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...ance’ techniques are able to handle or tolerate remaining faults. The strategies proposed by Lee and Anderson [LA90] are still valid and compliant with newer literature, for example, [ALR01], [BW01], =-=[Som01]-=-, and [SS98]. Techniques for fault avoidance, fault prevention, and fault tolerance are discussed in more detail in the Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.2.3. The focus of this thesis is on validation of the sy...

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...ues are able to handle or tolerate remaining faults. The strategies proposed by Lee and Anderson [LA90] are still valid and compliant with newer literature, for example, [ALR01], [BW01], [Som01], and =-=[SS98]-=-. Techniques for fault avoidance, fault prevention, and fault tolerance are discussed in more detail in the Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.2.3. The focus of this thesis is on validation of the system behavio...

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...). This work focuses on safety-related systems and subsystems which are called programmable electronic systems (PESs) in the standard [IEC98c, p. 25], or “computer systems” in other literature (e.g., =-=[Sto96]-=-). The importance of this safety life-cycle is that it takes diverse aspects of the realization of the system into account, and that it assigns a separates2.2. SAFETY-CRITICAL REAL-TIME SYSTEMS 17 6 O...

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...s to interact with its environment in real-time. The correctness of a real-time system depends not only on the logical result of the computation but also on the time at which the results are produced =-=[Sta88]-=- (see also [TBYS96, p. 18–19]). The point in time by which the result must be produced for the temporal behavior of the response to be correct is called deadline (see [Kop97, p. 2] and [KRPO93, p. 3-2...

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... be changed and the target (real-time) application is only interrupted in case of a fault (the authors measured interrupt latencies in the range from 1 µs to 5 µs for a PowerPC processor). FTAPE (see =-=[TIJ96]-=-) is for evaluating fault tolerance and performance of dependable systems. The fault injector is able to inject processor, memory, and I/O faults. The application software does not need to be changed ...

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....g., ANDgate, OR-gate, etc.) of the system in question, and faults are injected at this level, for example, as stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, or inversion. The tools MEFISTO (see [JAR + 94]) and VERIFY (see =-=[STB97]-=-) cover fault injection on the gate-level and are intended to support the development of dependable systems. A simulation at the functional level (or system-level) does not model certain details of th...

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...andard 61508 [IEC98a], [IEC00a], [IEC98b], [IEC98c], [IEC98d], [IEC00b], [IEC00c] and in other literature, for example, Storey [Sto96] discusses the draft of the IEC standard 61508 and the authors in =-=[SS01]-=- give a guideline to the IEC standard 61508. An example of a development process of safety-critical systems is described in [ADM + 00]. The authors present a “system-safety process for ‘bywire’ automo...

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... this thesis. This text includes only information relevant to this case study. For instance, the case study does not discuss the reliability of the BbW system architecture. This topic is discussed in =-=[TGO00]-=-. The authors discuss different fault-tolerant system architectures and compare these with respect to their reliability characteristics.s5.2. BRAKE-BY-WIRE SYSTEM 109 vSensRL actuatorRL vSensRR actuat...

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...d a brief explanation of relevant testing techniques and methods. Details are left to the literature, for example, [Bei90], [Bei95], [Dae97], [How87], [Jor95], [Mye79], [Mye01], [Per00], [Som01], and =-=[Tha94]-=-. The following selection and descriptions of techniques and methods are mainly based on recommendations for safety validation of software and systems in the IEC standard 61508 ([IEC00a], [IEC98b], an...