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22
On designing collusion-resistant routing schemes for non-cooperative wireless ad hoc networks
- of Shanghai Jiaotong University, China. He
, 1996
"... In wireless ad hoc networks, routing requires cooperation of nodes. Since nodes often belong to different users, it is highly important to provide incentives for them to co-operate. However, most existing studies of the incentive-compatible routing problem focus on individual nodes ’ in-centives, as ..."
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Cited by 40 (12 self)
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In wireless ad hoc networks, routing requires cooperation of nodes. Since nodes often belong to different users, it is highly important to provide incentives for them to co-operate. However, most existing studies of the incentive-compatible routing problem focus on individual nodes ’ in-centives, assuming that no subset of them would collude. Clearly, this assumption is not always valid. In this pa-per, we present a systematic study of collusion resistance in incentive-compatible routing schemes. In particular, we con-sider two standard solution concepts for collusion resistance in game theory, namely Group Strategyproofness and Strong Nash Equilibrium. We show that achieving Group Strate-gyproofness is impossible while achieving Strong Nash Equi-librium is possible. More specifically, we design a scheme that is guaranteed to converge to a Strong Nash Equilib-rium. In addition, we give a cryptographic method that prevents profit transfer between colluding nodes, as long as they do not fully trust each other unconditionally. This method makes our scheme widely applicable in practice. Ex-periments show that our solution is collusion-resistant and has good performance.
Design multicast protocols for non-cooperative networks,”
- IEEE INFOCOM.
, 2005
"... Abstract-Conventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities are selfish: they will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contributing t ..."
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Cited by 15 (8 self)
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Abstract-Conventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities are selfish: they will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contributing to the network by following the prescribed protocols. Thus, new protocols should be designed for the non-cooperative network that is composed of selfish entities. In this paper, we specifically show how to design truthful multicast protocols for non-cooperative networks such that these selfish entities will follow the protocols out of their own interests. By assuming that every entity has a fixed cost for a specific multicast, we give a general framework to decide whether it is possible and how, if possible, to transform an existing multicast protocol to a truthful multicast protocol by designing a proper payment protocol. We then show how the payments to those relay entities are shared fairly among all receivers so that it encourages collaboration among receivers. As running examples, we show how to design truthful multicast protocols for several multicast structures that are currently used in practice. We also conduct extensive simulations to study the relation between the payment and the cost of the multicast structure. Our simulations show that multicast not only saves the total resources, but also benefits the individual receiver even in selfish networks.
Dealing With Selfishness and Moral Hazard in Non-Cooperative Wireless Networks
, 2008
"... For non-cooperative networks in which each node is a selfish agent, certain incentives must be given to intermediate nodes to let them forward the data for others. What makes the scenario worse is that, in a multi-hop non-cooperative network, the endpoints can only observe whether or not the end-to ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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For non-cooperative networks in which each node is a selfish agent, certain incentives must be given to intermediate nodes to let them forward the data for others. What makes the scenario worse is that, in a multi-hop non-cooperative network, the endpoints can only observe whether or not the end-to-end transaction was successful or not, but not the individual actions of intermediate nodes. Thus, in the absence of properly designed incentive schemes, rational and selfish intermediate nodes may choose to forward data packets at a very low priority or simply drop the packets, and they could put the blame on the unreliable channel. In this paper, assuming the receiver is a trusted authority, we propose several methods that discourage the hidden actions under hidden information in multi-hop noncooperative networks with high probability. We design several algorithmic mechanisms for a number of routing scenarios such that each selfish agent will maximize its expected utility (i.e., profit) when it truthfully declares its type (i.e., cost and its actions) and it truthfully follows its declared actions. Our simulations show that the payments by our mechanisms are only slightly larger than the actual cost incurred by all intermediate nodes.
Low-Cost Truthful Multicast in Selfish and Rational Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
"... It is conventionally assumed that all wireless devices will follow some prescribed routing protocols without any deviation. However, the scarce resources in wireless devices raise a concern about this assumption. Most often, the owners of wireless devices will try to manipulate the protocols for it ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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It is conventionally assumed that all wireless devices will follow some prescribed routing protocols without any deviation. However, the scarce resources in wireless devices raise a concern about this assumption. Most often, the owners of wireless devices will try to manipulate the protocols for its own benefit, instead of faithfully following the protocols. Therefore, some new protocols intended for selfish and rational wireless devices need to be designed. In this paper, we specifically study the multicast in selfish and rational wireless ad hoc networks. By assuming that each wireless node has a private cost of forwarding data for other nodes, we give an efficient method to construct a multicast tree, namely VMST, whose cost is 5-approximation of the optimum multicast tree cost for homogeneous wireless networks modelled by unit disk graph. Based on VMST, we design a truthful payment scheme that pays minimum for any relay node among all truthful payment schemes based on VMST. We also conduct extensive experiments to study the practical performances of proposed protocol.
Hiddenaction in network routing
- Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on
, 2007
"... Abstract — In communication networks, such as the Internet or mobile ad-hoc networks, the actions taken by intermediate nodes or links are typically hidden from the communicating endpoints; all the endpoints can observe is whether or not the end-to-end transmission was successful. Therefore, in the ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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Abstract — In communication networks, such as the Internet or mobile ad-hoc networks, the actions taken by intermediate nodes or links are typically hidden from the communicating endpoints; all the endpoints can observe is whether or not the end-to-end transmission was successful. Therefore, in the absence of incentives to the contrary, rational (i.e., selfish) intermediaries may choose to forward messages at a low priority or simply not forward messages at all. Using a principal-agent model, we show how the hidden-action problem can be overcome through appropriate design of contracts in both the direct (the endpoints contract with each individual router directly) and the recursive (each router contracts with the next downstream router) cases. We further show that, depending on the network topology, per-hop or per-path monitoring may not necessarily improve the utility of the principal or the social welfare of the system.
FITS: A finite-time reputation system for cooperation in wireless ad-hoc networks
- IEEE Transactions on computers
, 2011
"... Abstract—A wireless ad hoc network does not have an infrastructure, and thus, needs the cooperation of nodes in forwarding other nodes ’ packets. Reputation system is an effective approach to give nodes incentives to cooperate in packet forwarding. However, existing reputation systems either lack ri ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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Abstract—A wireless ad hoc network does not have an infrastructure, and thus, needs the cooperation of nodes in forwarding other nodes ’ packets. Reputation system is an effective approach to give nodes incentives to cooperate in packet forwarding. However, existing reputation systems either lack rigorous analysis, or have analysis in unrealistic models. In this paper, we propose FITS, the first reputation system that has rigorous analysis and guaranteed incentive compatibility in a practical model. FITS has two schemes: the first scheme is very simple, but needs a Perceived Probability Assumption (PPA); the second scheme uses more sophisticated techniques to remove the need for PPA. We show that both of these two FITS schemes have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the packet forwarding probability of every node is one. Experimental results verify that FITS provides strong incentives for nodes to cooperate. Index Terms—Keywords ad hoc networks, incentive compatibility, routing, packet forwarding. Ç 1
1Mechanism Design for Finding Experts Using Locally Constructed Social Referral Web
"... Abstract—In this work, we address the problem of distributed expert finding using chains of social referrals and profile matching with only local information in online social networks. By assuming that users are selfish, rational, and have privately known cost of participating in the referrals, we d ..."
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Cited by 3 (2 self)
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Abstract—In this work, we address the problem of distributed expert finding using chains of social referrals and profile matching with only local information in online social networks. By assuming that users are selfish, rational, and have privately known cost of participating in the referrals, we design a novel truthful efficient mechanism in which an expert-finding query will be relayed by intermediate users. When receiving a referral request, a participant will locally choose among her neighbors some user to relay the request. In our mechanism, several closely coupled methods are carefully designed to improve the performance of distributed search, including, profile matching, social acquaintance prediction, score function for locally choosing relay neighbors, and budget estimation. We conduct exten-sive experiments on several datasets of online social networks. The extensive study of our mechanism shows that the success rate of our mechanism is about 90 % in finding closely matched experts using only local search and limited budget, which significantly improves the previously best rate 20%. The overall cost of finding an expert by our truthful mechanism is about 20 % of the untruthful methods, e.g.. the method that always selects high-degree neighbors. The median length of social referral chains is 6 using our localized search decision, which surprisingly matches the well-known small-world phenomenon of global social structures.
Design Differentiated Service Multicast With Selfish Agents
, 2005
"... Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link ei is associated with a (privately k ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link ei is associated with a (privately known) cost coefficient ci such that the cost of ei to provide a transmission service with bandwidth demand x is ci · x. Further, we assume that there is a fixed source node s and a set R of receivers, each of which requires from s data with a minimum bandwidth demand. The DiffServ multicast problem is to compute a link-weighted tree rooted at s and spanning R such that the receivers ’ demands are met. This generalizes the traditional link weighted Steiner tree problem. We first show that a previous approximation algorithm does not directly induce a strategyproof mechanism. We then give a new polynomial time algorithm to construct a DiffServ multicast tree whose total cost is no more than 8 times the optimal total cost when the cost coefficient of each link is known. Based on this tree, we design a truthful mechanism for DiffServ multicast, i.e., we give a polynomial-time computable payment scheme to compensate all chosen relay links such that each link maximizes its profit when it declares its cost coefficient truthfully.
Efficient Bandwidth Allocation in Wireless Community Networks
- in Proc. of Wireless Days 2011,Niagara Falls
, 2011
"... Abstract—The network coverage and the number of residential users that a network operator may serve through a Wireless Mesh Network can be significantly increased by subleasing the available bandwidth to a subset of customers. In this paper we propose an innovative mechanism to allocate the availabl ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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Abstract—The network coverage and the number of residential users that a network operator may serve through a Wireless Mesh Network can be significantly increased by subleasing the available bandwidth to a subset of customers. In this paper we propose an innovative mechanism to allocate the available bandwidth of a wireless network operator to those customers who are willing to pay the higher price for satisfying their bandwidth demand. We formulate the allocation mechanism as a combinatorial truthful auction and further present a greedy algorithm that finds efficient allocations even for large-size, real scenarios, while maintaining the truthfulness property. Numerical results show that the greedy algorithm represents an efficient and practical alternative to the combinatorial auction mechanism.
