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131
Robust Incentive Techniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks
, 2004
"... Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today's P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, asymmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and tr ..."
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Cited by 256 (3 self)
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Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today's P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, asymmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and traitors. To tackle these challenges we model the P2P system using the Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma (GPD), and propose the Reciprocative decision function as the basis of a family of incentives techniques. These techniques are fully distributed and include: discriminating server selection, maxflowbased subjective reputation, and adaptive stranger policies. Through simulation, we show that these techniques can drive a system of strategic users to nearly optimal levels of cooperation.
Free-Riding and Whitewashing in Peer-to-Peer Systems
- ANNUALWORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION SECURITY
, 2004
"... We devise a simple model to study the phenomenon of free-riding and the effect of free identities on user behavior in peer-to-peer systems. At the heart of our model is a strategic user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user's generosity. The user decides w ..."
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Cited by 170 (2 self)
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We devise a simple model to study the phenomenon of free-riding and the effect of free identities on user behavior in peer-to-peer systems. At the heart of our model is a strategic user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user's generosity. The user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current burden of contributing in the system compares to her type. We derive the emerging cooperation level in equilibrium and quantify the effect of providing free-riders with degraded service on the emerging cooperation. We find that this penalty mechanism is beneficial mostly when the "generosity level" of the society (i.e., the average type) is low. To quantify the social cost of free identities, we extend the model to account for dynamic scenarios with turnover (users joining and leaving) and with whitewashers: users who strategically leave the system and re-join with a new identity. We find that the imposition of penalty on all legitimate newcomers incurs a significant social loss only under high turnover rates in conjunction with intermediate societal generosity levels.
Stability of end-to-end algorithms for joint routing and rate control
"... Dynamic multi-path routing has the potential to improve the reliability and performance of a communication network, but carries a risk. Routing needs to respond quickly to achieve the potential benefits, but not so quickly that the network is destabilized. This paper studies how rapidly routing can ..."
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Cited by 115 (1 self)
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Dynamic multi-path routing has the potential to improve the reliability and performance of a communication network, but carries a risk. Routing needs to respond quickly to achieve the potential benefits, but not so quickly that the network is destabilized. This paper studies how rapidly routing can respond, without compromising stability. We present a sufficient condition for the local stability of end-to-end algorithms for joint routing and rate control. The network model considered allows an arbitrary interconnection of sources and resources, and heterogeneous propagation delays. The sufficient condition we present is decentralized: the responsiveness of each route is restricted by the round-trip time of that route alone, and not by the roundtrip times of other routes. Our results suggest that stable, scalable load-sharing across paths, based on end-to-end measurements, can be achieved on the same rapid time-scale as rate control, namely the time-scale of round-trip times.
Coalition games with cooperative transmission: A cure for the curse of boundary nodes in selfish packet-forwarding wireless networks
- IEEE Trans. Comm
, 2009
"... Abstract — In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish nodes, applications of a repeated game can induce the nodes to forward each others ’ packets, so that the network performance can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of such networks cannot benefit from this strategy, as the ..."
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Cited by 42 (7 self)
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Abstract — In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish nodes, applications of a repeated game can induce the nodes to forward each others ’ packets, so that the network performance can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of such networks cannot benefit from this strategy, as the other nodes do not depend on them. This problem is sometimes known as the curse of the boundary nodes. To overcome this problem, an approach based on coalition games is proposed, in which the boundary nodes can use cooperative transmission to help the backbone nodes in the middle of the network. In return, the backbone nodes are willing to forward the boundary nodes’ packets. The stability of the coalitions is studied using the concept of a core. Then two types of fairness, namely, the minmax fairness using nucleolus and the average fairness using the Shapley function are investigated. Finally, a protocol is designed using both repeated games and coalition games. Simulation results show how boundary nodes and backbone nodes form coalitions together according to different fairness criteria. The proposed protocol can improve the network connectivity by about 50%, compared with pure repeated game schemes. I.
Experiences Applying Game Theory to System Design
- Proc. ACM SIGCOMM
, 2004
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Mandayam, “Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks
- IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
, 2005
"... Abstract—The assumption that all nodes cooperate to relay packets for each other may not be realistic for commercial wireless ad hoc networks. An autonomous (selfish) node in a wireless network has two disincentives for forwarding for others: energy expenditure (real cost) and possible delays for it ..."
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Cited by 36 (2 self)
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Abstract—The assumption that all nodes cooperate to relay packets for each other may not be realistic for commercial wireless ad hoc networks. An autonomous (selfish) node in a wireless network has two disincentives for forwarding for others: energy expenditure (real cost) and possible delays for its own data (opportunity cost). We introduce a mechanism that “fosters cooperation through bribery ” in the context of forwarding in ad hoc networks. Using a microeconomic framework based on game theory, we design and analyze a pricing algorithm that encourages forwarding among autonomous nodes by reimbursing forwarding. Taking a joint network-centric and user-centric approach, the revenue maximizing network and utility (measured in bits-per-Joule) maximizing nodes interact through prices for channel use, reimbursements for forwarding, transmitter power control, as well as forwarding and destination preferences. In a three-node (two-sources, one-access-point) network, the network converges to an architecture that induces forwarding only when the network geometries are such that forwarding is likely to increase individual benefits (network revenue and node utilities). For other geometries, the network converges to architectures that do not favor forwarding. We then generalize to a multinode network, where it is seen that the nodes ’ willingness to forward decrease for large ratios of the average internodal distance to the smallest distance between the access point and any source node. Pricing with reimbursement generally improves the network aggregate utility (or aggregate bits-per-Joule), as well as utilities and revenue compared with the corresponding pricing algorithm without reimbursement. Index Terms—Cooperation, incentive for forwarding, noncoop-erative game, pricing, revenue maximization, Stackelberg game, utility. I.
Non-cooperative Forwarding in Ad-hoc Networks
, 2004
"... Abstract- A wireless Ad-hoc network is expected to be made up of energy aware entities (nodes) interested in their own perceived performance. An important problem in such a scenario is to provide incentives for collaboration among the participating entities. Forwarding packets of other nodes is an e ..."
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Cited by 35 (0 self)
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Abstract- A wireless Ad-hoc network is expected to be made up of energy aware entities (nodes) interested in their own perceived performance. An important problem in such a scenario is to provide incentives for collaboration among the participating entities. Forwarding packets of other nodes is an example of activity that requires such a collaboration. However, it may not be in interest of a node to always forward the requesting packets. At the same time, not forwarding any packet may adversly affect the network functioning. Assuming that the nodes are rational, i.e., their actions are strictly determined by their self-interest, we view the problem in framework of non-cooperative game theory and provide a simple punishing mechanism considering endto-end performance objectives of the nodes. We also provide a distributed implementation of the proposed mechanism. This implementation has a small computational and storage complexity hence is suitable for the scenario under consideration.
Trading in Trust, Tokens, and Stamps
- In Proc. of the First Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems
, 2003
"... Proposals for providing incentives to increase node participation in peer-to-peer systems can be broadly categorised into token-based and trust-based schemes. This paper aims to relate both models to a variant of stamp trading [6], where nodes produce personalised stamps then trade them to obtain se ..."
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Cited by 33 (0 self)
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Proposals for providing incentives to increase node participation in peer-to-peer systems can be broadly categorised into token-based and trust-based schemes. This paper aims to relate both models to a variant of stamp trading [6], where nodes produce personalised stamps then trade them to obtain service from each other. By combining features from both trust and token schemes, we present the first trust scheme which gives rise to a bounded-size trust economy and describe its implications for peer-to-peer routing. 1
DARWIN: Distributed and Adaptive Reputation mechanism for WIreless ad-hoc Networks
, 2007
"... Mobile ad-hoc networks are deployed under the assumption that participating nodes are willing to forward other nodes’ packets. In reputation-based mechanisms cooperation is induced by means of a threat of partial or total disconnection from the network if a node is non-cooperative; however packet co ..."
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Cited by 32 (1 self)
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Mobile ad-hoc networks are deployed under the assumption that participating nodes are willing to forward other nodes’ packets. In reputation-based mechanisms cooperation is induced by means of a threat of partial or total disconnection from the network if a node is non-cooperative; however packet collisions and interference may make cooperative nodes appear selfish sometimes. In this paper we use a simple network model to first study the performance of some proposed reputation strategies and then present a new mechanism that we call DARWIN (Distributed and Adaptive Reputation mechanism for WIreless ad-hoc Networks). The idea is to avoid a retaliation situation after a node has been falsely perceived as selfish so cooperation can be restored quickly. We prove that our strategy is robust to imperfect measurements, is collusion-resistant and can achieve full cooperation among nodes.
