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234
Allocate fair payoff for cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks using Shapley value
- Proceedings of the 18th International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium
, 2004
"... In wireless mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), energy is a scarce resource. Though cooperation is the basis of network services, due to the limited energy reserve of each node, there is no guarantee any given protocols would be followed by nodes managed by different authorities. Instead of treating the ..."
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Cited by 14 (0 self)
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In wireless mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), energy is a scarce resource. Though cooperation is the basis of network services, due to the limited energy reserve of each node, there is no guarantee any given protocols would be followed by nodes managed by different authorities. Instead of treating the selfish nodes as a security concern and trying to eliminate them, we propose a novel way to encourage cooperative works- rewarding service providers according to their contributions. Nodes in a MANET can form coalitions to reduce aggregate transmission power on each hop along a route. The payment of each node in a coalition is determined by using Shapley Value, a well-known concept in game theory for allocating payoff for each member in a cooperative coalition. We present the Contribution rewArd routing Protocol with Shapley Value (CAP-SV) in this paper. It achieves the ob-jective of truthfulness. The performance of CAP-SV is stud-ied by simulations using ns-2. Analysis and experimental re-sults show a routing protocol with the consideration of the incentives of individual nodes stimulates cooperation and improves network lifetime without significantly diminishing the performance of the whole network.
An optimal dynamic pricing framework for autonomous mobile ad hoc networks
- in Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM’06
, 2006
"... Abstract — In autonomous mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) where each user is its own authority, fully cooperative behaviors, such as unconditionally forwarding packets for each other or, honestly revealing its private information, cannot be directly assumed. The pricing mechanism is one way to provide ..."
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Abstract — In autonomous mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) where each user is its own authority, fully cooperative behaviors, such as unconditionally forwarding packets for each other or, honestly revealing its private information, cannot be directly assumed. The pricing mechanism is one way to provide incentives for the users to act cooperatively by rewarding some payment for cooperative behaviors. In this paper, we model the pricing and routing as multi-stage dynamic games. By taking into consideration that the packet-forwarding will incur a cost to the relay user and the successful transmission brings benefits to the sender/receiver, we propose a dynamic pricing framework to maximize the sender/receiver’s payoff by considering the dynamic nature of MANETs, meanwhile, keeping the forwarding incentives of the relay nodes by providing the optimal payments based on the auction rules. The contributions of this paper are multi-folds: Firstly, by modeling the pricing and routing as a dynamic game, the sender is able to exploit the time diversity in MANET to increase their payoffs by adaptively allocating the packets to be transmitted into different stages. Secondly, based on the auction structure and routing dynamics, a simple optimal dynamic programming algorithm is developed to implement efficient multi-stage pricing for autonomous MANETs. Thirdly, the path diversity of MANET is exploited using the optimal auction mechanism in each stage. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed dynamic pricing framework has significant performance gains over the existing static pricing algorithms. I.
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions in Wireless Networks
, 2007
"... We investigate the problem of sharing the cost of a multicast transmission in a wireless network in which each node (i.e., radio station) of the network corresponds to a (set of) user(s) potentially interested in receiving the transmission. As in the model considered by Feigenbaum et al. [2001], use ..."
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Cited by 14 (2 self)
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We investigate the problem of sharing the cost of a multicast transmission in a wireless network in which each node (i.e., radio station) of the network corresponds to a (set of) user(s) potentially interested in receiving the transmission. As in the model considered by Feigenbaum et al. [2001], users may act selfishly and report a false “level of interest” in receiving the transmission trying to be charged less by the system. We consider the issue of designing so called truthful mechanisms for the problem of maximizing the net worth (i.e., the overall “satisfaction” of the users minus the cost of the transmission) for the case of wireless networks. Intuitively, truthful mechanisms guarantee that no user has an incentive in reporting a false valuation of the transmission. Unlike the “wired” network case, here the cost of a set of connections implementing a multicast tree is not the sum of the single edge costs, thus introducing a complicating factor in the problem. We provide both positive and negative results on the existence of optimal algorithms for the problem and their use to obtain VCG truthful mechanisms achieving the same performances.
A cartel maintenance framework to enforce cooperation in wireless networks with selfish users
- IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun
, 2008
"... Abstract — In distributed wireless networks without centralized control, each user is its own authority to maximize its own performance. This distributed characteristic provides the users with the incentives of greedy competitions for the network resources such as bandwidth and transmission time. Su ..."
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Cited by 13 (5 self)
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Abstract — In distributed wireless networks without centralized control, each user is its own authority to maximize its own performance. This distributed characteristic provides the users with the incentives of greedy competitions for the network resources such as bandwidth and transmission time. Such competitions deteriorate the system performance dramatically and result in low non-cooperative performances. Ensuring cooperation among selfish users can improve the performances and thus becomes an important issue for such wireless networks. In this paper, a Cartel Maintenance repeated game framework is proposed to enforce the cooperation among selfish users. The soul of Cartel Maintenance is to construct contracts among independent individuals for cooperative benefits and non-cooperative punishment, so as to limit inefficient competitions. In the proposed framework, a trigger-punishment game rule is designed to encourage the users to follow the cooperative strategy. First, all users agree to cooperate. Then in the following time slot, if users observe the others play cooperatively, cooperation will be played. If some users detect that others may defect based on the observed information, these users will play punishment phases for a certain period of time. This punishment is optimized so that the gain obtained by the deviation users is outweighed by the future punishments. Therefore, no user has the incentives to deviate, and the cooperation among selfish users is enforced. Then, the framework is employed to the multiple random access scenarios in wireless networks with selfish users, where the closed-form optimal solutions of cooperation enforcement are derived. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme can achieve significant performance gains over the non-cooperation scheme by having enough punishment threat to keep the cooperation among users. Index Terms — Game theory, distributed control, and cooperative systems. I.
Social Welfare Based Routing in Ad hoc Networks
"... Due to resource scarcity, a paramount concern in ad hoc networks is to utilize the limited resources efficiently. The self-organized nature of ad hoc networks makes the social welfare based approach an efficient way to allocate the limited resources. However, the effect of instability of mobile nod ..."
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Cited by 12 (8 self)
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Due to resource scarcity, a paramount concern in ad hoc networks is to utilize the limited resources efficiently. The self-organized nature of ad hoc networks makes the social welfare based approach an efficient way to allocate the limited resources. However, the effect of instability of mobile nodes has not been adequately addressed in the literature. To efficiently address the routing problem in ad hoc networks, we introduce a new metric, maximum expected social welfare, and integrate the cost and stability of nodes in a unified model to evaluate the optimality of routes. The expected social welfare is defined in terms of expected benefit (of the routing source) minus the expected costs incurred by forwarding nodes. Based on our new metric, we design an optimal and efficient algorithm, and implement the algorithm in both centralized (optimal) and distributed (near-optimal) manners. We also extend our work to incorporate retransmission and study the effect of local and global retransmission restrictions on the selection of routing paths.
A Game Theory Based Reputation Mechanism to Incentivize Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
, 2009
"... In wireless ad hoc networks one way to incentivize nodes to forward other nodes ’ packets is through the use of reputation mechanisms, where cooperation is induced by the threat of partial or total network disconnection if a node acts selfishly. The problem is that packet collisions and interference ..."
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Cited by 11 (0 self)
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In wireless ad hoc networks one way to incentivize nodes to forward other nodes ’ packets is through the use of reputation mechanisms, where cooperation is induced by the threat of partial or total network disconnection if a node acts selfishly. The problem is that packet collisions and interference may make cooperative nodes appear selfish sometimes, generating unnecessary and unwanted punishments. With the use of a simple network model we first study the performance of some proposed reputation strategies and then present a new mechanism called DARWIN (Distributed and Adaptive Reputation mechanism for WIreless ad hoc Networks), where we try to avoid retaliation situations after a node is falsely perceived as selfish to help restore cooperation quickly. Using game theory, we prove that our mechanism is robust to imperfect measurements, is collusion-resistant and can achieve full cooperation among nodes. Simulations are presented to complement our theoretical analysis and evaluate the performance of our algorithm compared to other proposed reputation strategies.
On adaptive-width channel allocation in non-cooperative, multi-radio wireless networks
, 2010
"... Abstract—Due to the limitation of radio spectrum resource and fast growing of wireless applications, careful channel allocation is highly needed to mitigate the performance degradation of wireless networks because of interference among different users. While most of the existing works consider alloc ..."
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Cited by 10 (6 self)
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Abstract—Due to the limitation of radio spectrum resource and fast growing of wireless applications, careful channel allocation is highly needed to mitigate the performance degradation of wireless networks because of interference among different users. While most of the existing works consider allocating fixed-width channels, combining contiguous channels may provide an alternative way to better utilize the available channels. In this paper, we study the problem of adaptive-width channel allocation from a game-theoretic point of view, in which the nodes are rational and always pursue their own objectives. We first model the problem as a strategic game, and show the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) , when there is no exogenous factor to influence players ’ behavior. We further propose a charging scheme to influence the players ’ behavior, by which the system is guaranteed to converge to a Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE), a solution concept that gives participants much stronger incentives. We show that, when the system converges to a DSE, it also achieves global optimality, in terms of system-wide throughput without starvation. Numerical results verify that with our charging scheme, the system-wide throughput obtained is higher as compared to the throughput obtained when system is in NE. I.
An Incentive Framework for Cellular Traffic Offloading
- IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING
, 2015
"... Cellular networks (e.g., 3G) are currently facing severe traffic overload problems caused by excessive traffic demands. Offloading part of the cellular traffic through other forms of networks, such as Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) and WiFi hotspots, is a promising solution. However, since these ne ..."
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Cited by 10 (3 self)
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Cellular networks (e.g., 3G) are currently facing severe traffic overload problems caused by excessive traffic demands. Offloading part of the cellular traffic through other forms of networks, such as Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) and WiFi hotspots, is a promising solution. However, since these networks can only provide intermittent connectivity to mobile users, utilizing them for cellular traffic offloading may result in a non-negligible delay. As the delay increases, the users’ satisfaction decreases. In this paper, we investigate the tradeoff between the amount of traffic being offloaded and the users ’ satisfaction. We provide a novel incentive framework to motivate users to leverage their delay tolerance for cellular traffic offloading. To minimize the incentive cost given an offloading target, users with high delay tolerance and large offloading potential should be prioritized for traffic offloading. To effectively capture the dynamic characteristics of users ’ delay tolerance, our incentive framework is based on reverse auction to let users proactively express their delay tolerance by submitting bids. We further illustrate how to predict the offloading potential of the users by using stochastic analysis for both DTN and WiFi cases. Extensive trace-driven simulations verify the efficiency of our incentive framework for cellular traffic offloading.
Modelling routing in wireless ad hoc networks with dynamic Bayesian games
- 1st IEEE International Conference on Sensor and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (IEEE SECON
, 2004
"... Abstract — Mobile agents acting in wireless ad hoc networks are energy constrained, which leads to potential selfishness as nodes are not necessarily willing to forward packets for other nodes. Situations like this are traditionally analyzed using game theory and recently also the ad hoc networking ..."
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Cited by 9 (1 self)
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Abstract — Mobile agents acting in wireless ad hoc networks are energy constrained, which leads to potential selfishness as nodes are not necessarily willing to forward packets for other nodes. Situations like this are traditionally analyzed using game theory and recently also the ad hoc networking community has witnessed game-theoretic approaches to especially routing. However, from a theoretical point-of-view the contemporary game-theoretic approaches have mainly ignored two important aspects: non-simultaneous decision making and incorporating history information into the decision making process. In this article we propose a new model that fills these gaps and allows to analyze routing theoretically. I.
Market models and pricing mechanisms in a multihop wireless hotspot network
, 2005
"... Multihop wireless hotspot network [4, 14, 20, 34] has been recently proposed to extend the coverage area of a base station. However, with selfish nodes in the network, multihop packet forwarding cannot take place without an incentive mechanism. In this paper, we adopt the “pay for service ” incentiv ..."
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Cited by 8 (1 self)
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Multihop wireless hotspot network [4, 14, 20, 34] has been recently proposed to extend the coverage area of a base station. However, with selfish nodes in the network, multihop packet forwarding cannot take place without an incentive mechanism. In this paper, we adopt the “pay for service ” incentive model. i.e., clients pay the relaying nodes for their packet forwarding service. Our focus in this paper is to determine a “fair ” pricing for packet forwarding. To this end, we model the system as a market where the pricing for packet forwarding is determined by demand and sup-ply. Depending on the network communication scenario, the market models are different. We classify the network into four different scenarios and propose different pricing mechanisms for them. Our simulation results show that the pricing mechanisms are able to guide the market into an equilibrium state quickly. We also show that maintaining communication among the relaying nodes is important for a stable market pricing. 1
