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Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions
, 2001
"... We investigate cost-sharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link o ..."
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Cited by 284 (16 self)
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We investigate cost-sharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link of the multicast tree, while we give evidence that the latter requires a quadratic total number of messages. We also show that the welfare value achieved by an optimal multicast tree is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor, even for bounded-degree networks. The lower-bound proof for the Shapley value uses a novel algebraic technique for bounding from below the number of messages exchanged in a distributed computation; this technique may prove useful in other contexts as well.
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions
, 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
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Cited by 283 (24 self)
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.
Making Greed Work in Networks: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Switch Service Disciplines
- IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING
, 1994
"... This paper discusses congestion control from a game-theoretic perspective. There are two basic premises: (1) users are assumed to be independent and selfish, and (2) central administrative control is exercised only at the network switches. The operating points resulting from selfish user behavior ..."
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Cited by 220 (11 self)
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This paper discusses congestion control from a game-theoretic perspective. There are two basic premises: (1) users are assumed to be independent and selfish, and (2) central administrative control is exercised only at the network switches. The operating points resulting from selfish user behavior depend crucially on the service disciplines implemented in network switches. This effect is investigated in a simple model consisting of a single exponential server shared by many Poisson sources. We discuss the extent to which one can guarantee, through the choice of switch service disciplines, that these selfish operating points will be efficient and fair. We also discuss to what extent the choice of switch service disciplines can ensure that these selfish operating points are unique and are easily and rapidly accessible by simple self-optimization techniques. We show that no service discipline can guarantee optimal efficiency. As for the other properties, we show that the traditio...
Competitive Routing in Multi-User Communication Networks
- IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
, 1993
"... We consider a communication network shared by several selfish users. Each user seeks to optimize its own performance by controlling the routing of its given flow demand, giving rise to a non-cooperative game. We investigate the Nash equilibrium of such systems. For a two-node multiple-links system, ..."
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Cited by 219 (23 self)
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We consider a communication network shared by several selfish users. Each user seeks to optimize its own performance by controlling the routing of its given flow demand, giving rise to a non-cooperative game. We investigate the Nash equilibrium of such systems. For a two-node multiple-links system, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is proved under reasonable convexity conditions. It is shown that this Nash equilibrium point possesses interesting monotonicity properties. For general networks, these convexity conditions are not sufficient for guaranteeing uniqueness, and a counter example is presented. Nonetheless, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for general topologies is established under various assumptions. Also with Sun Microsystems, Mountain View, CA 1 1 Introduction Traditional computer networks were designed with a single administrative domain in mind. That is, the network is designed and operated as a single entity with a single control objective. A single control object...
An introduction to collective intelligence
- Handbook of Agent technology. AAAI
, 1999
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Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems
- Market Based Control of Distributed Systems. World Scientific
, 1996
"... With the advances in computer and networking technology, thousands of heterogeneous com-puters can be interconnected to provide a large collection of computing and communication resources. These systems are used by agrowing and increasingly heterogeneous set of users. ..."
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Cited by 118 (2 self)
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With the advances in computer and networking technology, thousands of heterogeneous com-puters can be interconnected to provide a large collection of computing and communication resources. These systems are used by agrowing and increasingly heterogeneous set of users.
Selfish behavior and stability of the internet: A game-theoretic analysis of tcp
- Proceedings of SIGCOMM
, 2002
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An Approach to Pricing, Optimal Allocation and Quality of Service Provisioning In High-Speed Packet Networks
- IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE INFOCOM
, 1995
"... In this paper, we propose a new methodology based on economic models to provide Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees to competing traffic classes (classes of sessions) in packet networks. We consider an economic model of a packet network where resources are priced. Traffic classes compete for network ..."
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Cited by 73 (2 self)
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In this paper, we propose a new methodology based on economic models to provide Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees to competing traffic classes (classes of sessions) in packet networks. We consider an economic model of a packet network where resources are priced. Traffic classes compete for network resources and they purchase them to satisfy their QoS needs. Our contributions are the following: 1) We provide a new definition for QoS provisioning based on economic models (Pareto efficiency). 2) We obtain the set of optimal resource allocations (Pareto optimal) which provide QoS guarantees to competing traffic classes. 3) We show the impact on equilibrium prices and optimal allocations due to traffic load and variability, and QoS requirements. 4) We propose packet scheduling and admission policies to provide QoS guarantees to traffic classes based on available QoS and prices in the network.
Pricing Network Resources for Adaptive Applications in a Differentiated Services Network
, 2001
"... The Differentiated Services framework (DiffServ) has been proposed to provide multiple Quality of Service (QoS) classes over IP networks. A network supporting multiple classes of service also requires a differentiated pricing structure. We propose a pricing scheme in a DiffServ environment based on ..."
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Cited by 60 (2 self)
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The Differentiated Services framework (DiffServ) has been proposed to provide multiple Quality of Service (QoS) classes over IP networks. A network supporting multiple classes of service also requires a differentiated pricing structure. We propose a pricing scheme in a DiffServ environment based on the cost of providing different levels of quality of service to different classes, and on long-term demand. Pricing of network services dynamically based on the level of service, usage, and congestion allows a more competitive price to be offered, allows the network to be used more efficiently, and provides a natural and equitable incentive for applications to adapt their service contract according to network conditions. We develop a DiffServ simulation framework to compare the performance of a network supporting congestion-sensitive pricing and adaptive service negotiation to that of a network with a static pricing policy. Adaptive users adapt to price changes by adjusting their sending rate or selecting a different service class. We also develop the demand behavior of adaptive users based on a perceptually reasonable user utility function. Simulation results show that a congestion-sensitive pricing policy coupled with user rate adaptation is able to control congestion and allow a service class to meet its performance assurances under large or bursty offered loads, even without explicit admission control. Users are able to maintain a stable expenditure. Allowing users to migrate between service classes in response to price increases further stabilizes the individual service prices. When admission control is enforced, congestion-sensitive pricing still provides an advantage in terms of a much lower connection blocking rate at high loads. I.
Quality of Service Provision in Noncooperative Networks: Heterogenous Preferences, Multi-Dimensional QoS Vectors, and Burstiness
- In Proc. 1st International Conference on Information and Computation Economies
, 1998
"... This paper studies the quality of service (QoS) provision problem in noncooperative networks where applications or users are selfish and routers implement generalized processor sharing (GPS)-based packet scheduling. First, we formulate a model of QoS provision in noncooperative networks where users ..."
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Cited by 48 (9 self)
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This paper studies the quality of service (QoS) provision problem in noncooperative networks where applications or users are selfish and routers implement generalized processor sharing (GPS)-based packet scheduling. First, we formulate a model of QoS provision in noncooperative networks where users are given the freedom to choose both the service classes and traffic volume allocated, and heterogenous QoS preferences are captured by individual utility functions. We present a comprehensive analysis of the noncooperative multi-class QoS provision game, giving a complete characterization of Nash equilibria and their existence criteria, and show under what conditions they are Pareto and system optimal. We show that, in general, Nash equilibria need not exist, and when they do exist, they need not be Pareto nor system optimal. However, we show that for certain "resource-plentiful" systems, the world indeed can be nice with Nash equilibria, Pareto optima, and system optima collapsing into a s...
