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15
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions
, 2001
"... We investigate costsharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link o ..."
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Cited by 284 (16 self)
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We investigate costsharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link of the multicast tree, while we give evidence that the latter requires a quadratic total number of messages. We also show that the welfare value achieved by an optimal multicast tree is NPhard to approximate within any constant factor, even for boundeddegree networks. The lowerbound proof for the Shapley value uses a novel algebraic technique for bounding from below the number of messages exchanged in a distributed computation; this technique may prove useful in other contexts as well.
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions
, 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
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Cited by 283 (24 self)
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
 In TARK 03
, 2003
"... This paper deals with multiunit combinatorial auctions where there are n types of goods for sale, and for each good there is some fixed number of units. We focus on the case where each bidder desires a relatively small number of units of each good. In particular, this includes the case where each g ..."
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Cited by 112 (13 self)
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This paper deals with multiunit combinatorial auctions where there are n types of goods for sale, and for each good there is some fixed number of units. We focus on the case where each bidder desires a relatively small number of units of each good. In particular, this includes the case where each good has exactly k units, and each bidder desires no more than a single unit of each good. We provide incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions for the general case where bidders are not limited to single minded valuations. The mechanisms we give have approximation ratios close to the best possible for both online and offline scenarios. This is the first result where nonVCG mechanisms are derived for nonsingle minded bidders for a natural model of combinatorial auctions.
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
 In Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC
, 2005
"... Weak monotonicity is a simple necessary condition for a social choice function to be implementable by a truthful mechanism. Roberts [10] showed that it is sufficient for all social choice functions whose domain is unrestricted. Lavi, Mu’alem and Nisan [6] proved the sufficiency of weak monotonicity ..."
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Cited by 80 (0 self)
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Weak monotonicity is a simple necessary condition for a social choice function to be implementable by a truthful mechanism. Roberts [10] showed that it is sufficient for all social choice functions whose domain is unrestricted. Lavi, Mu’alem and Nisan [6] proved the sufficiency of weak monotonicity for functions over orderbased domains and Gui, Muller and Vohra [5] proved sufficiency for orderbased domains with range constraints and for other special types of linear inequality constraints on the domain. Here we generalize these results by showing that weak monotonicity is sufficient for functions defined on any convex domain. 1
Characterizing dominant strategy mechanisms with multidimensional types
, 2004
"... This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasilinear utilities and multidimensional types for variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule. ..."
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Cited by 42 (4 self)
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This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasilinear utilities and multidimensional types for variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.
An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
"... We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms to minimize the makespan on m unrelated machines. In their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen [14] showed a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m, thus leaving a large gap. They conjectured that their upper bound is tight, but were unable to p ..."
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Cited by 24 (2 self)
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We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms to minimize the makespan on m unrelated machines. In their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen [14] showed a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m, thus leaving a large gap. They conjectured that their upper bound is tight, but were unable to prove it. Despite many attempts that yield positive results for several special cases, the conjecture is far from being solved: the lower bound was only recently slightly increased to 2.61 [5, 10], while the best upper bound remained unchanged. In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. This is the first concrete evidence to the correctness of the NisanRonen conjecture, especially given that the classic scheduling algorithms are anonymous, and all stateoftheart mechanisms for special cases of the problem are anonymous as well.
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions in Wireless Networks
, 2007
"... We investigate the problem of sharing the cost of a multicast transmission in a wireless network in which each node (i.e., radio station) of the network corresponds to a (set of) user(s) potentially interested in receiving the transmission. As in the model considered by Feigenbaum et al. [2001], use ..."
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Cited by 14 (2 self)
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We investigate the problem of sharing the cost of a multicast transmission in a wireless network in which each node (i.e., radio station) of the network corresponds to a (set of) user(s) potentially interested in receiving the transmission. As in the model considered by Feigenbaum et al. [2001], users may act selfishly and report a false “level of interest” in receiving the transmission trying to be charged less by the system. We consider the issue of designing so called truthful mechanisms for the problem of maximizing the net worth (i.e., the overall “satisfaction” of the users minus the cost of the transmission) for the case of wireless networks. Intuitively, truthful mechanisms guarantee that no user has an incentive in reporting a false valuation of the transmission. Unlike the “wired” network case, here the cost of a set of connections implementing a multicast tree is not the sum of the single edge costs, thus introducing a complicating factor in the problem. We provide both positive and negative results on the existence of optimal algorithms for the problem and their use to obtain VCG truthful mechanisms achieving the same performances.
The communication cost of selfishness
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 2005
"... We consider the amount of communication required to implement a given decision rule when the mechanism must be ex post or Bayesian incentive compatible. In ex post incentive compatibility, the communication protocol must reveal enough information to calculate monetary transfers to the agents to moti ..."
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Cited by 10 (0 self)
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We consider the amount of communication required to implement a given decision rule when the mechanism must be ex post or Bayesian incentive compatible. In ex post incentive compatibility, the communication protocol must reveal enough information to calculate monetary transfers to the agents to motivate them to be honest (agents ’ payoffs areassumedtobequasilinear in such transfers). For Bayesian incentive compatibility, the protocol may need to hide some information from the agents to prevent deviations contingent on the information. In both cases, the selfishness of the agents can substancially increase the communication costs. We provide an exponential upper bound on the communication cost of selfishness, which is tight in the Bayesian setting. Whether this exponential upper bound is ever achieved in the ex post setting remains an open question. We examine some extensions of our initial setting. In particular we show that for the averagecase communication complexity measure, the communication cost of selfishness may be arbitrarily large in both ex post and Bayesian settings. We also examine some special cases in which the communication cost of selfishness proves to be very low, in particular when we want to implement efficiency. 1
Scheduling without payments
 In SAGT
, 2011
"... We consider mechanisms without payments for the problem of scheduling unrelated machines. Specifically, we consider truthful in expectation randomized mechanisms under the assumption that a machine (player) is bound by its reports: when a machine lies and reports value ˜ti j for a task instead of th ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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We consider mechanisms without payments for the problem of scheduling unrelated machines. Specifically, we consider truthful in expectation randomized mechanisms under the assumption that a machine (player) is bound by its reports: when a machine lies and reports value ˜ti j for a task instead of the actual one ti j, it will execute for time ˜ti j if it gets the task—unless the declared value ˜ti j is less than the actual value ti j, in which case, it will execute for time ti j. Our main technical result is an optimal mechanism for one task and n players which has approximation ratio (n + 1)/2. We also provide a matching lower bound, showing that no other truthful mechanism can achieve a better approximation ratio. This immediately gives an approximation ratio of (n + 1)/2 and n(n + 1)/2 for social cost and makespan minimization, respectively, for any number of tasks. 1
Revenue Monotonicity in Deterministic, DominantStrategy Combinatorial Auctions
, 2009
"... In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counterintuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic dominantstrategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that su ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counterintuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic dominantstrategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of “revenue monotonicity” can occur under any such mechanism that is weakly maximal—meaning roughly that it chooses allocations that cannot be augmented to cause a losing bidder to win without hurting winning bidders—and that allows bidders to express arbitrary singleminded preferences. We also give a set of other impossibility results as corollaries, concerning revenue when the set of goods changes, falsenameproofness, and the core.