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## 1 Charging Games in Networks of Electrical Vehicles

Citations: | 1 - 1 self |

### Citations

846 | Worst-case equilibria
- Koutsoupias, Papadimitriou
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...us and less symmetry is available which makes both the cost/utility functions and constraints different. One of the consequences of this is that a notion of ”efficiency” close to the price of anarchy =-=[10]-=- of the game considered in this paper cannot be upper bounded by using classical results such as [11]. In this paper, two versions of the considered charging game will be studied, namely : an atomic v... |

591 | Algorithmic Game Theory
- Nisan, Roughgarden, et al.
- 2007
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Citation Context ...n Ass.1-2 hold for fGrid, Prop.6 applies and their Nash equilibrium concide which concludes the proof. Tight bounds have been determined for the standard notion of Price of Anarchy in congestion games=-=[15]-=-, with the standard definition based on total cost weighted by the number of users choosing each alternative. For example, in the case of quadratic cost functions with nonnegative coefficients, the pr... |

589 | Potential games
- Monderer, Shapley
- 1996
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Citation Context ...of Nash equilibrium (the reader could refer to [13] for a reminder of this concept). Remarkably, although the game under investigation is not a congestion game, it is always an ordinal potential game =-=[14]-=- and can also be an exact potential game in some special cases. It thus inherit many favorable properties described in the seminal work of [14]. Let us state the first Proposition. Proposition 1: The ... |

217 | Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
- Orda, Rom, et al.
- 1993
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... as a set of available facilities ”simultaneously”. However, since several facilities can be exploited, it is not a congestion game in the sense of Rosenthal [8]. The closest model is rather given by =-=[9]-=-. The latter is concerned with the more general scenario in which each user can split its demand between several facilities (called ”parallel links” in [9]). The main technical differences between the... |

63 | Agent-based micro-storage management for the smart grid. In:
- Vytelingum, TD, et al.
- 2010
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ch a problem is given by non-cooperative games. It is quite recent that gametheoretic tools have been applied to smart grids (see e.g., [2] for a recent survey). Interesting contributions include [3]–=-=[7]-=-. As far as the problem of charging is concerned, the authors of [4] show the usefulness of a well-chosen pricing policy to incite users to charge their vehicle in order to regulate frequency of the d... |

48 | Methodologies for analyzing equilibria in wireless games,”
- Lasaulce, Altman
- 2009
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...IC CHARGING GAME : PROPOSED FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULTS A. Game description The problem described in the preceding section is modeled by a static non-cooperative game under strategic form (see e.g., =-=[12]-=-[13]). The game can therefore be described mathematically by a triplet GA = (I, {Si}i∈I , {ui}i∈I) whose components are defined as follows : • the set of players is given by the set of electrical vehi... |

43 |
Coordinated charging of multiple plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in residential distribution grids.
- Clement, Haesen, et al.
- 2009
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...r instance, the former is typically about 3 kW at home while the latter is about 6 kW (or kVA to be more precise). This shows the importance of scheduling in an appropriate manner the charging period =-=[1]-=-. This is precisely what this paper is about. As the decision to plug the EV to the network and to start charging belongs to the vehicle owner, the problem is naturally distributed. This is one of the... |

37 |
Autonomous Demand Side Management Based on Game Theoretic Energy Consumption Scheduling for the Future Smart Grid,”
- Mohsenian-Rad, Wong, et al.
- 2010
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... is concerned, the authors of [4] show the usefulness of a well-chosen pricing policy to incite users to charge their vehicle in order to regulate frequency of the distribution network. References [5]=-=[6]-=- used O. Beaude is with L2S, Renault, and Supelec, France ; S. Lasaulce is with CNRS, L2S, France ; M. Hennebel is with Supelec, France. E-mail @ : olivier.beaude@lss.supelec.fr, lasaulce@lss.supelec.... |

33 |
Game Theory and Learning for Wireless Networks: Fundamentals and Applications, 1st ed
- Lasaulce, Tembine
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...HARGING GAME : PROPOSED FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULTS A. Game description The problem described in the preceding section is modeled by a static non-cooperative game under strategic form (see e.g., [12]=-=[13]-=-). The game can therefore be described mathematically by a triplet GA = (I, {Si}i∈I , {ui}i∈I) whose components are defined as follows : • the set of players is given by the set of electrical vehicles... |

24 |
Stier-Moses. Selfish routing in capacitated networks
- Correa, Schulz, et al.
- 2004
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...nt. One of the consequences of this is that a notion of ”efficiency” close to the price of anarchy [10] of the game considered in this paper cannot be upper bounded by using classical results such as =-=[11]-=-. In this paper, two versions of the considered charging game will be studied, namely : an atomic version which assumes a finite number of EV ; a nonatomic version where only fractions of users (those... |

12 | Wind Power Integration via Aggregator-Consumer Coordination: A Game Theoretic Approach,” Innovative Smart Grid Technologies,
- Wu, Mohsenian-Rad, et al.
- 2012
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e such a problem is given by non-cooperative games. It is quite recent that gametheoretic tools have been applied to smart grids (see e.g., [2] for a recent survey). Interesting contributions include =-=[3]-=-–[7]. As far as the problem of charging is concerned, the authors of [4] show the usefulness of a well-chosen pricing policy to incite users to charge their vehicle in order to regulate frequency of t... |

9 | Game theoretic methods for the smart grid,”
- Saad, Han, et al.
- 2012
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...of the reasons why a reasonable mathematical model to analyze such a problem is given by non-cooperative games. It is quite recent that gametheoretic tools have been applied to smart grids (see e.g., =-=[2]-=- for a recent survey). Interesting contributions include [3]–[7]. As far as the problem of charging is concerned, the authors of [4] show the usefulness of a well-chosen pricing policy to incite users... |

5 |
Noncooperative games for autonomous consumer load balancing over smart grid
- Agarwal, Cui
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ing is concerned, the authors of [4] show the usefulness of a well-chosen pricing policy to incite users to charge their vehicle in order to regulate frequency of the distribution network. References =-=[5]-=-[6] used O. Beaude is with L2S, Renault, and Supelec, France ; S. Lasaulce is with CNRS, L2S, France ; M. Hennebel is with Supelec, France. E-mail @ : olivier.beaude@lss.supelec.fr, lasaulce@lss.supel... |

2 |
interaction game,” Smart Grid
- “Vehicle-to-aggregator
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...hat gametheoretic tools have been applied to smart grids (see e.g., [2] for a recent survey). Interesting contributions include [3]–[7]. As far as the problem of charging is concerned, the authors of =-=[4]-=- show the usefulness of a well-chosen pricing policy to incite users to charge their vehicle in order to regulate frequency of the distribution network. References [5][6] used O. Beaude is with L2S, R... |