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424
Can We Trust Trust?
- Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations
, 1988
"... whether we necessarily need more cooperation, keeping, for the moment, the distinction between cooperation and trust blurred and their relationship implicit. According to the trite observation - Adam Smith wrote - if there is any society among robbers and murderers, they must at least abstain from r ..."
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Cited by 325 (1 self)
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whether we necessarily need more cooperation, keeping, for the moment, the distinction between cooperation and trust blurred and their relationship implicit. According to the trite observation - Adam Smith wrote - if there is any society among robbers and murderers, they must at least abstain from robbing and murdering one another (Smith [1759] 1976: 86; see also Saint Augustine in Dunn, this volume). This trite observation serves a double purpose: it reminds us that basic forms of cooperation are inevitable if a society is to be at all viable, but it also points out, perhaps unwittingly, that there are instances of cooperation - notably those among robbers and murderers - that we may want to dispose of rather than improve. We may want less cooperation (and trust) rather than more, especially among those who are threatening us, and whose cooperation is a hindrance to ours. A priori, we cannot always say whether greater trust and cooperation are in fa
Not-For-Profit Entrepreneurs
- Journal of Public Economics
, 2001
"... Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. We derive conditions under which completely selfinterested en ..."
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Cited by 103 (1 self)
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Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. We derive conditions under which completely selfinterested entrepreneurs opt for not-for-profit status, despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises. We also show that even in the absence of tax advantages, unrestricted donations would flow to non-profits rather than for-profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non-profits. 1 Earlier work on non-profit firms includes Arrow (1963) and Nelson and Krashinsky (1973).
Uncertainty and learning in pharmaceutical demand.” Econometrica 73(4
, 2005
"... Di erences in the e ectiveness and side e ects of di erent drugs introduces uncertainty into pharmaceutical demand. This in turn introduces dynamic aspects to drug choice: patients have an incentive to experiment to gain information useful for future choices. Exploiting a rich panel dataset on anti- ..."
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Cited by 48 (0 self)
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Di erences in the e ectiveness and side e ects of di erent drugs introduces uncertainty into pharmaceutical demand. This in turn introduces dynamic aspects to drug choice: patients have an incentive to experiment to gain information useful for future choices. Exploiting a rich panel dataset on anti-ulcer drug prescriptions, the purpose of this paper is to measure the importance of uncertainty and learning for pharmaceutical drugs. To do so, we specify and estimate a dynamic structural model of demand for anti-ulcer drugs which embeds drug choice in a patient's multi-period expected utility maximization problem. Patients learn in Bayesian fashion about the e ectiveness of alternative drugs. Our results suggest that patients have considerable uncertainty as they begin treatment, but that it decreases quickly with drug use. Simulations imply increases in treatment costs due to uncertainty are modest, ranging from 1.5-4.2 % depending on illness severity.
How Beneficient is the Market? A Look at the Modern History of
- Mortality.” European Review of Economic History
, 1999
"... ..."
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Public and Private Roles in Health.” Theory and Financing Patters. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 339. The World Bank
, 1996
"... (HNP) of the World Bank’s Human Development Network. The papers in this series aim to provide a vehicle for publishing preliminary and unpolished results on HNP topics to encourage discussion and debate. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the ..."
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Cited by 47 (0 self)
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(HNP) of the World Bank’s Human Development Network. The papers in this series aim to provide a vehicle for publishing preliminary and unpolished results on HNP topics to encourage discussion and debate. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. Citation and the use of material presented in this series should take into account this provisional character. For free copies of papers in this series please contact the individual authors whose name appears on the paper. Enquiries about the series and submissions should be made directly to
The Value of Health Insurance: The Access Motive
- Journal of Health Economics
, 1999
"... Why do people purchase health insurance? Many economists would answer that it permits purchasers to avoid risk of financial loss. This note suggests that health insurance is also demanded because it represents a mechanism for gaining access to health care that would otherwise be unaffordable. For ex ..."
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Cited by 44 (4 self)
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Why do people purchase health insurance? Many economists would answer that it permits purchasers to avoid risk of financial loss. This note suggests that health insurance is also demanded because it represents a mechanism for gaining access to health care that would otherwise be unaffordable. For example, although a US$300,000 procedure is unaffordable to a person with US$50,000 in net worth, access is possible through insurance because the annual premium is only a fraction of the procedure’s cost. The value of insurance for coverage of unaffordable care is derived from the value of the medical care
Incentives and Government Relief for Risk
- Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
, 1991
"... Government relief is offered for a wide range of risks-- natural disaster, economic dislocation, sickness and injury. This paper explores the effect of such relief on incentives and the allocation of risk in a model with private insurance. It is shown that government relief is inefficient, even when ..."
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Cited by 39 (4 self)
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Government relief is offered for a wide range of risks-- natural disaster, economic dislocation, sickness and injury. This paper explores the effect of such relief on incentives and the allocation of risk in a model with private insurance. It is shown that government relief is inefficient, even when its level is less than the private insurance coverage that individuals would otherwise have purchased and even when private insurance coverage is incomplete due to problems of moral hazard.
Social Finance
, 2007
"... Expanding access to financial services holds the promise to help reduce poverty and spur economic development. But, as a practical matter, commercial banks have faced challenges expanding access to poor and low-income households in developing economies, and nonprofits have had limited reach. We revi ..."
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Cited by 33 (2 self)
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Expanding access to financial services holds the promise to help reduce poverty and spur economic development. But, as a practical matter, commercial banks have faced challenges expanding access to poor and low-income households in developing economies, and nonprofits have had limited reach. We review recent innovations that are improving the quantity and quality of financial access. They are taking possibilities well beyond early models centered on providing “microcredit ” for small business investment. We focus on new credit mechanisms and devices that help households manage cash flows, save, and cope with risk. Our eye is on contract designs, product innovations, regulatory policy, and ultimately economic and social impacts. We relate the innovations and empirical evidence to theoretical ideas, drawing links in particular to new work in behavioral economics and to randomized evaluation methods.
Insurance, moral hazard and chemical use in agriculture
- AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
, 1993
"... This paper examines how crop insurance affects corn farmers' fertilizer and pesticide use in the U.S. Midwest. Crop insurance might be expected to affect chemical use because of "moral hazard"; insured farmers may undertake riskier production than do uninsured farmers. Results suggest ..."
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Cited by 30 (1 self)
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This paper examines how crop insurance affects corn farmers' fertilizer and pesticide use in the U.S. Midwest. Crop insurance might be expected to affect chemical use because of "moral hazard"; insured farmers may undertake riskier production than do uninsured farmers. Results suggest that insurance exerts considerable influence on corn farmers ' chemical use decisions. Those purchasing insurance applied significantly more nitrogen per acre (19%), spent more on pesticides (21%), and treated more acreage with both herbicides and insecticides (7 % and 63%) than did those not purchasing insurance. These results suggest that both fertilizer and pesticides may be risk-increasing inputs. Key words: crop insurance, fertilizer use, moral hazard, pesticide use, risk. Deteriorating quality of the rural environment and agricultural resource base has become a growing source of concern in the United States. Environmental problems include leaching of nitrate and pesticides into groundwater, surface water pollution from soil erosion and nutrients
