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Truthful multicast routing in selfish wireless networks
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF MOBICOM
, 2004
"... In wireless networks, it is often assumed that each individual wireless terminal will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation – except, perhaps, for a few faulty or malicious ones. Wireless terminals, when owned by individual users, will likely do what is the most beneficial ..."
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Cited by 32 (0 self)
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In wireless networks, it is often assumed that each individual wireless terminal will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation – except, perhaps, for a few faulty or malicious ones. Wireless terminals, when owned by individual users, will likely do what is the most beneficial to their owners, i.e., act “selfishly”. Therefore, an algorithm or protocol intended for selfish wireless networks must be designed. In this paper, we specifically study how to conduct efficient multicast routing in selfish wireless networks. We assume that each wireless terminal or communication link will incur a cost when it transits some data. Traditionally, the VCG mechanism has been the only method to design protocols so that each selfish agent will follow the protocols for its own interest to maximize its benefit. The main contributions of this paper are twofolds. First, for each of the widely used multicast structures, we show that the VCG based mechanism does not guarantee that the selfish terminals will follow the protocol. Second, we design the first multicast protocols without using VCG mechanism such that each agent maximizes its profit when it truthfully reports its cost. Extensive simulations are conducted to study the practical performances of the proposed protocols regarding the actual network cost and total payment.
Truthful Multicast in Selfish Wireless Networks
, 2004
"... In wireless network, it is often assumed that each individual wireless terminal or link will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation – except, perhaps, for the faulty or malicious ones. Wireless terminals or links, often owned by individuals, will likely do what is most bene ..."
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Cited by 27 (6 self)
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In wireless network, it is often assumed that each individual wireless terminal or link will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation – except, perhaps, for the faulty or malicious ones. Wireless terminals or links, often owned by individuals, will likely do what is most beneficial to their owners – act “selfishly”. Thus, it is more reasonable to expect that each selfish terminal will try to manipulate the algorithms or protocols for its owners ’ benefit, instead faithfully follow the designed protocols. Therefore, an algorithm or protocol intended for selfish wireless terminals or links must be designed. In this paper, we specifically study how to conduct efficient multicast in selfish wireless networks. We assume that each wireless terminal or communication link (called agent) will incur a cost when it transits some data, and the cost is known to the wireless terminal or communication link itself. For each of the widely used structures for multicast, we design a strategyproof multicast mechanism without using the well known VCG mechanism such that each agent has to truthfully report its cost to maximize its profit. Extensive simulations are conducted to study the practical performances of the proposed protocols regarding the actually network cost and total payment.
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
 In Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
, 2005
"... The family of VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They only apply to optimization problems with a utilitarian objective function, and their output should optimize the objectiv ..."
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Cited by 17 (10 self)
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The family of VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They only apply to optimization problems with a utilitarian objective function, and their output should optimize the objective function. For many optimization problems, finding the optimal output is computationally intractable. If we apply VCG mechanisms to polynomialtime algorithms that approximate the optimal solution, the resulting mechanisms may no longer be truthful. In light of these limitations, it is useful to study whether we can design a truthful nonVCG payment scheme that is computationally tractable for a given output method O. In this paper, we focus our attention on binary demand games in which the agents’ only available actions are to take part in the a game or not to. For these problems, we prove that a truthful mechanism M = (O, P) exists (with proper payment method P) if and only if O satisfies a certain monotone property. We also provide several general algorithms to compute the payments efficiently for various types of output. In particular, we show how a truthful payment can be computed through “or/and ” combinations, roundbased combinations, and some more complex combinations of outputs from subgames.
Design multicast protocols for noncooperative networks,”
 IEEE INFOCOM.
, 2005
"... AbstractConventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities are selfish: they will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contributing t ..."
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Cited by 15 (8 self)
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AbstractConventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities are selfish: they will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contributing to the network by following the prescribed protocols. Thus, new protocols should be designed for the noncooperative network that is composed of selfish entities. In this paper, we specifically show how to design truthful multicast protocols for noncooperative networks such that these selfish entities will follow the protocols out of their own interests. By assuming that every entity has a fixed cost for a specific multicast, we give a general framework to decide whether it is possible and how, if possible, to transform an existing multicast protocol to a truthful multicast protocol by designing a proper payment protocol. We then show how the payments to those relay entities are shared fairly among all receivers so that it encourages collaboration among receivers. As running examples, we show how to design truthful multicast protocols for several multicast structures that are currently used in practice. We also conduct extensive simulations to study the relation between the payment and the cost of the multicast structure. Our simulations show that multicast not only saves the total resources, but also benefits the individual receiver even in selfish networks.
Cost Sharing and Strategyproof Mechanisms for Set Cover Games
"... We develop for set cover games several general costsharing methods that are approximately budgetbalanced, core, and/or groupstrategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budgetbalanced core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that ..."
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Cited by 13 (3 self)
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We develop for set cover games several general costsharing methods that are approximately budgetbalanced, core, and/or groupstrategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budgetbalanced core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that can of the total cost if we require the cost sharing being a core. Here n is the number of all players to be served. We give an efficient cost 1 allocation method that always recovers of the total cost, where dmax is ln dmax the maximum size of all sets. We then study the cost allocation scheme for all induced subgames. It is known that no cost sharing scheme can always recover more than 1 of the total cost for every subset of players. We give an efficient cost n sharing scheme that always recovers at least 1 of the total cost for every subset 2n of players and furthermore, our scheme is crossmonotone. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we present a strategyproof charging mechanism, under the assumption that all sets are simple sets, such that each element maximizes its profit when it reports its valuation truthfully; further, the total cost of the set cover is no more than ln dmax times that of an optimal solution. When the sets are selfish agents with privately known costs, we present a strategyproof payment mechanism in which each set maximizes its profit when it reports its cost truthfully. We also show how to fairly share the payments to all sets among the elements. always recover more than 1 ln n 1
Share the multicast payment fairly
 IN COCOON: ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTING AND COMBINATORICS
, 2005
"... Multicast routing uses a structure, either a tree or a mesh, to connect the receivers to the source, thus saving the bandwidth. How to share the cost among the receivers in a certain fair way has been studied widely in literature. When the agents, either the links or the nodes, in the network are s ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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Multicast routing uses a structure, either a tree or a mesh, to connect the receivers to the source, thus saving the bandwidth. How to share the cost among the receivers in a certain fair way has been studied widely in literature. When the agents, either the links or the nodes, in the network are selfish, it is desirable to pay the agents in a proper way such that each agent still reveals its true cost, a property known as strategyproofness. Several strategyproof mechanisms have been proposed based on several different multicast structures, and it is natural that the payments instead of the costs should be shared among the receivers. Motivated by this, we study how the payment should be shared among the receivers in a fair way when the payment is computed via a strategyproof mechanism based on some low cost multicast structure. Specifically, when links are selfish agents, based on a strategyproof mechanism whose multicast tree is at most 2 times the optimal, we propose a payment sharing scheme that is 1 n2budgetbalanced, crossmonotonic, and in the core. We also prove that there is no payment sharing scheme that can achieve βbudgetbalance and crossmonotonicity for β = Ω ( 1). When both n the relay agents and the receivers are selfish, we show a negative result: combining a strategyproof mechanism M for the relay agents and a fair sharing scheme ξ LST for the receivers does not necessarily imply a strategyproof mechanism overall.
LowCost Truthful Multicast in Selfish and Rational Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
"... It is conventionally assumed that all wireless devices will follow some prescribed routing protocols without any deviation. However, the scarce resources in wireless devices raise a concern about this assumption. Most often, the owners of wireless devices will try to manipulate the protocols for it ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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It is conventionally assumed that all wireless devices will follow some prescribed routing protocols without any deviation. However, the scarce resources in wireless devices raise a concern about this assumption. Most often, the owners of wireless devices will try to manipulate the protocols for its own benefit, instead of faithfully following the protocols. Therefore, some new protocols intended for selfish and rational wireless devices need to be designed. In this paper, we specifically study the multicast in selfish and rational wireless ad hoc networks. By assuming that each wireless node has a private cost of forwarding data for other nodes, we give an efficient method to construct a multicast tree, namely VMST, whose cost is 5approximation of the optimum multicast tree cost for homogeneous wireless networks modelled by unit disk graph. Based on VMST, we design a truthful payment scheme that pays minimum for any relay node among all truthful payment schemes based on VMST. We also conduct extensive experiments to study the practical performances of proposed protocol.
Incentive compatible cost and stabilitybased routing in ad hoc networks
 In Proc. of IEEE ICPADS
, 2006
"... In this paper, we embed an incentivecompatible, efficient, and individual rational payment scheme into our cost and stabilitybased routing protocol in ad hoc networks which consist of selfish nodes. Unlike traditional routing protocols in ad hoc networks, which only elicit cost information from s ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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In this paper, we embed an incentivecompatible, efficient, and individual rational payment scheme into our cost and stabilitybased routing protocol in ad hoc networks which consist of selfish nodes. Unlike traditional routing protocols in ad hoc networks, which only elicit cost information from selfish nodes, our protocol motivates selfish nodes to report truthfully both their stability and cost information.
Broadcast in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes: A bayesian incentive compatibility approach
 in 2nd IEEE/CreateNet/ICST International Conference on COMmunication System softWAre and MiddlewaRE (COMSWARE
, 2007
"... Abstract — We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. In this paper, we design Bayesian incentive compatible Broadcast (BICB) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based payment schemes have been popularly used in the liter ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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Abstract — We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. In this paper, we design Bayesian incentive compatible Broadcast (BICB) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based payment schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design several dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoc wireless networks. There are a few important limitations in using a DSIC broadcast protocol for the ICB problem since it requires the network to be biconnected and it is not budget balanced [5]. Our proposed BICB protocol overcomes these difficulties. We prove the optimality of our proposed incentive compatible scheme for the BICB protocol. We finally compare and contrast the BICB protocol and a DSIC broadcast protocol. Keywords Ad hoc wireless networks, broadcast, selfish nodes, rational
Design Differentiated Service Multicast With Selfish Agents
, 2005
"... Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link ei is associated with a (privately k ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link ei is associated with a (privately known) cost coefficient ci such that the cost of ei to provide a transmission service with bandwidth demand x is ci · x. Further, we assume that there is a fixed source node s and a set R of receivers, each of which requires from s data with a minimum bandwidth demand. The DiffServ multicast problem is to compute a linkweighted tree rooted at s and spanning R such that the receivers ’ demands are met. This generalizes the traditional link weighted Steiner tree problem. We first show that a previous approximation algorithm does not directly induce a strategyproof mechanism. We then give a new polynomial time algorithm to construct a DiffServ multicast tree whose total cost is no more than 8 times the optimal total cost when the cost coefficient of each link is known. Based on this tree, we design a truthful mechanism for DiffServ multicast, i.e., we give a polynomialtime computable payment scheme to compensate all chosen relay links such that each link maximizes its profit when it declares its cost coefficient truthfully.