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49
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions
, 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
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Cited by 283 (24 self)
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.
Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money
, 2009
"... The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with gametheoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic moneybased mechanisms cannot be applied efficiently. Recent years have seen the design of various truthful approximation mechanisms that rely on enforc ..."
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Cited by 58 (14 self)
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The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with gametheoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic moneybased mechanisms cannot be applied efficiently. Recent years have seen the design of various truthful approximation mechanisms that rely on enforcing payments. In this paper, we advocate the reconsideration of highly structured optimization problems in the context of mechanism design. We explicitly argue for the first time that, in such domains, approximation can be leveraged to obtain truthfulness without resorting to payments. This stands in contrast to previous work where payments are ubiquitous, and (more often than not) approximation is a necessary evil that is required to circumvent computational complexity. We present a case study in approximate mechanism design without money. In our basic setting agents are located on the real line and the mechanism must select the location of a public facility; the cost of an agent is its distance to the facility. We establish tight upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratio given by strategyproof mechanisms without payments, with respect to both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, under two objective functions: the social cost, and the maximum cost. We then extend our results in two natural directions: a domain where two facilities must be located, and a domain where each agent controls multiple locations.
The Structure of strategyproof social choice, part II: nondictatorship, anonymity and neutrality,
, 2005
"... Abstract We define a general notion of singlepeaked preferences based on abstract betweenness relations. Special cases are the classical example of singlepeaked preferences on a line, the separable preferences on the hypercube, the "multidimensionally singlepeaked" preferences on the ..."
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Cited by 39 (8 self)
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Abstract We define a general notion of singlepeaked preferences based on abstract betweenness relations. Special cases are the classical example of singlepeaked preferences on a line, the separable preferences on the hypercube, the "multidimensionally singlepeaked" preferences on the product of lines, but also the unrestricted preference domain. Generalizing and unifying the existing literature, we show that a social choice function is strategyproof on a sufficiently rich domain of generalized singlepeaked preferences if and only if it takes the form of voting by issues ("voting by committees") satisfying a simple condition called the "Intersection Property." Based on the Intersection Property, we show that the class of preference domains associated with "median spaces" gives rise to the strongest possibility results; in particular, we show that the existence of strategyproof social choice rules that are nondictatorial and neutral requires an underlying median space. A space is a median space if, for every triple of elements, there is a fourth element that is between each pair of the triple; numerous examples are given (some wellknown, some novel), and the structure of median spaces and the associated preference domains is analysed.
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy ∗
, 1004
"... In this paper we study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values model and an arbitrary objective function. We design a mechanism that allows for approximate optimal implementation of insensitive objective functions in expost Nash equilibrium. If, furthermore, values are pri ..."
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Cited by 37 (1 self)
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In this paper we study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values model and an arbitrary objective function. We design a mechanism that allows for approximate optimal implementation of insensitive objective functions in expost Nash equilibrium. If, furthermore, values are private then the same mechanism is strategy proof. We cast our results onto two specific models: pricing and facility location. The mechanism we design is optimal up to an additive factor of the order of magnitude of one over the square root of the number of agents and involves no utility transfers. Underlying our mechanism is a lottery between two auxiliary mechanisms — with high probability we actuate a mechanism that reduces players influence on the choice of the social alternative, while choosing the optimal outcome with high probability. This is where the recent notion of differential privacy is employed. With the complementary probability we actuate a mechanism that is typically far from optimal but is incentive compatible. The joint mechanism inherits the desired properties from both. We thank Amos Fiat and Haim Kaplan for discussions at an early stage of this research. We thank Frank McSherry and Kunal Talwar for helping to clarify issues related to the constructions in [22]. Finally, we thank Jason Hartline,
Manipulation through Bribes
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (2000) 91, 180198.
, 2000
"... We consider allocation rules that choose both an outcome and transfers, based on the agents’ reported valuations of the outcomes. Under a given allocation rule, a bribing situation exists when agent j could pay agent i to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both agents. A rule is br ..."
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Cited by 25 (2 self)
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We consider allocation rules that choose both an outcome and transfers, based on the agents’ reported valuations of the outcomes. Under a given allocation rule, a bribing situation exists when agent j could pay agent i to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both agents. A rule is bribeproof if such opportunities never arise. The central result is that when a bribeproof rule is used, the resulting payoff to any one agent is a continuous function of any other agent’s reported valuations. We then show that on connected domains of valuation functions, if either the set of outcomes is finite or each agent’s set of admissible valuations is smoothly connected, then an agent’s payoff is a constant function of other agents’ reported valuations. Finally, under the additional assumption of a standard domainrichness condition, we show that a bribeproof rule must be a constant function. The results apply to a very broad class of economies.
StrategyProofness and SingleCrossing
, 2008
"... This paper analyzes strategyproof collective choice rules when individuals have singlecrossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous and strategyproof on a maximal singlecrossing domain if and only if it is an e ..."
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Cited by 14 (0 self)
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This paper analyzes strategyproof collective choice rules when individuals have singlecrossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous and strategyproof on a maximal singlecrossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n − 1 fixed ballots located at the end points of the set of alternatives. As a byproduct, the paper also proves that strategyproofness implies the topsonly property. And it offers a strategic foundation for the so called “singlecrossing version” of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences.
Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
, 2011
"... Allocation and exchange of many discrete resources – such as kidneys or school seats – is conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary transfers. A primary concern in designing such mechanisms is the coordinated strategic behavior of market participants and its impact on resulting allocations. T ..."
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Cited by 9 (1 self)
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Allocation and exchange of many discrete resources – such as kidneys or school seats – is conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary transfers. A primary concern in designing such mechanisms is the coordinated strategic behavior of market participants and its impact on resulting allocations. To assess the impact of this implementation constraint, we construct the full class of group dominantstrategy incentive compatible and Pareto efficient mechanisms. We call these mechanisms “Trading Cycles. ” This class contains new mechanisms as well as such previously studied mechanisms as top trading cycles, serial dictatorships, and hierarchical exchange. In some problems, the new tradingcycles mechanisms perform better than all previously known mechanisms. Just as importantly, knowing that all group incentivecompatible and efficient mechanisms can be implemented as trading cycles allows us to determine easily which efficient