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**1 - 2**of**2**### 1 (To appear in Synthese) The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy

"... Abstract This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition give ..."

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Abstract This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that any measure of epistemic justification is also a measure of incremental confirmation. However, the degree of epistemic justification must meet an additional condition, and all known measures of incremental confirmation fail to meet it. I describe this additional condition as well as a measure that meets it. The paper then applies the measure to the conjunction fallacy and proposes an explanation of the fallacy.

### Confirmation and Induction

, 2007

"... The term ‘confirmation’ is used in epistemology and the philosophy of science whenever observational data and evidence speak in favor of or support scientific theories and everyday hypotheses. Historically confirmation has been closely related to the problem of induction, the question of what to bel ..."

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The term ‘confirmation’ is used in epistemology and the philosophy of science whenever observational data and evidence speak in favor of or support scientific theories and everyday hypotheses. Historically confirmation has been closely related to the problem of induction, the question of what to believe regarding the future in the face of knowledge that is restricted to the past and present. One relation between confirmation and inductive logic is that the conclusion H of an inductively strong argument with premise E is confirmed by E. If inductive strength comes in degrees and the inductive strength of the argument with premise E and conclusion H is equal to r, the degree of confirmation of H by E is likewise said to be equal to r. This article begins by briefly reviewing Hume’s formulation of the problem of the justification of induction. Then we jump to the middle of the twentieth century and Hempel’s pioneering work on confirmation. After looking at Popper’s falsificationism and the hypothetico-deductive method of hypotheses testing, I introduce the notion of probability as it was defined by Kolmogorov. Probability theory is the main mathematical tool for Carnap’s inductive logic as well as for Bayesian confirmation theory. Carnap’s inductive logic is based