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13
Solidarity and Unanimity in AttributeBased Domains
"... We study the implications of populationmonotonicity (Thomson, 1983) and replacementdomination (Moulin, 1987) in the class of attributebased preference domains (Nehring and Puppe 2002 a,b). Both conditions require that when some parameters of the economy change, the agents whose parameters are kept ..."
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Cited by 4 (4 self)
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We study the implications of populationmonotonicity (Thomson, 1983) and replacementdomination (Moulin, 1987) in the class of attributebased preference domains (Nehring and Puppe 2002 a,b). Both conditions require that when some parameters of the economy change, the agents whose parameters are kept …xed, should either all weakly lose or all weakly win. Populationmonotonicity applies to the arrival and departure of agents, while replacementdomination applies to changes in preferences. Using results by Nehring and Puppe (2002b) on strategyproof and onto choice functions, we characterize on attributebased preference domains the unanimity rules as the class of choice functions that satisfy either condition of solidarity and are in addition strategyproof and onto. We also characterize the attributebased domains on which these properties are compatible. Next, we characterize the class of treestructured domains as the ones where populationmonotonicity and Paretoe ¢ ciency are compatible. Unanimity rules are the rules that satisfy these conditions on these domains.
Efficiency and Consistency for Locating Multiple Public Facilities
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 2008
"... In the problem of locating multiple public facilities studied by Barbera ̀ and Bevia ́ (2002, 2005), we offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency, decentralizability of efficient decisions in a game of community division and local public goods provision, and a constructive alg ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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In the problem of locating multiple public facilities studied by Barbera ̀ and Bevia ́ (2002, 2005), we offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency, decentralizability of efficient decisions in a game of community division and local public goods provision, and a constructive algorithm for efficient and consistent decisions.
Two necessary conditions for strategyproofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
 GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 2012
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Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle
, 2006
"... We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have singlepeaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same di ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have singlepeaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, populationmonotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacementdomination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Paretoefficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We
Ordinal games
, 2007
"... We study strategic games where players’ preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we extend Voorneveld’s concept of bestresponse potential from cardinal to ordinal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a be ..."
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We study strategic games where players’ preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we extend Voorneveld’s concept of bestresponse potential from cardinal to ordinal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a bestresponse potential game if and only if it does not have a bestresponse cycle. Further, Milgrom and Shannon’s concept of quasisupermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games. We find that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasisupermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. Finally, we extend several setvalued solution concepts from cardinal to ordinal games in our sense.
Solidarity and ParetoEfficiency in Choosing a Location on a Cycle
, 2003
"... In this paper, we study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have singlepeaked, symmetric preferences. Solidarity requirements say that when the economy changes, the agents who are not causing the change should all be affec ..."
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In this paper, we study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have singlepeaked, symmetric preferences. Solidarity requirements say that when the economy changes, the agents who are not causing the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first requirement we study, populationmonotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second requirement, replacementdomination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. We first restrict agents’ preferred points to be located at the vertices of a regular polygon inscribed in the circle. Solutions satisfying the requirements for polygons with three, four or five vertices are characterized. When the number of vertices of the polygon is greater than five, we show that no solution satisfy the requirements. This incompatibility extends to the unconstrained problem where agents’ preferred points can be located anywhere on the circle.
PopulationMonotonicity . . .
, 2003
"... This paper studies the implications of populationmonotonicity (Thomson, 1983) in the class of public choice models with a variable population and no transfers. The conditions requires that when some new agents join the economy, the agents who were present before and after the change and whose prefe ..."
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This paper studies the implications of populationmonotonicity (Thomson, 1983) in the class of public choice models with a variable population and no transfers. The conditions requires that when some new agents join the economy, the agents who were present before and after the change and whose preferences were kept fixed, should either all weakly loose or all weakly win. First, we show that under Paretoefficiency, populationmonotonicity is equivalent to strategyproofness and representedtypesonly, a condition according to which the choice should only depend on the set of preferences that are present in a profile and not on the number and labels of agents who have each of these preferences. The equivalence still holds if strategyproofness is replaced by coalitionstrategyproofness. Second, we show that Paretoefficient and populationmonotonic choice functions admit a status quo point: there exists an alternative that is always weakly Paretodominated by the choice of the rule. In particular, the status quo point is selected whenever it is Paretoefficient.
by
, 2006
"... The distance metric on the location space for multidimensional public good varieties represents complementarity between the goods features. "Euclidean " feature complementarity has atypical strong properties that lead to a failure of intuition about the optimalmenu design problem. If the ..."
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The distance metric on the location space for multidimensional public good varieties represents complementarity between the goods features. "Euclidean " feature complementarity has atypical strong properties that lead to a failure of intuition about the optimalmenu design problem. If the population is heterogeneous, increasing the distance between two varieties is welfareimproving in Euclidean space, but not generally. A basic optimaldirection principle always applies: "anticonvex " menu changes increase participation and surplus. A menu replacement is anticonvex if it moves the varieties apart in the common line space. The result extends to some impure public goods with breakeven pricing and varietyspeci
c costs. A su ¢ cient condition for menus to be Paretooptimal is that "personal price " (nominal price plus perceived distance from a variety) is linear in the norm that induces the distance metric. JEL Codes: H41, D78, D71, R13, R12