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Truthful multicast routing in selfish wireless networks
- IN PROCEEDINGS OF MOBICOM
, 2004
"... In wireless networks, it is often assumed that each individual wireless terminal will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation – except, perhaps, for a few faulty or malicious ones. Wireless terminals, when owned by individual users, will likely do what is the most beneficial ..."
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In wireless networks, it is often assumed that each individual wireless terminal will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation – except, perhaps, for a few faulty or malicious ones. Wireless terminals, when owned by individual users, will likely do what is the most beneficial to their owners, i.e., act “selfishly”. Therefore, an algorithm or protocol intended for selfish wireless networks must be designed. In this paper, we specifically study how to conduct efficient multicast routing in selfish wireless networks. We assume that each wireless terminal or communication link will incur a cost when it transits some data. Traditionally, the VCG mechanism has been the only method to design protocols so that each selfish agent will follow the protocols for its own interest to maximize its benefit. The main contributions of this paper are two-folds. First, for each of the widely used multicast structures, we show that the VCG based mechanism does not guarantee that the selfish terminals will follow the protocol. Second, we design the first multicast protocols without using VCG mechanism such that each agent maximizes its profit when it truthfully reports its cost. Extensive simulations are conducted to study the practical performances of the proposed protocols regarding the actual network cost and total payment.
Truthful Multicast in Selfish Wireless Networks
, 2004
"... In wireless network, it is often assumed that each individual wireless terminal or link will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation – except, perhaps, for the faulty or malicious ones. Wireless terminals or links, often owned by individuals, will likely do what is most bene ..."
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Cited by 27 (6 self)
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In wireless network, it is often assumed that each individual wireless terminal or link will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation – except, perhaps, for the faulty or malicious ones. Wireless terminals or links, often owned by individuals, will likely do what is most beneficial to their owners – act “selfishly”. Thus, it is more reasonable to expect that each selfish terminal will try to manipulate the algorithms or protocols for its owners ’ benefit, instead faithfully follow the designed protocols. Therefore, an algorithm or protocol intended for selfish wireless terminals or links must be designed. In this paper, we specifically study how to conduct efficient multicast in selfish wireless networks. We assume that each wireless terminal or communication link (called agent) will incur a cost when it transits some data, and the cost is known to the wireless terminal or communication link itself. For each of the widely used structures for multicast, we design a strategyproof multicast mechanism without using the well known VCG mechanism such that each agent has to truthfully report its cost to maximize its profit. Extensive simulations are conducted to study the practical performances of the proposed protocols regarding the actually network cost and total payment.
Stimulating Cooperation in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: A Coalitional Game Theoretic Approach
, 2010
"... ... of the non-existence of end-to-end connections, it is essential that nodes take advantage of connection opportunities to forward messages, to make end-to-end messaging possible. Thus it is crucial to make sure that nodes have incentives to forward messages for others, despite that the routing pr ..."
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Cited by 10 (1 self)
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... of the non-existence of end-to-end connections, it is essential that nodes take advantage of connection opportunities to forward messages, to make end-to-end messaging possible. Thus it is crucial to make sure that nodes have incentives to forward messages for others, despite that the routing protocols in VANETs are different from traditional end-to-end routing protocols. In this paper, we study how to stimulate message forwarding in VANETs. Our approach is based on coalitional game theory. In particular, we propose an incentive scheme for VANETs and rigorously show that with our scheme faithfully following the routing protocol is to the best interests of each node. In addition, we extend our scheme to take the limited storage space of each node into consideration. Experiments on testbed trace data verify that our scheme is effective in stimulating cooperation of message forwarding in VANETs.
Share the multicast payment fairly
- IN COCOON: ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTING AND COMBINATORICS
, 2005
"... Multicast routing uses a structure, either a tree or a mesh, to connect the receivers to the source, thus saving the bandwidth. How to share the cost among the receivers in a certain fair way has been studied widely in literature. When the agents, either the links or the nodes, in the network are s ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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Multicast routing uses a structure, either a tree or a mesh, to connect the receivers to the source, thus saving the bandwidth. How to share the cost among the receivers in a certain fair way has been studied widely in literature. When the agents, either the links or the nodes, in the network are selfish, it is desirable to pay the agents in a proper way such that each agent still reveals its true cost, a property known as strategyproofness. Several strategyproof mechanisms have been proposed based on several different multicast structures, and it is natural that the payments instead of the costs should be shared among the receivers. Motivated by this, we study how the payment should be shared among the receivers in a fair way when the payment is computed via a strategyproof mechanism based on some low cost multicast structure. Specifically, when links are selfish agents, based on a strategyproof mechanism whose multicast tree is at most 2 times the optimal, we propose a payment sharing scheme that is 1 n2-budget-balanced, cross-monotonic, and in the core. We also prove that there is no payment sharing scheme that can achieve β-budget-balance and cross-monotonicity for β = Ω ( 1). When both n the relay agents and the receivers are selfish, we show a negative result: combining a strategyproof mechanism M for the relay agents and a fair sharing scheme ξ LST for the receivers does not necessarily imply a strategyproof mechanism overall.
Dealing With Selfishness and Moral Hazard in Non-Cooperative Wireless Networks
, 2008
"... For non-cooperative networks in which each node is a selfish agent, certain incentives must be given to intermediate nodes to let them forward the data for others. What makes the scenario worse is that, in a multi-hop non-cooperative network, the endpoints can only observe whether or not the end-to ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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For non-cooperative networks in which each node is a selfish agent, certain incentives must be given to intermediate nodes to let them forward the data for others. What makes the scenario worse is that, in a multi-hop non-cooperative network, the endpoints can only observe whether or not the end-to-end transaction was successful or not, but not the individual actions of intermediate nodes. Thus, in the absence of properly designed incentive schemes, rational and selfish intermediate nodes may choose to forward data packets at a very low priority or simply drop the packets, and they could put the blame on the unreliable channel. In this paper, assuming the receiver is a trusted authority, we propose several methods that discourage the hidden actions under hidden information in multi-hop noncooperative networks with high probability. We design several algorithmic mechanisms for a number of routing scenarios such that each selfish agent will maximize its expected utility (i.e., profit) when it truthfully declares its type (i.e., cost and its actions) and it truthfully follows its declared actions. Our simulations show that the payments by our mechanisms are only slightly larger than the actual cost incurred by all intermediate nodes.
Mechanism design for set cover games when elements are agents
- In Proc 1st Intl Conf Algorithmic Applications in Management (AAIM
, 2005
"... Abstract. In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately ef ..."
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Cited by 5 (1 self)
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Abstract. In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately efficient strategyproof mechanisms, each of which decides, after soliciting the declared bids by all elements, which elements will be covered, which sets will provide the coverage to these selected elements, and how much each element will be charged. For single-cover 1 set cover games, we present a mechanism that is at least dmax-efficient, 1 dmax fraction i.e., the total valuation of all selected elements is at least of the total valuation produced by any mechanism. Here dmax is the maximum size of the sets. For multi-cover set cover games, we present 1 a budget-balanced strategyproof mechanism that is-efficient dmaxHdmax under reasonable assumptions. Here Hn is the harmonic function. For set cover games when both sets and elements are selfish agents, we show that a cross-monotonic payment-sharing scheme does not necessarily induce a strategyproof mechanism. This is a sharp contrast to the well-known fact that a cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme always induces a strategyproof mechanism. 1
QoS-Aware streaming in overlay multicast considering the selfishness in construction action
, 2007
"... Most existing overlay multicast proposals have assumed that the nodes are cooperative and thus focus on the global topology optimization. However, a unique and important characteristic of overlay nodes is that, as application-layer agents, they can be selfish with their own interests. To achieve bet ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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Most existing overlay multicast proposals have assumed that the nodes are cooperative and thus focus on the global topology optimization. However, a unique and important characteristic of overlay nodes is that, as application-layer agents, they can be selfish with their own interests. To achieve better Quality-of-Service (QoS) or to minimize forwarding overhead, an overlay node can behave selfishly in the information collection or in the overlay construction. While the former has recently been investigated, the impact of selfishness in the construction action remains unclear. In this paper, we present the first systematic study on the impact of selfishness in both tree and mesh overlay construction. Our investigation considers multiple QoS measures for streaming applications, including stream latency, resolution, and continuity. Our contribution is twofold: First, we analyze how for selfish overlay nodes to choose a construction-action policy to optimize their individual multi-metric QoS. Second, we demonstrate that the selfishness-aware policy for the construction action is consistent with the QoS optimization for the global multicast session, but not vice versa. The implication is significant: A globally optimal overlay construction itself can be vulnerable to individual selfishness; but, following our directions, we can design an overlay that is both globally optimal and selfish-resistant.
Design Differentiated Service Multicast With Selfish Agents
, 2005
"... Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link ei is associated with a (privately k ..."
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Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link ei is associated with a (privately known) cost coefficient ci such that the cost of ei to provide a transmission service with bandwidth demand x is ci · x. Further, we assume that there is a fixed source node s and a set R of receivers, each of which requires from s data with a minimum bandwidth demand. The DiffServ multicast problem is to compute a link-weighted tree rooted at s and spanning R such that the receivers ’ demands are met. This generalizes the traditional link weighted Steiner tree problem. We first show that a previous approximation algorithm does not directly induce a strategyproof mechanism. We then give a new polynomial time algorithm to construct a DiffServ multicast tree whose total cost is no more than 8 times the optimal total cost when the cost coefficient of each link is known. Based on this tree, we design a truthful mechanism for DiffServ multicast, i.e., we give a polynomial-time computable payment scheme to compensate all chosen relay links such that each link maximizes its profit when it declares its cost coefficient truthfully.
Defending against buffer map cheating in DONetlike P2P streaming, IEEE Transactions on Multimedia 11 (3) (2009) 535–542.2007. Jiangping Wu is now a full professor in computer science department of Tsinghua University. He received master and doctor degrees
- IEEE. Yong Cui, Ph.D Associate Professor in Tsinghua University, Council Member in China Communication Standards Association. He directed several international and national R&D projects. He had the honor to win National Science and Technology Progress Awa
, 2004
"... system is especially suitable to support live stream applications, since its data structure can tolerate node dynamics quite well. However, optimal streaming demands the cooperation of indi-vidual nodes. If selfish nodes cheat about their buffer maps to reduce the forwarding burden, the overall stre ..."
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system is especially suitable to support live stream applications, since its data structure can tolerate node dynamics quite well. However, optimal streaming demands the cooperation of indi-vidual nodes. If selfish nodes cheat about their buffer maps to reduce the forwarding burden, the overall streaming quality would be negatively affected. To defend against this kind of cheating, we design a trustworthy service-differentiation based incentive mechanism with low complexity in this paper. The mechanism is composed of the service-differentiation algorithm and the contribution-evaluation algorithm. Compared with other studies in this area, the primary characteristic of our mechanism lies in two aspects. Firstly, the contribution of each node is eval-uated considering the features of live streaming, not just by the transferring bytes. Secondly, the potential cheating behavior of overlay nodes during the fulfillment of incentive algorithms can be avoided, which is usually not considered by other similar studies. Extensive simulations suggest that the algorithms are indeed effective for defending against buffer map cheating in DONet-like P2P streaming. Index Terms—Buffer map cheating, P2P streaming, trustworthy incentive mechanism. I.
A scalable and robust approach to collaboration enforcement in mobile adhoc networks
- Communication and Networks
, 2007
"... Abstract: Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) have attracted great research interest in recent years. Among many issues, lack of motivation for participating nodes to collaborate forms a major obstacle to the adoption of MANETs. Many contemporary collaboration enforcement techniques employ reputation me ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Abstract: Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) have attracted great research interest in recent years. Among many issues, lack of motivation for participating nodes to collaborate forms a major obstacle to the adoption of MANETs. Many contemporary collaboration enforcement techniques employ reputation mechanisms for nodes to avoid and penalize malicious participants. Reputation information is propagated among participants and updated based on complicated trust relationships to thwart false accusation of benign nodes. The aforementioned strategy suffers from low scalability and is likely to be exploited by adversaries. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to address these problems. With the proposed technique, no reputation information is propagated in the network and malicious nodes cannot cause false penalty to benign hosts. Nodes classify their one-hop neighbors through direct observation and misbehaving nodes are penalized within their localities.
