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Ad hoc-VCG: A truthful and cost-efficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish agents
, 2003
"... We introduce a game-theoretic setting for routing in a mobile ad hoc network that consists of greedy, selfish agents who accept payments for forwarding data for other agents if the payments cover their individual costs incurred by forwarding data. In this setting, we propose Ad hoc-VCG, a reactive r ..."
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Cited by 234 (8 self)
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We introduce a game-theoretic setting for routing in a mobile ad hoc network that consists of greedy, selfish agents who accept payments for forwarding data for other agents if the payments cover their individual costs incurred by forwarding data. In this setting, we propose Ad hoc-VCG, a reactive routing protocol that achieves the design objectives of truthfulness (i.e., it is in the agents ’ best interest to reveal their true costs for forwarding data) and cost-efficiency (i.e., it guarantees that routing is done along the most costefficient path) in a game-theoretic sense by paying to the intermediate nodes a premium over their actual costs for forwarding data packets. We show that the total overpayment (i.e., the sum of all premiums paid) is relatively small by giving a theoretical upper bound and by providing experimental evidence. Our routing protocol implements a variation of the well-known mechanism by Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves in a mobile network setting. Finally, we analyze a very natural routing protocol that is an adaptation of the Packet Purse Model [8] with auctions in our setting and show that, unfortunately, it does not achieve cost-efficiency or truthfulness
On Designing Incentive-Compatible Routing and Forwarding Protocols in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks --An Integrated Approach Using Game Theoretical and Cryptographic Techniques
, 2005
"... In many applications, wireless ad-hoc networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, a challenging problem is how to provide incentives to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we study ad-hoc games—the routing and packet forwarding games in wireless ad-hoc networks. Unlik ..."
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Cited by 126 (12 self)
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In many applications, wireless ad-hoc networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, a challenging problem is how to provide incentives to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we study ad-hoc games—the routing and packet forwarding games in wireless ad-hoc networks. Unlike previous work which focuses either on routing or on forwarding, this paper investigates both routing and forwarding. We first uncover an impossibility result—there does not exist a protocol such that following the protocol to always forward others’ traffic is a dominant action. Then we define a novel solution concept called cooperation optimal protocols. We present Corsac, a cooperation-optimal protocol consisting of a routing protocol and a forwarding protocol. The routing protocol of Corsac integrates VCG with a novel cryptographic technique to address the challenge in wireless ad-hoc networks
Market Sharing Games Applied to Content Distribution in Ad-Hoc Networks
- MOBIHOC'04
, 2004
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On the topologies formed by selfish peers
- In PODC ’06
"... Current peer-to-peer (P2P) systems often suffer from a large fraction of freeriders not contributing any resources to the network. Various mechanisms have been designed to overcome this problem. However, the selfish behavior of peers has aspects which go beyond resource sharing. This paper studies t ..."
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Cited by 54 (5 self)
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Current peer-to-peer (P2P) systems often suffer from a large fraction of freeriders not contributing any resources to the network. Various mechanisms have been designed to overcome this problem. However, the selfish behavior of peers has aspects which go beyond resource sharing. This paper studies the effects on the topology of a P2P network if peers selfishly select the peers to connect to. In our model, a peer exploits locality properties in order to minimize the latency (or response times) of its lookup operations. At the same time, the peer aims at not having to maintain links to too many other peers in the system. We show that the resulting topologies can be much worse than if peers collaborated. Moreover, the network may never stabilize, even in the absence of churn. 1
On designing collusion-resistant routing schemes for non-cooperative wireless ad hoc networks
- of Shanghai Jiaotong University, China. He
, 1996
"... In wireless ad hoc networks, routing requires cooperation of nodes. Since nodes often belong to different users, it is highly important to provide incentives for them to co-operate. However, most existing studies of the incentive-compatible routing problem focus on individual nodes ’ in-centives, as ..."
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Cited by 40 (12 self)
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In wireless ad hoc networks, routing requires cooperation of nodes. Since nodes often belong to different users, it is highly important to provide incentives for them to co-operate. However, most existing studies of the incentive-compatible routing problem focus on individual nodes ’ in-centives, assuming that no subset of them would collude. Clearly, this assumption is not always valid. In this pa-per, we present a systematic study of collusion resistance in incentive-compatible routing schemes. In particular, we con-sider two standard solution concepts for collusion resistance in game theory, namely Group Strategyproofness and Strong Nash Equilibrium. We show that achieving Group Strate-gyproofness is impossible while achieving Strong Nash Equi-librium is possible. More specifically, we design a scheme that is guaranteed to converge to a Strong Nash Equilib-rium. In addition, we give a cryptographic method that prevents profit transfer between colluding nodes, as long as they do not fully trust each other unconditionally. This method makes our scheme widely applicable in practice. Ex-periments show that our solution is collusion-resistant and has good performance.
The COMMIT Protocol for Truthful and Cost-Efficient Routing in Ad Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes
"... Abstract—We consider the problem of establishing a route and sending packets between a source/destination pair in ad hoc networks composed of rational selfish nodes whose purpose is to maximize their own utility. In order to motivate nodes to follow the protocol specification, we use side payments t ..."
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Cited by 17 (0 self)
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Abstract—We consider the problem of establishing a route and sending packets between a source/destination pair in ad hoc networks composed of rational selfish nodes whose purpose is to maximize their own utility. In order to motivate nodes to follow the protocol specification, we use side payments that are made to the forwarding nodes. Our goal is to design a fully distributed algorithm such that 1) a node is always better off participating in the protocol execution (individual rationality), 2) a node is always better off behaving according to the protocol specification (truthfulness), 3) messages are routed along the most energy-efficient (least cost) path, and 4) the message complexity is reasonably low. We introduce the COMMIT protocol for individually rational, truthful, and energy-efficient routing in ad hoc networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ad hoc routing protocol with these features. COMMIT is based on the VCG payment scheme in conjunction with a novel game-theoretic technique to achieve truthfulness for the sender node. By means of simulation, we show that the inevitable economic inefficiency is small. As an aside, our work demonstrates the advantage of using a cross-layer approach to solving problems: Leveraging the existence of an underlying topology control protocol, we are able to simplify the design and analysis of our routing protocol and reduce its message complexity. On the other hand, our investigation of the routing problem in the presence of selfish nodes disclosed a new metric under which topology control protocols can be evaluated: the cost of cooperation. Index Terms—Wireless ad hoc networks, cooperation in ad hoc networks, cooperative routing, energy efficiency, topology control. Ç 1
and R.P.Gilles, “Effect of Selfish Node Behavior on Efficient Topology Design
- IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING
, 2008
"... Abstract—The problem of topology control is to assign per-node transmission power such that the resulting topology is energy efficient and satisfies certain global properties such as connectivity. The conventional approach to achieve these objectives is based on the fundamental assumption that nodes ..."
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Cited by 12 (4 self)
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Abstract—The problem of topology control is to assign per-node transmission power such that the resulting topology is energy efficient and satisfies certain global properties such as connectivity. The conventional approach to achieve these objectives is based on the fundamental assumption that nodes are socially responsible. We examine the following question: if nodes behave in a selfish manner, how does it impact the overall connectivity and energy consumption in the resulting topologies? We pose the above problem as a noncooperative game and use game-theoretic analysis to address it. We study Nash equilibrium properties of the topology control game and evaluate the efficiency of the induced topology when nodes employ a greedy best response algorithm. We show that even when the nodes have complete information about the network, the steady-state topologies are suboptimal. We propose a modified algorithm based on a better response dynamic and show that this algorithm is guaranteed to converge to energy-efficient and connected topologies. Moreover, the node transmit power levels are more evenly distributed, and the network performance is comparable to that obtained from centralized algorithms.
Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics
, 2008
"... We consider a network formation game where a finite number of nodes wish to send traffic to each other. Nodes contract bilaterally with each other to form bidirectional communication links; once the network is formed, traffic is routed along shortest paths (if possible). Cost is incurred to a node ..."
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Cited by 10 (2 self)
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We consider a network formation game where a finite number of nodes wish to send traffic to each other. Nodes contract bilaterally with each other to form bidirectional communication links; once the network is formed, traffic is routed along shortest paths (if possible). Cost is incurred to a node from four sources: (1) routing traffic; (2) maintaining links to other nodes; (3) disconnection from destinations the node wishes to reach; and (4) payments made to other nodes. We assume that a network is stable if no single node wishes to unilaterally deviate, and no pair of nodes can profitably deviate together (a variation on the notion of pairwise stability). We study such a game under a form of myopic best response dynamics. In choosing their best strategy, nodes optimize their single period payoff only. We characterize a simple set of assumptions under which these dynamics will converge to a pairwise stable network topology; we also characterize an important special case, where the dynamics converge to a star centered at a node with minimum cost for routing traffic. In this sense, our dynamics naturally select an efficient equilibrium. Further, we show that these assumptions are satisfied by a contractual model motivated by bilateral Rubinstein bargaining with infinitely patient players.
Non-cooperative Facility Location and Covering Games
"... We consider a general class of non-cooperative games related to combinatorial covering and facility location problems. A game is based on an integer programming formulation of the corresponding optimization problem, and each of the k players wants to satisfy a subset of the constraints. For that pur ..."
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Cited by 7 (1 self)
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We consider a general class of non-cooperative games related to combinatorial covering and facility location problems. A game is based on an integer programming formulation of the corresponding optimization problem, and each of the k players wants to satisfy a subset of the constraints. For that purpose, resources available in integer units must be bought, and their cost can be shared arbitrarily between players. We consider the existence and cost of exact and approximate pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In general, prices of anarchy and stability are in Θ(k) and deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard. Under certain conditions, however, cheap Nash equilibria exist, in particular if the integrality gap of the underlying integer program is 1, or in the case of single constraint players. We also present algorithms that compute simultaneously near-stable and near-optimal approximate Nash equilibria in polynomial time.
Network Creation Games with Disconnected Equilibria
, 2008
"... In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) [11] to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For each edge a player must pay a cost α, and the individual ..."
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Cited by 6 (2 self)
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In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) [11] to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For each edge a player must pay a cost α, and the individual cost for a player represents a trade-off between edge costs and shortest path lengths to all other players. We extend the model to a penalized game (PCG), for which we reduce the penalty for a pair of disconnected players to a finite value β. We prove that the PCG is not a potential game, but pure Nash equilibria always exist, and pure strong equilibria exist in many cases. We provide tight conditions under which disconnected (strong) Nash equilibria can evolve. Components of these equilibria must be (strong) Nash equilibria of a smaller NCG. But in contrast to the NCG, for the vast majority of parameter values no tree is a stable component. Finally, we show that the price of anarchy is Θ(n), several orders of magnitude larger than in the NCG. Perhaps surprisingly, the price of anarchy for strong equilibria increases only to at most 4.
