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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions
, 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
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Cited by 283 (24 self)
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.
Competitive Generalized Auctions
, 2002
"... We describe mechanisms for auctions that are simultaneously truthful (alternately known as strategy-proof or incentive-compatible) and guarantee high "net" profit. We make use of appropriate variants of competitive analysis of algorithms in designing and analyzing our mechanisms. Thus, we ..."
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Cited by 93 (20 self)
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We describe mechanisms for auctions that are simultaneously truthful (alternately known as strategy-proof or incentive-compatible) and guarantee high "net" profit. We make use of appropriate variants of competitive analysis of algorithms in designing and analyzing our mechanisms. Thus, we do not require any probabilistic assumptions on bids. We present
Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing
, 2004
"... in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Tampa FL, October 2001. This work was supported by the DoD University Research Initiative (URI) program administered by the Oce of Naval Research under Grant N00014-01-1-0795. ..."
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Cited by 52 (3 self)
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in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Tampa FL, October 2001. This work was supported by the DoD University Research Initiative (URI) program administered by the Oce of Naval Research under Grant N00014-01-1-0795.
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Agents
- In Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
, 2005
"... We consider the problem of designing mechanisms with the incentive property that no coalition of agents can engage in a collusive strategy that results in an increase in the combined utility of the coalition. For single parameter agents, we give a characterization that essentially restricts such mec ..."
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Cited by 44 (7 self)
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We consider the problem of designing mechanisms with the incentive property that no coalition of agents can engage in a collusive strategy that results in an increase in the combined utility of the coalition. For single parameter agents, we give a characterization that essentially restricts such mechanisms to those that post a “take it or leave it ” price to for each agent in advance. We then consider relaxing the incentive property to only hold with high probability. In this relaxed model, we are able to design approximate profit maximizing auctions and approximately efficient auctions. We also give a general framework for designing mechanisms for single parameter agents while maintaining the coalition incentive property with high probability. In addition, we give several results for a weaker incentive property from the literature known as group strategyproofness.
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
- Theoretical Computer Science
, 2002
"... We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of group-strategyproof, budget-balanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in gam ..."
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Cited by 31 (3 self)
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We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of group-strategyproof, budget-balanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in game theory to show that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately efficient and approximately budget-balanced. Our results show that one important and natural case of multicast cost sharing is an example of a canonical hard problem in distributed, algorithmic mechanism design; in this sense, they represent progress toward the development of a complexity theory of Internet computation.
Dynamic posted price mechanisms
, 2002
"... Abstract We consider the problem of selling a single commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good, by a dynamic "posted price " mechanism. In such a mechanism, each consumer is offered a price for their receipt of an item and they can choose to accept or reject the offer. Th ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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Abstract We consider the problem of selling a single commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good, by a dynamic "posted price " mechanism. In such a mechanism, each consumer is offered a price for their receipt of an item and they can choose to accept or reject the offer. The mechanism can use previous consumers ' responses when setting prices for subsequent consumers. We show that a two round posted price mechanism can come within a factor of four of optimal for mass markets. Thus the penalty for using a dynamic posted price instead of running an auction is also at most a factor of four.
Hardness Results for Multicast Cost Sharing (Extended Abstract)
- in Proceedings of the 22nd Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2002
"... We continue the study of multicast cost... ..."
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