Results 1 - 10
of
27
On Designing Incentive-Compatible Routing and Forwarding Protocols in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks --An Integrated Approach Using Game Theoretical and Cryptographic Techniques
, 2005
"... In many applications, wireless ad-hoc networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, a challenging problem is how to provide incentives to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we study ad-hoc games—the routing and packet forwarding games in wireless ad-hoc networks. Unlik ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 126 (12 self)
- Add to MetaCart
In many applications, wireless ad-hoc networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, a challenging problem is how to provide incentives to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we study ad-hoc games—the routing and packet forwarding games in wireless ad-hoc networks. Unlike previous work which focuses either on routing or on forwarding, this paper investigates both routing and forwarding. We first uncover an impossibility result—there does not exist a protocol such that following the protocol to always forward others’ traffic is a dominant action. Then we define a novel solution concept called cooperation optimal protocols. We present Corsac, a cooperation-optimal protocol consisting of a routing protocol and a forwarding protocol. The routing protocol of Corsac integrates VCG with a novel cryptographic technique to address the challenge in wireless ad-hoc networks
A survey of social-based routing in delay tolerant networks: positive and negative social effects
- Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE 15.1
, 2013
"... Abstract—Delay tolerant networks (DTNs) may lack continuous network connectivity. Routing in DTNs is thus challenging since it must handle network partitioning, long delays, and dynamic topology in such networks. In recent years, social-based ap-proaches, which attempt to exploit social behaviors of ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 26 (7 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Delay tolerant networks (DTNs) may lack continuous network connectivity. Routing in DTNs is thus challenging since it must handle network partitioning, long delays, and dynamic topology in such networks. In recent years, social-based ap-proaches, which attempt to exploit social behaviors of DTN nodes to make better routing decision, have drawn tremendous interests in DTN routing design. In this article, we summarize the social properties in DTNs, and provide a survey of recent social-based DTN routing approaches. To improve routing performance, these methods either take advantages of positive social characteristics such as community and friendship to assist packet forwarding or consider negative social characteristics such as selfishness. We conclude by discussing some open issues and challenges in social-based approaches regarding the design of DTN routing protocols. Index Terms—DTN routing; Social-based approaches; Social graphs; Social network analysis; Delay tolerant networks.
Globally optimal channel assignment for non-cooperative wireless networks
- in INFOCOM’08
, 2008
"... Abstract—Channel assignment is a very important topic in wireless networks. In this paper, we study FDMA channel assignment in a non-cooperative wireless network, where devices are selfish. Existing work on this problem has considered Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is not a very strong solution concep ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 25 (15 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract—Channel assignment is a very important topic in wireless networks. In this paper, we study FDMA channel assignment in a non-cooperative wireless network, where devices are selfish. Existing work on this problem has considered Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is not a very strong solution concept and may not guarantee a good system-wide performance. In contrast, in this work we introduce a payment formula to ensure the existence of a Strongly Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (SDSE), a much stronger solution concept. We show that, when the system converges to a SDSE, it also achieves global optimality in terms of effective system-wide throughput. Furthermore, we extend our work to the case in which some radios have limited tunability. We show that, in this case, it is generally impossible to have a similar SDSE solution; but, with additional assumptions on the numbers of radios and the types of channels, etc., we can again achieve a SDSE solution that guarantees globally optimal effective system throughput in the entire system. Besides this extension, we also consider another extension of our strategic game, which is a repeated game that provides fairness. Finally, we evaluate our design in experiments. Our evaluations verify that the system does converge to the globally optimal channel assignment with our designed payment formula, and that the effective system-wide throughput is significantly higher than that of anarchy and Nash Equilibrium (NE). I.
OURS: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems in Non-Cooperative Wireless Networks
- MOBICOM'06
, 2006
"... We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather tha ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 23 (2 self)
- Add to MetaCart
We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS). Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service requestor is not selfish, we propose a
Design multicast protocols for non-cooperative networks,”
- IEEE INFOCOM.
, 2005
"... Abstract-Conventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities are selfish: they will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contributing t ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 15 (8 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract-Conventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities are selfish: they will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contributing to the network by following the prescribed protocols. Thus, new protocols should be designed for the non-cooperative network that is composed of selfish entities. In this paper, we specifically show how to design truthful multicast protocols for non-cooperative networks such that these selfish entities will follow the protocols out of their own interests. By assuming that every entity has a fixed cost for a specific multicast, we give a general framework to decide whether it is possible and how, if possible, to transform an existing multicast protocol to a truthful multicast protocol by designing a proper payment protocol. We then show how the payments to those relay entities are shared fairly among all receivers so that it encourages collaboration among receivers. As running examples, we show how to design truthful multicast protocols for several multicast structures that are currently used in practice. We also conduct extensive simulations to study the relation between the payment and the cost of the multicast structure. Our simulations show that multicast not only saves the total resources, but also benefits the individual receiver even in selfish networks.
On adaptive-width channel allocation in non-cooperative, multi-radio wireless networks
, 2010
"... Abstract—Due to the limitation of radio spectrum resource and fast growing of wireless applications, careful channel allocation is highly needed to mitigate the performance degradation of wireless networks because of interference among different users. While most of the existing works consider alloc ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 10 (6 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract—Due to the limitation of radio spectrum resource and fast growing of wireless applications, careful channel allocation is highly needed to mitigate the performance degradation of wireless networks because of interference among different users. While most of the existing works consider allocating fixed-width channels, combining contiguous channels may provide an alternative way to better utilize the available channels. In this paper, we study the problem of adaptive-width channel allocation from a game-theoretic point of view, in which the nodes are rational and always pursue their own objectives. We first model the problem as a strategic game, and show the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) , when there is no exogenous factor to influence players ’ behavior. We further propose a charging scheme to influence the players ’ behavior, by which the system is guaranteed to converge to a Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE), a solution concept that gives participants much stronger incentives. We show that, when the system converges to a DSE, it also achieves global optimality, in terms of system-wide throughput without starvation. Numerical results verify that with our charging scheme, the system-wide throughput obtained is higher as compared to the throughput obtained when system is in NE. I.
On Mechanism Design Without Payments for Throughput Maximization
"... Abstract—It is well-known that the overall efficiency of a distributed system can suffer if the participating entities seek to maximize their individual performance. Consequently, mechanisms have been designed that force the participants to behave more cooperatively. Most of these game-theoretic sol ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 8 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract—It is well-known that the overall efficiency of a distributed system can suffer if the participating entities seek to maximize their individual performance. Consequently, mechanisms have been designed that force the participants to behave more cooperatively. Most of these game-theoretic solutions rely on payments between participants. Unfortunately, such payments are often cumbersome to implement in practice, especially in dynamic networks and where transaction costs are high. In this paper, we investigate the potential of mechanisms which work without payments. We consider the problem of throughput maximization in multi-channel environments and shed light onto the throughput increase that can be achieved with and without payments. We introduce and analyze two different concepts: the worst-case leverage where we assume that players end up in the worst rational strategy profile, and the average-case leverage where player select a random non-dominated strategy. Our theoretical insights are complemented by simulations. I.
Share the multicast payment fairly
- IN COCOON: ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTING AND COMBINATORICS
, 2005
"... Multicast routing uses a structure, either a tree or a mesh, to connect the receivers to the source, thus saving the bandwidth. How to share the cost among the receivers in a certain fair way has been studied widely in literature. When the agents, either the links or the nodes, in the network are s ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 7 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Multicast routing uses a structure, either a tree or a mesh, to connect the receivers to the source, thus saving the bandwidth. How to share the cost among the receivers in a certain fair way has been studied widely in literature. When the agents, either the links or the nodes, in the network are selfish, it is desirable to pay the agents in a proper way such that each agent still reveals its true cost, a property known as strategyproofness. Several strategyproof mechanisms have been proposed based on several different multicast structures, and it is natural that the payments instead of the costs should be shared among the receivers. Motivated by this, we study how the payment should be shared among the receivers in a fair way when the payment is computed via a strategyproof mechanism based on some low cost multicast structure. Specifically, when links are selfish agents, based on a strategyproof mechanism whose multicast tree is at most 2 times the optimal, we propose a payment sharing scheme that is 1 n2-budget-balanced, cross-monotonic, and in the core. We also prove that there is no payment sharing scheme that can achieve β-budget-balance and cross-monotonicity for β = Ω ( 1). When both n the relay agents and the receivers are selfish, we show a negative result: combining a strategyproof mechanism M for the relay agents and a fair sharing scheme ξ LST for the receivers does not necessarily imply a strategyproof mechanism overall.
Cost-effective Traffic Assignment for Multipath Routing in Selfish Networks
"... Abstract Multipath routing has long been studied as an important routing strategy in networks. Many multipath routing protocols schedule traffic among multiple paths in order to distribute load. However, existing multipath routing protocols with traffic assignment require that all nodes in the netwo ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 3 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract Multipath routing has long been studied as an important routing strategy in networks. Many multipath routing protocols schedule traffic among multiple paths in order to distribute load. However, existing multipath routing protocols with traffic assignment require that all nodes in the network follow the protocol, which may not always be a valid assumption. In this paper, we propose a traffic assignment scheme to deal with selfish behavior, which is shown to be strategy-proof. Evaluations demonstrate that our scheme is very efficient.
iShare: Exploiting Opportunistic Ad hoc Connections for Improving Data Download of Cellular Users
"... This paper presents an Incentive-based Sharing (iShare) protocol that blends cellular and ad hoc networks for content dissemination services. With iShare, mobile users download content from a source via cellular links and at the same time form a mesh ad hoc network for peer-to-peer exchange of conte ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 3 (1 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
This paper presents an Incentive-based Sharing (iShare) protocol that blends cellular and ad hoc networks for content dissemination services. With iShare, mobile users download content from a source via cellular links and at the same time form a mesh ad hoc network for peer-to-peer exchange of content data. The mesh remains robust to network dynamics, minimizes ad hoc communication overhead, and parallelizes the downloading process among mesh members. In order to counter selfish behavior, we apply an efficient and practical “titfor-tat” incentive mechanism, which exploits proximity and mutual content interest of mobile users. This mechanism becomes particularly effective in the case of network dynamics since we utilize promiscuous and broadcast modes of the ad hoc channel. As a result, our protocol effectively helps to free resources in the cellular network and accelerates the content download for its users. Furthermore, it enables users to continuously obtain data via ad hoc connections during cellular handoff periods and provides multi-homing downloads for groups spanning adjacent cells. We evaluate the performance of iShare by means of simulations and compare it to other content dissemination schemes using cellular broadcast channels, cellular unicast channels, and tree-based protocols. The obtained results show that iShare significantly outperforms alternative approaches and creates a win-win situation by improving performance of both iShare and other mobile users. 1
