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Federalism as a Public Good
"... Abstract. This paper suggests that stabilizing federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of federalism. ..."
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Abstract. This paper suggests that stabilizing federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of federalism.
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, 2011
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Subsidiarity and Robustness: Building the Adaptive Efficiency of Federal Systems
, 2013
"... Subsidiarity—a systemic predilection for locating authority at the most local level feasible—has long been admired for its ability to protect localized, diverse interests from the tyranny of a national majority. In this article I suggest a novel benefit of subsidiarity: it boosts the adaptive effici ..."
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Subsidiarity—a systemic predilection for locating authority at the most local level feasible—has long been admired for its ability to protect localized, diverse interests from the tyranny of a national majority. In this article I suggest a novel benefit of subsidiarity: it boosts the adaptive efficiency of federal systems. To remain relevant, federal systems must adapt to meet changing circumstances. The process of adaptation involves both pushing federalism’s boundaries in search of improved national-state balance, and selecting beneficial changes and rejecting harmful ones, a job most efficiently conducted by a set of diverse, complementary safeguards. By drawing a distinction between policy subsidiarity and safeguard subsidiarity, I describe how each form of subsidiarity contributes to the process of constitutional adaptation and federal system robustness. Subsidiarity is, in a very real sense, the soul of federalism. Subsidiarity
Constitutional Change in Federations: The Role of Complementary Institutions
, 2012
"... This essay applies new developments in complex systems theory to understand how constitutional change can occur informally, without amendment. The chapter develops a three-part theory of constitutional dynamics by analyzing the the complex interaction of the federal system’s varied building blocks: ..."
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This essay applies new developments in complex systems theory to understand how constitutional change can occur informally, without amendment. The chapter develops a three-part theory of constitutional dynamics by analyzing the the complex interaction of the federal system’s varied building blocks: the national government, the state governments, and the auxiliary institutions of governance (such as a judiciary), and the non-governmental institutions, including the party system. First, constitutional innovation derives from constitutional ambiguity and institutional imperfection. Second, complementary institutions constrain informal constitutional change to an incremental path, preventing radical ruptures from past practice. Third, through a model of behavioral spillovers and cross-domain influences, the chapter offers a theory of the emergence of constitutional trends. These dynamics may help us to to understand how periods of centralization
Valuing Exit Options
, 2006
"... This paper examines an important aspect of federalism: the effect of a secession threat on the union’s productivity. Productivity requires a compliance maintenance regime with credible punishment. An exit option gives a government the alternative of opting out of the union rather than suffer the dis ..."
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This paper examines an important aspect of federalism: the effect of a secession threat on the union’s productivity. Productivity requires a compliance maintenance regime with credible punishment. An exit option gives a government the alternative of opting out of the union rather than suffer the disutility of a punishment. Equilibria are characterized over a continuous range of exit option values. The results indicate that only exit options that are superior to union membership improve utility; those of moderate value decrease net and individual government utility due to their harmful effect on compliance maintenance. A prescription that emerges from these results is that if the exit option is inferior to the benefit from a thriving union, member governments should voluntarily submit to measures that make exit as costly as possible. In federalism we observe no perfectly harmonious unions; instead, even the most stable—the United States since 1865, Switzerland—are characterized by near-constant quibbling and, periodically, more serious disputes. Others, such as Canada, seem to be perennially at the brink of rupture. An emerging body of work studies the institutional design supporting
1Authority Migration in Federations: A Framework for Analysis
"... Why does one federation succeed while another fails? Federations may fail for exogenous reasons: foreign invasion, collapse of its currency, or global market forces. If we focus on endogenous factors, the possible reasons for failure include diversity, where populations drift apart or clash too oft ..."
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Why does one federation succeed while another fails? Federations may fail for exogenous reasons: foreign invasion, collapse of its currency, or global market forces. If we focus on endogenous factors, the possible reasons for failure include diversity, where populations drift apart or clash too often, or jealousy from redistributive asymmetry, with unequal shouldering of costs or dispersion of benefits, and, of course, corruption and insurrection. While potentially significant, these problems are not particular to federalism; they threaten all democracies. There is, however, one threat that afflicts federations in particular. It is the one that perplexed and animated James Madison in the American context: opportunistic authority migration between levels of government. Authority may be manipulated by two kinds of actors: the public and the governments themselves. Authority migration can be beneficial: the distribution of authority may be adjusted to make governments more efficient. When initiated by public demand, authority migration demonstrates governmental responsiveness. But it can also be harmful. It can occur not by benevolent design or by majority demand, but instead to 2serve particular interests, often at the cost of the general welfare. In these cases, authority
How Does Reciprocity Work? Evidence from the Laws of War
"... Please do not cite or quote without the author's permission. Abstract-1-Reciprocity is a central concept in much of international relations, particularly international law. The idea that states should respond to one another in kind is deeply ingrained in how we think about international politic ..."
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Please do not cite or quote without the author's permission. Abstract-1-Reciprocity is a central concept in much of international relations, particularly international law. The idea that states should respond to one another in kind is deeply ingrained in how we think about international politics, on topics from the use of force to trade liberalization. Empirical work has shown broad patterns of reciprocity in state interactions (e.g. (Goldstein and Freeman 1990)). Agreements to cooperate are generally believed to be enforced by threats of reciprocal retaliation against defections from the agreement. International institutions, including international law, are believed to aid in reciprocal enforcement in a variety of ways. Despite this general belief about the logic and role of reciprocity in international politics, there are important gaps in our understanding of it. First, the varieties of reciprocity are not always appreciated. The game of iterated Prisoners ' Dilemma game is often used to illustrate the logic of reciprocity; responses are direct, immediate, and proportionate to the defection from the agreement to cooperate. This form of reciprocity can support full cooperation between the
