, et al. - 1991
53
Bayesian Implementation”.
- JACKSON - 1991
51
Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Barberà, Gul, et al. - 1993
51
Incentives and Public Inputs
- Groves, Loeb - 1975
49
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Moulin - 1980
47
Straightforward elections, unanimity and phantom voters,Review of Economic Studies 50
- Border, Jordan - 1983
47
Serial Cost Sharing,"
- MOULIN, SHENKER - 1992
46
Implementation in environments with complete information.
- Moore - 1992
44
Groves’ scheme on restricted domains,”
- Holmström - 1979
42
Strategy-proof Voting Schemes with Continuous Preferences,Social Choice and Welfare 7
- Barberà, Peleg - 1990
40
Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- JACKSON, MOULIN - 1992
39
Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies”.
- PALFREY, SRIVASTAVA - 1989
38
Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusion, Review of Economic Studies 71, forthcoming
- Norman - 2004
37
The Rate at Which a Simple Market Converges to Efficiency as the Number of Traders Increases: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms,”
- Gresik, Satterthwaite - 1989
36
Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information,
- Gul, Postlewaite - 1992
35
Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations
- Makowski, Mezzetti - 1994
35
The loser’s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions.
- Pesendorfer, Swinkels - 1997
34
Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism.
- Moulin - 1986
32
Incentive compatibility since 1972. In:
- Groves, Ledyard - 1977
31
Robust trading mechanisms,”
- Hagerty, Rogerson - 1987
31
Incentive compatibility and incomplete information.
- Ledyard - 1978
30
Strategy-proof exchange.
- Barbera, Jackson - 1995
28
Bayesian Implementation
- Palfrey, Srivastava - 1993
27
A differential approach to dominant strategy mechanisms,
- Laffont, Maskin - 1980
24
Voting under constraints,
- Barberà, Massó, et al. - 1997
24
An alternative characterization of the uniform rule,
- Ching - 1994
23
Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies,
- Jackson, Manelli - 1997
22
Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions
- Corchón - 1996
21
Serial Cost Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Moulin - 1994
20
Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments
- Abdulkadiroùglu, Sönmez - 1998
20
Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms.
- d’Aspremont, Crémer, et al. - 1990
19
Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions with Costly Information,
- Jackson - 2002
19
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms", Review of Economic Studies
- LEDYARD, PALFREY - 1994
17
Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Barberà, Jackson, et al. - 1997
15
A general solution to King Solomon’s dilemma
- Perry, Reny - 1999
13
On the generic non-optimality of dominant strategy allocation mechanisms”, Econometrica
- Hurwicz, Walker - 1990
13
Vickrey-clarke-groves mechanisms and perfect competition
- Makowski, Ostroy - 1987
11
Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms,
- Kovalenkov - 2002
11
The Possibility of Efficient Mechanisms for Trading and Indivisible Object,”
- Makowski, Mezzetti - 1993
10
The optimal design of a market.
- Brusco, Jackson - 1999
10
Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations,
- Jackson - 1992
9
Unique Implementation of the Full Surplus Extraction Outcome in Auctions with Correlated types
- Brusco - 1998
7
Asymptotically Strategy-proof Walrasian Exchange," forthcoming
- Cordoba, Hammond - 1997
6
Strategy-proof division with singlepeaked preferences and individual endowments.
- Klaus, Peters, et al. - 1998
5
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms for Economies with an Indivisible Good
- Ohseto - 1999
4
Maximal domains and strategy-proofness in public good economies”,
- Berga - 1997
4
Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments
- Moreno - 1994
3
Efficient Allocation of a "Prize": King Solomon's Dilemma
- Glazer, Ma - 1989
3
E cient Collective Choice with Compensation
- Groves - 1977
3
E ciency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," forthcoming: American Economic Review
- Pesendorfer, Swinkels - 1995
2
2000), "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence
- A1-Najjar, Smorodinsky
2
Efficient Allocation of a "Pie": King Solomon's Dilemma
- Bag - 1996
2
Notes on Efficient Auctions," mimeo
- Dasgupta, Maskin - 1997
2
Mechanism design with collusion and correlation”Econometrica
- La¤ont, Martimort - 2000
2
E cient and Strategy-Proof Exchange with Leontief Preferences," mimeo: Universitat Autonoma de
- Nicolo - 1999
1
House Allocation with Existing Tenants, " forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory
- Abdulkadiroglu, Sonmez - 1999
1
Smorodinsky (2000), "Provision of a Public Good with Bounded Cost
- Al-Najjar, R
1
Asymptotic Revenue Equivalence in Auctions," mimeo: Caltech
- Bali, Jackson - 2000
1
A Crash Course in Implementation Theory ," Forthcoming in The Axiomatic Method: Principles and Applications to Game Theory and Resource Allocation, edited by
- Jackson - 1997
1
E cient Mechanism Design," mimeo: Hebrew University
- Krishna, Perry - 1998
1
Palfrey (2000), "A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
- Ledyard, T
1
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility, " mimeo
- McLean, Postlewaite - 1999
1
Mechanisms for Multilateral Trading and Fixed Prices," mimeo
- Miyagawa - 1999
1
Strategy-Proof Multiple-Assignment Using Quotas
- Papai - 2000
1
An Ex-Post Efficient Auction," mimeo
- Perry, Reny - 1999