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14
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions
, 2001
"... We investigate cost-sharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link o ..."
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Cited by 284 (16 self)
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We investigate cost-sharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link of the multicast tree, while we give evidence that the latter requires a quadratic total number of messages. We also show that the welfare value achieved by an optimal multicast tree is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor, even for bounded-degree networks. The lower-bound proof for the Shapley value uses a novel algebraic technique for bounding from below the number of messages exchanged in a distributed computation; this technique may prove useful in other contexts as well.
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions
, 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
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Cited by 283 (24 self)
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.
Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs: budget balance versus efficiency
, 1999
"... A service is produced for a set of agents. The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service. We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served ..."
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Cited by 201 (19 self)
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A service is produced for a set of agents. The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service. We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them. If such a mechanism is budget balanced (covers cost exactly), it cannot be efficient (serve the surplus maximizing set of users) and vice-versa. We characterize the rich family of budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanisms; they correspond to the family of cost sharing formulae where an agent's cost share does not decrease when the set of users expand. The mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal. When we require efficiency rather than budget balance -- the more common route in the literature -- we find that there is a single Clarke-Groves mech...
Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing
, 2004
"... in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Tampa FL, October 2001. This work was supported by the DoD University Research Initiative (URI) program administered by the Oce of Naval Research under Grant N00014-01-1-0795. ..."
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Cited by 52 (3 self)
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in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Tampa FL, October 2001. This work was supported by the DoD University Research Initiative (URI) program administered by the Oce of Naval Research under Grant N00014-01-1-0795.
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
- Theoretical Computer Science
, 2002
"... We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of group-strategyproof, budget-balanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in gam ..."
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Cited by 31 (3 self)
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We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of group-strategyproof, budget-balanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in game theory to show that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately efficient and approximately budget-balanced. Our results show that one important and natural case of multicast cost sharing is an example of a canonical hard problem in distributed, algorithmic mechanism design; in this sense, they represent progress toward the development of a complexity theory of Internet computation.
Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
- INT J GAME THEORY
, 1998
"... Games with cooperation structure are cooperative games with a family of feasible coalitions, that describes which coalitions can negotiate in the game. We study a model of cooperation structure and the corresponding restricted game, in which the feasible coalitions are those belonging to a partitio ..."
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Cited by 10 (5 self)
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Games with cooperation structure are cooperative games with a family of feasible coalitions, that describes which coalitions can negotiate in the game. We study a model of cooperation structure and the corresponding restricted game, in which the feasible coalitions are those belonging to a partition system. First, we study a recursive procedure for computing the Hart and Mas-Colell potential of these games and we develop the relation between the dividends of Harsanyi in the restricted game and the worths in the original game. The properties of partition convex geometries are used to obtain formulas for the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the players in the restricted game v L, in terms of the original game v. Finally, we consider the Owen multilinear extension for the restricted game.
Strategic Properties of Heterogeneous Serial Cost Sharing
- Mathematical Social Sciences (forthcoming
, 2000
"... We show that serial cost sharing for heterogeneous goods [4], and a large number of other cost sharing mechanisms, have the same strong strategic properties as serial cost sharing for homogenous goods [10], including uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for all utility proles and cost functions, do ..."
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Cited by 8 (1 self)
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We show that serial cost sharing for heterogeneous goods [4], and a large number of other cost sharing mechanisms, have the same strong strategic properties as serial cost sharing for homogenous goods [10], including uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for all utility proles and cost functions, dominance solvability, solvability in overwhelmed actions, and robustness to coalitional deviations. We describe several applications to cost/surplus sharing and the Internet. 1 Introduction In [10, 13], Moulin and Shenker introduced a cost sharing mechanisms with extremely strong strategic properties. Dubbed serial cost sharing (or fair share in the network context) this mechanism leads to games in which the Nash equilibrium is unique, robust to coalitional deviations and the only rationalizable strategy prole. In addition, this Nash equilibrium is the unique outcome of adaptive learning [7] and reasonable learning in asynchronous low information environments [5]. I would like to th...
Hardness Results for Multicast Cost Sharing (Extended Abstract)
- in Proceedings of the 22nd Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2002
"... We continue the study of multicast cost... ..."
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Budget Balanced Mechanisms for the Multicast Pricing Problem with Rates
- EC'03
, 2003
"... ..."
The Complexity of Egalitarian Mechanisms for Linear Programming Games
, 2013
"... We show that the most cost-efficient subset problem for linear programming games is NP-hard, and in fact inapproximable within a constant factor in polynomial time, unless P = NP. This in turn implies that computing the prices output by an egalitarian mechanism and computing a cost allocation in the ..."
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We show that the most cost-efficient subset problem for linear programming games is NP-hard, and in fact inapproximable within a constant factor in polynomial time, unless P = NP. This in turn implies that computing the prices output by an egalitarian mechanism and computing a cost allocation in the equal split-off set for linear programming games is NP-hard.
