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## Induction in Philosophy and AI (0)

Venue: | Proc. ECAI'96 Workshop on Abductive and Inductive Reasoning |

Citations: | 1 - 0 self |

### Citations

1649 |
A logic for default reasoning
- Reiter
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... has lead to the formalisation of various forms of inductive reasoning in nonmonotonic logics. 3.1 Induction and nonmonotonic logic Nonmnonotonic logics, such as Circumscription [9] and Default Logic =-=[10]-=-, have been widely used to formalise inductive arguments; for example the Tweety argument and the commonsense laws of change and inertia. At first sight it seems that Circumscription can also be used ... |

964 |
Circumscription - a form of non-monotonic reasoning
- McCarthy
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...previous section. This has lead to the formalisation of various forms of inductive reasoning in nonmonotonic logics. 3.1 Induction and nonmonotonic logic Nonmnonotonic logics, such as Circumscription =-=[9]-=- and Default Logic [10], have been widely used to formalise inductive arguments; for example the Tweety argument and the commonsense laws of change and inertia. At first sight it seems that Circumscri... |

346 |
Knowledge in Flux
- Gärdenfors
- 1987
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Citation Context ...erved to date have been -- by ruling out the possiblity of there being other P 's. From a technical point of view the intended effect can be achieved by combining circumscription with belief revision =-=[4]-=-. For example, if T is the set of sentences resulting from circumscribing P in the above example, then in computing TsP (c)sc 6= asc 6= b, 8x(P (x) oe x = asx = b) is removed, 8x(P (x) oe Q(x)) is 2 r... |

23 | Rationality postulates for induction. In:
- Flach
- 1996
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Citation Context ...ensures that the the inductive consequence relation satisfies the following property: If \Theta j OE and \Theta [ fOEg j / then \Theta j /. Rationality postulates of this kind are considered by Flach =-=[3]-=-. Deciding on an appropriate set of postulates represents the logical problem of induction. Picking a particular consequence relation which satisfies the postulates -- picking a particular pragmatic f... |

18 |
Pragmatic logics.
- Bell
- 1991
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Citation Context ...l point of view as the circumscription step involves a suspension of belief in there being further P 's. 3.2 A general model-theoretic framework It is possible to use the idea of pragmatic entailment =-=[1, 2]-=- to give a general model-theoretic account of induction and abduction. Let L be a languageand I be the class of all models of L. A semantic meaning function is a function [[]] from L to I . Intuitivel... |

14 |
The Justification of Induction
- Swinburne
- 1974
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Citation Context ...s section provides a summary of some of the philosophical background of induction. It is largely based on Swinburne's introduction to his excellent collection of essays on the philosophy of induction =-=[12]. 2.1-=- Inductive arguments In the introduction Swinburne makes several important points about inductive reasoning. He begins by proposing the following definition: "An inductive argument is an argument... |

13 | Abductive Consequence Relations
- Lobo, Uzcátegui
- 1997
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Citation Context ...cular \Theta 0 such that \Theta [ \Theta 0 is consistent and \Theta [ \Theta 0 j= OE; where, intuitively, \Theta 0 represents the explanation (or explanations) for OE given \Theta. Lobo and Uzcategui =-=[8]-=- investigate the properties of abductive consequencerelations. Given an abductive task \Theta j OE and explanation(s) \Theta 0 for OE given \Theta (that is, \Theta [ \Theta 0 is consistent and \Theta ... |

10 |
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis:
- Hume
- 1748
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Citation Context ...e justification of induction For all is a woven web of guesses. Xenophanes An issue which is of central interest to philosophers is the justification of induction. This issue was first raised by Hume =-=[7]-=- pp.36-38, in his famous skeptical argument aimed at enumerative induction. Essentially this runs as follows: such arguments arise because we observe uniformities in nature--e.g. that all observed eme... |

6 |
andtrans. A Nietzsche Reader
- Hollingdale
- 1977
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Citation Context ...r, if it did not in general act as a regulator, mankind must have perished through its perverse judgements and waking phantasies, its superficiality and credulity, in short through its consciousness&q=-=uot; [6]-=-. 3 Induction in Artificial Intelligence While philosophers have largely beenconcernedwith the justification of inductive reasoning, AI researchers are largely concerned with its use. Apart from speci... |

5 | Pragmatic Reasoning; a Model-Based Theory
- Bell
- 1995
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...l point of view as the circumscription step involves a suspension of belief in there being further P 's. 3.2 A general model-theoretic framework It is possible to use the idea of pragmatic entailment =-=[1, 2]-=- to give a general model-theoretic account of induction and abduction. Let L be a languageand I be the class of all models of L. A semantic meaning function is a function [[]] from L to I . Intuitivel... |

3 |
On Induction
- Russell
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... strike.) We judge that the premisses make it reasonable for us to accept the conclusion, even though no contradiction is involved in asserting the premisses and denying the conclusion", p.1. Rus=-=sell [11]-=- explains that inferences of this kind are based on past regularities in our experience which lead us to associate certain outcomes with experiences rather than others, and he notes that this kind of ... |

1 |
Fact, Fiction and Forecast (first edition
- Goodman
- 1955
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ey are enumerative. He argues that this is not a necessary condition; as there are correct inductive arguments which are not of this form. Neither is it sufficient; as Nelson Goodman's famous paradox =-=[5] show-=-s. (Swinburne states this as follows: "Suppose that all emeralds observed so far have been green. We can conclude by enumerative induction that all emeralds (future as well as past) are green. Bu... |