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2006. Sequentially Nash credible joint plans in strategic networks. This paper can be downloaded at http://www.unbsj.ca/arts/economic/faculty/nieva
"... I define Sequentially Nash Credible Joint Plans (SN), an extension of neologism proofness and a refinement of subgameperfect publicly correlated equilibrium. It applies to threeplayer network games with cheap talk where pairs in a finite rule of order select communication links and actions, have ..."
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I define Sequentially Nash Credible Joint Plans (SN), an extension of neologism proofness and a refinement of subgameperfect publicly correlated equilibrium. It applies to threeplayer network games with cheap talk where pairs in a finite rule of order select communication links and actions, have a preexisting common language and bargain so that unexpected, "non Nash", simultaneous messages ’ literal meaning are clear as they signal bilateral cooperation. Multiplicity is instead obtained in standard networks with bargaining. SN are an alternative to evolutionary equilibrium selection in strategic network games. Uniqueness or existence of the related Ferreira’s "nonbargained" communicationproofequilibrium is not often the case. As pairs can threat credibly with the unique HarsanyiSelten (HS) payoff and form a different link, the smoothed Nash demand game is SN’s novel noncooperative foundation. In contrast to HS, a companion paper finds SN in a variation of the AumannMyerson game with infinite action sets; in the simple majority game, the nu
Fair ultimatum: an experimental study of the Myerson value∗
, 2007
"... We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the empirical behavior of the bidandpropose mechanism, defined in Navarro and Perea (2005). This mechanism implements the Myerson value for networks, and therefore its outcome posesses fairness properties. Since the bidandpropose mechanism includes an u ..."
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We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the empirical behavior of the bidandpropose mechanism, defined in Navarro and Perea (2005). This mechanism implements the Myerson value for networks, and therefore its outcome posesses fairness properties. Since the bidandpropose mechanism includes an ultimatum game in the last stage, we design an experiment with several treatments, where subjects also play the simple ultimatum game. In order to check whether subjects behave fairly in the sense of Myerson or they are inequity averse, we compare results from games with symmetric and asymmetric outside options.
Working Papers A Sensitive Flexible Network Approach
, 2008
"... This paper takes an axiomatic approach to find rules for allocating the value of a network when the externalities generated across components are identifiable. Two new, and different, allocation rules are defined and characterized in this context. The first one is an extension of the playerbased fl ..."
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This paper takes an axiomatic approach to find rules for allocating the value of a network when the externalities generated across components are identifiable. Two new, and different, allocation rules are defined and characterized in this context. The first one is an extension of the playerbased flexible network allocation rule (Jackson (2005)). The second one follows the flexible network approach from a componentwise point of view, where the notion of network flexibility is adjusted with a flavor of core stability. Furthermore, two other allocation rules are proposed by relaxing the axiom of equal treatment of vital players. These collapse into the playerbased flexible network allocation rule (Jackson (2005)) for zeronormalized value functions with no externalities across components.
Social Networks and Nonmarket Valuations *
"... Abstract This paper considers the role of social networks in the nonmarket valuation of public goods. In the model individuals derive utility from both their own direct enjoyment of the public good as well as from the enjoyment of those in their network. We find that network structure almost alway ..."
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Abstract This paper considers the role of social networks in the nonmarket valuation of public goods. In the model individuals derive utility from both their own direct enjoyment of the public good as well as from the enjoyment of those in their network. We find that network structure almost always matters, both for utility and for valuation. The network increases aggregate valuation when it assigns higher importance, that is, greater total weight, to individuals with higher private values for the public good. The model provides a theoretical foundation for the idea of opinion leaders who have disproportionate influence over their communities. Specifically, opinion leaders are individuals assigned high importance by the network, and projects favored by opinion leaders tend to be favored by the network as a whole. The model can also guide future empirical studies by enabling a more structural approach to nonmarket valuation in a sociallyconnected group.
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
"... Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Timeseries of networks are stud ..."
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Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Timeseries of networks are studied that describe processes of network formation where links may appear or disappear at any period. Moreover, convergence to an efficient network is not necessarily prescribed. Transitions from one network to another are random and yield a Markov chain. We propose the linkbased allocation rule for such dynamic random network formation processes and provide its axiomatic characterization. By considering a monotone game and a particular (natural) network formation process we recover the linkbased flexible network allocation rule of Jackson (2005a).
SOCIALLY STRUCTURED GAMES
, 2007
"... We generalize the concept of a cooperative nontransferable utility game by introducing a socially structured game. In a socially structured game every coalition of players can organize themselves according to one or more internal organizations to generate payoffs. Each admissible internal organ ..."
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We generalize the concept of a cooperative nontransferable utility game by introducing a socially structured game. In a socially structured game every coalition of players can organize themselves according to one or more internal organizations to generate payoffs. Each admissible internal organization on a coalition yields a set of payoffs attainable by the members of this coalition. The strengths of the players within an internal organization depend on the structure of the internal organization and are represented by an exogenously given power vector. More powerful players have the power to take away payoffs of the less powerful players as long as those latter players are not able to guarantee their payoffs by forming a different internal organization within some coalition in which they have more power. We introduce the socially stable core as a solution concept that contains those payoffs that are both stable in an economic sense, i.e., belong to the core of the underlying cooperative game, and stable in a social sense, i.e., payoffs are sustained by a collection of internal organizations of coalitions for which power is distributed over all players in a balanced way. The socially stable core is a subset and therefore a refinement of the core. We show by means of examples that in many cases the socially stable core is a very small subset of the core. We will state conditions for which the socially stable core is nonempty. In order to derive this result, we formulate a new intersection theorem that generalizes the KKMS intersection theorem. We also discuss the relationship between social stability and the wellknown concept of balancedness for NTUgames, a sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core. In particular we give an example of a socially structured game that satisfies social stability and therefore has a nonempty core, but whose induced NTUgame does not satisfy balancedness in the general sense of Billera.
COST ALLOCATION IN AUGMENTED NETWORKS * (Preliminary version)
"... Abstract Many times, large communication and distribution infrastructures need to be upgraded to improve their security (gas pipelines or highcapacity wires for internet are two examples). The augmentation consists in adding new connections between the agents located on the nodes of the network. W ..."
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Abstract Many times, large communication and distribution infrastructures need to be upgraded to improve their security (gas pipelines or highcapacity wires for internet are two examples). The augmentation consists in adding new connections between the agents located on the nodes of the network. We assume that the augmentation is exogenously given (this may correspond to some real life situations where a supranational institution decides the augmentation but it has to be paid by the nations or partners). Each added link has an associated cost. We apply the axiomatic methodology to find desirable rules to divide the overall augmentation cost among the agents. We present three axioms: isolation, composition, and security monotonicity. Some combinations of those properties lead to impossibility results, while some others characterize the uniform rule.
A Service of zbw LeibnizInformationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions VALUES FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES OVER GRAPHS AND GAMES WITH INADMISSIBLE COALITION
"... StandardNutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, ..."
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StandardNutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter OpenContentLizenzen (insbesondere CCLizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may www.econstor.eu VALUES FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES OVER GRAPHS AND GAMES WITH INADMISSIBLE COALITIONS ZIV HELLMAN AND RON PERETZ ABSTRACT. We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting 'graph value' (and 'Svalue' in the general case) is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.
Competing Allocation Rules in Networks
, 2011
"... We examine a model in which two competing groups offer different allocation rules that may depend on the network of connections among the individuals that make up each group. We assume the existence of a single divisible good, such as a monetary prize, to be divided by each group. The probability of ..."
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We examine a model in which two competing groups offer different allocation rules that may depend on the network of connections among the individuals that make up each group. We assume the existence of a single divisible good, such as a monetary prize, to be divided by each group. The probability of winning the prize will depend on the group sizes, but we examine a more general contest function as well. We examine two well known allocation rules: the Myerson value and the egalitarian rule. We prove existence of equilibria and characterize the properties of the two networks. The implications for the outcome of the contest are examined. 1