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## Harvard Business School, Harvard (2009)

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### Citations

983 |
Auction Theory.
- Krishna
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...on we show that a competitive equilibrium 1 In [5] this auction is referred to as the the exact auction mechanism. 2 It is well-known that in the case of budget ties (see Che and Gale [3] and Krishna =-=[8]-=-) that the second price auction with budget constraints is not truthful. In this auction the winner is the bidder with the maximal “bid” min(vi, bi) and he and pays the second highest bid. We show tha... |

703 | Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game Theoretic Modelling and Analysis
- Roth, Sotomayor
- 1990
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...with budgets constrained bidders which is incentive compatible and outputs a competitive equilibrium must output the one with the minimal competitive prices. 1.1 Related Literature Roth and Sotomayor =-=[9]-=- consider the setting of two sided matching without contracts. They show that every mechanism which produces a stable matching, in which it is dominant for the men to be truthful, must output the men ... |

304 |
M.: The assignment game I: The core
- Shapley, Shubik
- 1971
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...hich always outputs a competitive equilibrium (envy free) must coincide with the DGS auction. 1 Introduction In a unit demand auction each bidder is interested in at most one item. Shapley and Shubik =-=[10]-=- showed that there exists a competitive equilibrium in this setting. Moreover, they showed that among all competitive prices there is a unique vector of competitive prices which is minimal, i.e. point... |

206 |
Multi-item auctions.
- Demange, Gale, et al.
- 1986
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...usiness School, Harvard Avinatan Hassidim MIT September 2009 Mark Braverman Microsoft Research, New England Abstract We show that the the unit demand auction introduced by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor =-=[5]-=- is incentive compatible even when bidders have budget constraints. Furthermore we show that myopic bidding is an ex post equilibrium. Finally, we show that any other incentive compatible which always... |

150 | Ascending auctions with package bidding.
- Ausubel, Milgrom
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...y ti, t ′ i in which si(ti) = si(t ′ i ) (i is assigned the same item), pi(ti) = pi(t ′ i ) (i pays the same price). 9 Consistent strategies can be thought of bidding through a proxy bidder (see e.g. =-=[2]-=-). 7Proof. Fix some type ti = (vi, bi) in which bidder i is assigned an item x ∈ K and let ˆti = (˜vi, ˜bi) be the type obtained by ti by letting ˜vi(x) = vi(x), ˜vi(y) = 0 for all other items, and ˜... |

115 |
Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders.”
- Che, Gale
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...endence assumption we show that a competitive equilibrium 1 In [5] this auction is referred to as the the exact auction mechanism. 2 It is well-known that in the case of budget ties (see Che and Gale =-=[3]-=- and Krishna [8]) that the second price auction with budget constraints is not truthful. In this auction the winner is the bidder with the maximal “bid” min(vi, bi) and he and pays the second highest ... |

91 |
Matching with Contracts.
- Hatfield, Milgrom
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...d by the Deferred Acceptance algorithm in which the men propose. Thus, our uniqueness result can be viewed as a generalization of their uniqueness result. Building on their work, Hatfiled and Milgrom =-=[7]-=- give a theoretical framework that unifies unit demand auctions and two sided matching, called “matching with contracts”. In their setting the two sides are hospitals and doctors, and each doctor can ... |

62 |
The strategy structure of two-sided matching markets.
- Demange, Gale
- 1985
(Show Context)
Citation Context ..., they showed that among all competitive prices there is a unique vector of competitive prices which is minimal, i.e. pointwise smaller than every other vector of competitive prices. Demange and Gale =-=[4]-=- further showed that the direct auction that outputs a competitive equilibrium with the minimal competitive prices is incentive compatible. Demange et. al [5] introduced a dynamic ascending auction, w... |

62 | Multi-unit auctions with budget limits - Dobzinski, Lavi, et al. - 2008 |

24 | Position auctions with budgets: Existence and uniqueness.
- Ashlagi, Braverman, et al.
- 2010
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... revenue. To summarize, our main contributions are (i) uniqueness - the stable outcome produced by the (generalized) deferred acceptance is the the only possible outcome for stable and incentive 3 In =-=[1]-=- the authors describe an incentive compatible auction for the special case of position auctions in which this result does not hold. 2compatible (ii) showing that in the dynamic setting myopic bidding... |