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89
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions
, 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
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Cited by 283 (24 self)
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.
Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 2001
"... This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or ..."
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Cited by 145 (8 self)
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This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others’ decisions.
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
, 1983
"... this paper is to study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. The approach that we take is in the spirit of cooperative game theory, in the sense that the concept of blocking" by a coalition is on ..."
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Cited by 144 (8 self)
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this paper is to study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. The approach that we take is in the spirit of cooperative game theory, in the sense that the concept of blocking" by a coalition is one of the primitive features of our analysis. A companion article no. ET962236 00220531#97 #25.00 Copyright # 1997 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games,” Working
 University of Chicago
, 1986
"... We transform a noncooperative game into a Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the priors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors, and so on. We provide a complete characterizat ..."
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Cited by 109 (0 self)
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We transform a noncooperative game into a Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the priors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors, and so on. We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successively eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively undominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (B.D. Bernheim, Economefrica 52 (1984) 10071028; D. Pearce, Economefrica 52 (1984), 10291050). Sufficient conditions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior and a result akin to R. J. Aumann (Econometrica 55 (1987) l18) on correlated equilibria, is derived with different hypotheses. Journal of
The origin of wealth: Evolution, complexity, and the radical remaking of economics
, 2006
"... In this broadranging book, Eric Beinhocker defends a vision of the economy as a complex adaptive system. The theory that explains the operation of the economic system he calls Complexity Economics. The Origin of Wealth is a frontal attack on Neoclassical economic theory. Beinhocker recognizes the s ..."
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Cited by 102 (4 self)
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In this broadranging book, Eric Beinhocker defends a vision of the economy as a complex adaptive system. The theory that explains the operation of the economic system he calls Complexity Economics. The Origin of Wealth is a frontal attack on Neoclassical economic theory. Beinhocker recognizes the successes of this theory, but locates them in the past. The combined aridity of classical game theory, in which there have been no new insights for almost twenty years, and general equilibrium theory, which has produced nothing of general interest since the consolidation of existence theorems in the 1950’s, accounts for the current eclipse in the status of pure theory in the eyes of many contemporary economists. For suchminded individuals, Beinhocker has a message. “Economics can do better, ” he says, “it’s time to move on. ” (p. 23) Some will dismiss this book out of hand because Beinhocker does not provide a workable analytical alternative to the Neoclassical model. He should not be dismissed, since the market economy is, in fact, a complex adaptive system, a fact that materially alters the analytical tools best deployed to model economic behavior. Indeed, some of the appropriate tools remain to be invented. From its characterization as a complex adaptive system, it follows that the market economy follows an evolutionary dynamic. It is well known in evolutionary biology that one can treat genetic and cultural evolution using the same analytical tools (including the same set of differential equations, the socalled replicator equations), ∗ Santa Fe Institute and Central European University. I would like to thank Samuel Bowles and Doyne Farmer for helpful comments, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for financial support. 1 and even combine them creatively in geneculture coevolution (CavalliSforza and Feldman 1973, Richerson and Boyd 2004). Beinhocker adds that institutions, including
Dynamic Psychological Games
, 2006
"... The motivation of decision makers who care for emotions, reciprocity, or social conformity may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (Games and Economic Behavior, 1989) point out that traditional game theory is illequipped to addre ..."
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Cited by 49 (2 self)
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The motivation of decision makers who care for emotions, reciprocity, or social conformity may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (Games and Economic Behavior, 1989) point out that traditional game theory is illequipped to address such matters, and they pioneer a new framework which does. However, their toolbox — psychological game theory — incorporates several restrictions that rule out plausible forms of beliefdependent motivation. Building on recent work on dynamic interactive epistemology, we propose a more general framework. Updated higherorder beliefs, beliefs of others, and plans of action may influence motivation, and we can capture dynamic psychological effects (such as sequential reciprocity, psychological forward induction, regret, and anxiety) that were previously ruled out. We develop solution concepts, provide examples, and explore properties.
Coherent Behavior in Noncooperative Games
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
, 1990
"... A new concept of mutually expected rationality in noncooperative games is proposed: joint coherence. This is an extension of the “no arbitrage opportunities” axiom that underlies subjective probability theory and a variety of economic models. It sheds light on the controversy over the strategies tha ..."
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Cited by 47 (5 self)
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A new concept of mutually expected rationality in noncooperative games is proposed: joint coherence. This is an extension of the “no arbitrage opportunities” axiom that underlies subjective probability theory and a variety of economic models. It sheds light on the controversy over the strategies that can reasonably be recommended to or expected to arise among Bayesian rational players. Joint coherence is shown to support Aumann’s position in favor of objective correlated equilibrium, although the common prior assumption is weakened and viewed as a theorem rather than an axiom. An elementary proof of the existence of correlated equilibria is given, and relationships with other solution concepts (Nash equilibrium, independent and correlated rationalizability) are also discussed.
On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 57, 392406
, 1992
"... We investigate whether replicator dynamics justify “survival of the fittest” when players inherit pure strategies, mixed strategies, or rules for choosing strategies. A strategy that never is a best reply can survive replicator dynamics if only pure strategies are heritable, but only rationalizable ..."
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Cited by 27 (0 self)
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We investigate whether replicator dynamics justify “survival of the fittest” when players inherit pure strategies, mixed strategies, or rules for choosing strategies. A strategy that never is a best reply can survive replicator dynamics if only pure strategies are heritable, but only rationalizable strategies survive if mixed strategies are heritable. Now suppose agents can inherit the rule of choosing a best reply to the last period’s population, rather than inheriting a strategy itself. Such optimizers need not drive out players who inherit a dominated strategy. If we interpret replicator dynamics as a learning process, this means that nonoptimizing behavior
Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
, 1999
"... A nonequilibrium model of rational strategic behavior that can be viewed as a refinement of (normal form) rationalizability is developed for both normal form and extensive form games. This solution concept is called a τtheory and is used to analyze the main concerns of the Nash equilibrium refinem ..."
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Cited by 20 (0 self)
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A nonequilibrium model of rational strategic behavior that can be viewed as a refinement of (normal form) rationalizability is developed for both normal form and extensive form games. This solution concept is called a τtheory and is used to analyze the main concerns of the Nash equilibrium refinements literature such as dominance, iterative dominance, extensive form rationality, invariance, and backward induction. The relationship between τtheories and dynamic learning is investigated.