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Profit incentive in a secondary spectrum market: A contract design approach
- in INFOCOM
, 2013
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Competition with Licensed Shared Spectrum
"... Abstract—This paper considers sharing wireless spectrum via licensed secondary access in which a single firm has an exclusive license for secondary use of a spectrum band. Building on previous work modeling competition among wireless service providers, we study competition between primary and second ..."
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Abstract—This paper considers sharing wireless spectrum via licensed secondary access in which a single firm has an exclusive license for secondary use of a spectrum band. Building on previous work modeling competition among wireless service providers, we study competition between primary and secondary firms with this type of sharing, and characterize its impact on social welfare, consumer welfare and firm profits. I.
Auction-Based Optimal Power Allocation in Multiuser Cooperative Networks
"... Abstract—This paper considers a wireless network where users cooperate with each other to improve the network performance. Our goal is to design an optimal power allocation algorithm for user cooperation in a distributed fashion. We formulate the power allocation problem as a multi-auctioneer multi- ..."
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Abstract—This paper considers a wireless network where users cooperate with each other to improve the network performance. Our goal is to design an optimal power allocation algorithm for user cooperation in a distributed fashion. We formulate the power allocation problem as a multi-auctioneer multi-bidder power auction. Specifically, each user acts as both an auctioneer (seller) and a bidder (buyer). Each auctioneer independently determines its trading price and allocates power to bidders, and each bidder chooses the demand from each auctioneer. We show that there exist bidding and pricing strategies that maximize the social welfare (total network throughput). Then we propose a distributed mechanism that can achieve the globally optimal equilibrium. Simulation results verify our proposed approach. I.
Spectrum Trading with Insurance in Cognitive Radio Networks
"... Abstract—Market based spectrum trading has been extensively studied to realize efficient spectrum utilization in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In this paper, we utilize the concept of insur-ance in spectrum trading so as to improve spectrum efficiency in CRNs. We show that by additionally purchas ..."
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Abstract—Market based spectrum trading has been extensively studied to realize efficient spectrum utilization in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In this paper, we utilize the concept of insur-ance in spectrum trading so as to improve spectrum efficiency in CRNs. We show that by additionally purchasing a specifically designed insurance contract from a PU, an SU can improve its utility since it will be insured against the potential accident, i.e., transmission failure incurred by excessively low SINR. Therefore insurance provides SUs more incentive to purchase PUs ’ channels and spectrum utilization in CRNs can be improved. In this paper, the original spectrum market including multiple PUs and multiple SUs are modeled as a hybrid market consisting of a spectrum market and an insurance market. In this hybrid market PUs serve as spectrum sellers as well as insurers and SUs act as spectrum buyers as well as insureds. We further model the hybrid market game as a four-stage Bayesian game between PUs and SUs. We characterize the second-best Pareto optimal (SBPO) market allocations and players ’ perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) strategies. Furthermore, through extensive simulation, we have demonstrated that at the PBE, high risk and low risk SUs will respectively experience improvement in their utilities for approximately 23.5 % and 4.6%. I.
1Profit Incentive in Trading Non-exclusive Access on a Secondary Spectrum Market Through Contract Design
"... Abstract—In this paper we formulate a contract design prob-lem where a primary license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential secondary users/buyers. It needs to determine how to optimally price the excess spectrum so as to maximize its profit, knowing t ..."
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Abstract—In this paper we formulate a contract design prob-lem where a primary license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential secondary users/buyers. It needs to determine how to optimally price the excess spectrum so as to maximize its profit, knowing that this excess capacity is stochastic in nature, does not come with exclusive access, and cannot provide deterministic service guarantees to a buyer. At the same time, buyers are of different types, characterized by different communication needs, tolerance for the channel uncertainty, and so on, all of which a buyer’s private information. The license holder must then try to design different contracts catered to different types of buyers in order to maximize its profit. We address this problem by adopting as a reference a traditional spectrum market where the buyer can purchase exclusive access with fixed/deterministic guarantees. We fully characterize the optimal solution in the cases where there is a single buyer type, and when multiple types of buyers share the same, known channel condition as a result of the primary user activity. In the most general case we construct an algorithm that generates a set of contracts in a computationally efficient manner, and show that this set is optimal when the buyer types satisfy a monotonicity condition. I.
Dynamic Cooperative Secondary Access in Hierarchical Spectrum Sharing Networks
"... Abstract-We consider a hierarchical spectrum sharing network consisting of a primary and a cognitive secondary transmitter-receiver pair, with non-backlogged traffic. The secondary transmitter may utilize cooperative transmission techniques to relay primary traffic while superimposing its own infor ..."
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Abstract-We consider a hierarchical spectrum sharing network consisting of a primary and a cognitive secondary transmitter-receiver pair, with non-backlogged traffic. The secondary transmitter may utilize cooperative transmission techniques to relay primary traffic while superimposing its own information, or transmit opportunistically when the primary user is idle. The secondary user meets a dilemma in this scenario. Choosing cooperation it can transmit a packet immediately even if the primary queue is not empty, but it has to bear the additional cost of relaying, since the primary performance needs to be guaranteed. To solve this dilemma we propose dynamic cooperative secondary access control that takes the state of the spectrum sharing network into account. We formulate the problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and prove the existence of a stationary policy that is average cost optimal. Then we consider the scenario when the traffic and link statistics are not known at the secondary user, and propose to find the optimal transmission strategy using reinforcement learning. With extensive numerical evaluation, we demonstrate that dynamic cooperation with state aware sequential decision is very efficient in spectrum sharing systems with stochastic traffic, and show that dynamic cooperation is necessary for the secondary system to be able to adapt to changing load conditions or to changing available energy resource. Our results show, that learning based access control, with or without known primary buffer state, has close to optimal performance. Index Terms-Hierarchical spectrum sharing, cooperative transmission, queuing systems, Markov decision process, reinforcement learning.
Partial Cooperation for Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Network
"... Abstract — In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio network where secondary users may have different sets of available channels. We propose a partial cooperation scheme that captures the feature of incomplete channel availability information under spatial heterogeneity. It encourages cooperation ..."
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Abstract — In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio network where secondary users may have different sets of available channels. We propose a partial cooperation scheme that captures the feature of incomplete channel availability information under spatial heterogeneity. It encourages cooperation among users in a group with the same priority channel, while allows contentions among users from different groups. We show that our proposed scheme achieves a good balance between the channel utilization and additional signaling overhead by comparing with no cooperation and full cooperation schemes. We further derive the lower bound of channel utilization of the proposed scheme by comparing it with a full cooperation scheme. Numerical results show that the average performance of the scheme can be more than two times better than the lower bound derived. In our simulations, the scheme is up to 15 % better in channel utilization than the no cooperation scheme.
Relay Selection for OFDM Wireless Systems under Asymmetric Information: A Contract-Theory Based Approach
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Improving Macrocell- Small Cell Coexistence through Adaptive Interference Draining
"... Abstract—The deployment of underlay small base sta-tions (SBSs) is expected to significantly boost the spectrum efficiency and the coverage of next-generation cellular networks. However, the coexistence of SBSs underlaid to a macro-cellular network faces important challenges, notably in terms of spe ..."
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Abstract—The deployment of underlay small base sta-tions (SBSs) is expected to significantly boost the spectrum efficiency and the coverage of next-generation cellular networks. However, the coexistence of SBSs underlaid to a macro-cellular network faces important challenges, notably in terms of spec-trum sharing and interference management. In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretic model that enables the SBSs to optimize their transmission rates by making decisions on the resource occupation jointly in the frequency and spatial domains. This procedure, known as interference draining, is performed among cooperative SBSs and allows to drastically reduce the interference experienced by both macro- and small cell users. At the macrocell side, we consider a modified water-filling policy for the power allocation that allows each macrocell user (MUE) to focus the transmissions on the degrees of freedom over which the MUE experiences the best channel and interfer-ence conditions. This approach not only represents an effective way to decrease the received interference at the MUEs but also grants the SBS tier additional transmission opportunities and allows for a more agile interference management. Simulation results show that the proposed approach yields significant gains at both macrocell and small cell tiers, in terms of average achievable rate per user, reaching up to 37%, relative to the non-cooperative case, for a network with 150 MUEs and 200 SBSs. I.