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Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions
, 2001
"... We investigate costsharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link o ..."
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Cited by 284 (16 self)
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We investigate costsharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link of the multicast tree, while we give evidence that the latter requires a quadratic total number of messages. We also show that the welfare value achieved by an optimal multicast tree is NPhard to approximate within any constant factor, even for boundeddegree networks. The lowerbound proof for the Shapley value uses a novel algebraic technique for bounding from below the number of messages exchanged in a distributed computation; this technique may prove useful in other contexts as well.
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions
, 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
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Cited by 283 (24 self)
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.
Making Greed Work in Networks: A GameTheoretic Analysis of Switch Service Disciplines
 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING
, 1994
"... This paper discusses congestion control from a gametheoretic perspective. There are two basic premises: (1) users are assumed to be independent and selfish, and (2) central administrative control is exercised only at the network switches. The operating points resulting from selfish user behavior ..."
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Cited by 220 (11 self)
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This paper discusses congestion control from a gametheoretic perspective. There are two basic premises: (1) users are assumed to be independent and selfish, and (2) central administrative control is exercised only at the network switches. The operating points resulting from selfish user behavior depend crucially on the service disciplines implemented in network switches. This effect is investigated in a simple model consisting of a single exponential server shared by many Poisson sources. We discuss the extent to which one can guarantee, through the choice of switch service disciplines, that these selfish operating points will be efficient and fair. We also discuss to what extent the choice of switch service disciplines can ensure that these selfish operating points are unique and are easily and rapidly accessible by simple selfoptimization techniques. We show that no service discipline can guarantee optimal efficiency. As for the other properties, we show that the traditio...
Selfish behavior and stability of the internet: A gametheoretic analysis of tcp
 Proceedings of SIGCOMM
, 2002
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Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
 Theoretical Computer Science
, 2002
"... We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of groupstrategyproof, budgetbalanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in gam ..."
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Cited by 31 (3 self)
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We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of groupstrategyproof, budgetbalanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in game theory to show that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately efficient and approximately budgetbalanced. Our results show that one important and natural case of multicast cost sharing is an example of a canonical hard problem in distributed, algorithmic mechanism design; in this sense, they represent progress toward the development of a complexity theory of Internet computation.
An experiment on learning with limited information: Nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow
 Games and Economic Behavior
, 2004
"... The authors would like to thank Arthur Schram, Frans van Winden, Arno Riedl, Ronald Bosman, and the rest of the members of CREED at the University of Amsterdam for their hospitality; John Ledyard, Yan Chen, participants at the ..."
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Cited by 15 (0 self)
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The authors would like to thank Arthur Schram, Frans van Winden, Arno Riedl, Ronald Bosman, and the rest of the members of CREED at the University of Amsterdam for their hospitality; John Ledyard, Yan Chen, participants at the
ObjectOriented Modeling of the Architecture of Integrated Networks
, 1992
"... A unified framework of an architecture for integrated networks is outlined. The fundamental objects of this architecture are modeled as information transport entities, network entities and operators. The network architecture is based on three fundamental principles: the Separation Principle, the Pri ..."
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Cited by 9 (4 self)
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A unified framework of an architecture for integrated networks is outlined. The fundamental objects of this architecture are modeled as information transport entities, network entities and operators. The network architecture is based on three fundamental principles: the Separation Principle, the Principle of Communication Transparency and the Principle of Asynchronous Resource Management. Based on these three principles the network objects are organized into an Integrated Reference Model. Augmented by performance modeling of four traffic classes and the corresponding performance measures, these principles define the structure of the network control and management architecture. Key words and phrases: asynchronous algorithms, entities, network architecture, traffic control architecture, objects, quality of service, reference model, performance modeling. CTR Technical Report # 1679004, Center for Telecommunications Research, Columbia University, New York, NY 100276699, January 1990. ...
A Markov game approach for optimal routing into a queueing network
, 1994
"... We study a dynamic optimal routing problem, where a controller has to decide to which of two queues should arriving customers (representing packets, messages, call etc...) be sent. The service rate in each queue may depend on the state of the system, may change in time and is unknown to the controll ..."
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Cited by 7 (6 self)
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We study a dynamic optimal routing problem, where a controller has to decide to which of two queues should arriving customers (representing packets, messages, call etc...) be sent. The service rate in each queue may depend on the state of the system, may change in time and is unknown to the controller. The goal of the controller is to design a strategy that guarantees the best performance under the worst case service conditions. The payoff is composed of a holding cost, an admission cost, and a cost that depends on the quality of the service. We consider both the finite and infinite horizon discounted cost and the expected average cost. The problem is studied in the framework of zerosum Markov games where the server, called player 1, is assumed to play against the router, called player 2. Each player is assumed to have the information of all previous actions of both players as well as the current and past states of the system. We show that there exist pure optimal strategies for both players. A value iteration algorithm is used to establish properties of the value of the game, which are related to supermodularity and to convexity. This is then shown to imply the existence of optimal strategies described by monotone switching curves for both players.
Bioinspired paradigms in Network Engineering Games
, 2012
"... Network Engineering Games (NEGs) is a new emmerging branch of game theory that has been developing in Electrical Engineering Departments. It concerns games that arise in all levels of telecommunication networks. There has been a growing interest among researchers in this community in bioinspired me ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Network Engineering Games (NEGs) is a new emmerging branch of game theory that has been developing in Electrical Engineering Departments. It concerns games that arise in all levels of telecommunication networks. There has been a growing interest among researchers in this community in bioinspired methodologies in recent years. This is due to two reasons. First, many problems in networking have a lot in common with problems encountered in biology. Some examples are (i) propagation of information in networks, that has often a similar dynamics as the propagation of epidemics within the population. (ii) energy management issues in wireless networks and competition over resources are often similar to issues that have been studied by biologists. Secondly, both equilibria concepts as well as replicator dynamics that arise in evolutionary games are quite relevant to NEGs. In this paper we first present an overview of applications and of tools used in network engineering games, we then describe in more depth bioinspired tools used in or relevant to network engineering games. We present finally an example of a stochastic epidemic game arising in wireless networks that involves competition over the relaying of information. 1
Selfish Behavior and Stability of the Internet:A GameTheoretic Analysis of TCP
 in: Proceedings ACM SIGCOMM (2002
"... ABSTRACT For years, the conventional wisdom [7, 22] has been that the continued stability of the Internet depends on the widespread deployment of "socially responsible " congestion control. In this paper, we seek to answer the following fundamental question: If network endpoints b ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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ABSTRACT For years, the conventional wisdom [7, 22] has been that the continued stability of the Internet depends on the widespread deployment of &quot;socially responsible &quot; congestion control. In this paper, we seek to answer the following fundamental question: If network endpoints behaved in a selfish manner, would the stability of the Internet be endangered?