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421
Tinysec: A link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks
 in Proc of the 2nd Int’l Conf on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems
"... We introduce TinySec, the first fullyimplemented link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks. In our design, we leverage recent lessons learned from design vulnerabilities in security protocols for other wireless networks such as 802.11b and GSM. Conventional security protocols te ..."
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Cited by 521 (0 self)
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We introduce TinySec, the first fullyimplemented link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks. In our design, we leverage recent lessons learned from design vulnerabilities in security protocols for other wireless networks such as 802.11b and GSM. Conventional security protocols tend to be conservative in their security guarantees, typically adding 16–32 bytes of overhead. With small memories, weak processors, limited energy, and 30 byte packets, sensor networks cannot afford this luxury. TinySec addresses these extreme resource constraints with careful design; we explore the tradeoffs among different cryptographic primitives and use the inherent sensor network limitations to our advantage when choosing parameters to find a sweet spot for security, packet overhead, and resource requirements. TinySec is portable to a variety of hardware and radio platforms. Our experimental results on a 36 node distributed sensor network application clearly demonstrate that software based link layer protocols are feasible and efficient, adding less than 10 % energy, latency, and bandwidth overhead.
Relations among notions of security for publickey encryption schemes
, 1998
"... Abstract. We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of privacy and nonmalleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove e ..."
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Cited by 517 (69 self)
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Abstract. We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of privacy and nonmalleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of nonmalleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
, 2000
"... Two distinct, rigorous views of cryptography have developed over the years, in two mostly separate communities. One of the views relies on a simple but effective formal approach; the other, on a detailed computational model that considers issues of complexity and probability. ..."
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Cited by 378 (11 self)
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Two distinct, rigorous views of cryptography have developed over the years, in two mostly separate communities. One of the views relies on a simple but effective formal approach; the other, on a detailed computational model that considers issues of complexity and probability.
Analysis of keyexchange protocols and their use for building secure channels
, 2001
"... Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of keyexchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any keyexchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with ..."
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Cited by 330 (20 self)
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Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of keyexchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any keyexchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of keyexchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversarycontrolled links. We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of keyexchange protocols, DiffieHellman and keytransport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques. 1
Authenticated encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm
, 2000
"... and analysis of the generic composition paradigm ..."
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Cited by 284 (23 self)
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and analysis of the generic composition paradigm
Revocation and Tracing Schemes for Stateless Receivers
, 2001
"... Abstract. We deal with the problem of a center sending a message to a group of users such that some subset of the users is considered revoked and should not be able to obtain the content of the message. We concentrate on the stateless receiver case, where the users do not (necessarily) update their ..."
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Cited by 250 (5 self)
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Abstract. We deal with the problem of a center sending a message to a group of users such that some subset of the users is considered revoked and should not be able to obtain the content of the message. We concentrate on the stateless receiver case, where the users do not (necessarily) update their state from session to session. We present a framework called the SubsetCover framework, which abstracts a variety of revocation schemes including some previously known ones. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantees the security of a revocation algorithm in this class. We describe two explicit SubsetCover revocation algorithms; these algorithms are very flexible and work for any number of revoked users. The schemes require storage at the receiver of log N and 1 2 log2 N keys respectively (N is the total number of users), and in order to revoke r users the required message lengths are of r log N and 2r keys respectively. We also provide a general traitor tracing mechanism that can be integrated with any SubsetCover revocation scheme that satisfies a “bifurcation property”. This mechanism does not need an a priori bound on the number of traitors and does not expand the message length by much compared to the revocation of the same set of traitors. The main improvements of these methods over previously suggested methods, when adopted to the stateless scenario, are: (1) reducing the message length to O(r) regardless of the coalition size while maintaining a single decryption at the user’s end (2) provide a seamless integration between the revocation and tracing so that the tracing mechanisms does not require any change to the revocation algorithm.
Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes
, 1999
"... This paper shows a generic and simple conversion from weak asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes into an asymmetric encryption scheme which is secure in a very strong sense  indistinguishability against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks in the random oracle model. In particular, this convers ..."
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Cited by 206 (9 self)
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This paper shows a generic and simple conversion from weak asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes into an asymmetric encryption scheme which is secure in a very strong sense  indistinguishability against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks in the random oracle model. In particular, this conversion can be applied efficiently to an asymmetric encryption scheme that provides a large enough coin space and, for every message, many enough variants of the encryption, like the ElGamal encryption scheme.
OCB: A BlockCipher Mode of Operation for Efficient Authenticated Encryption
, 2001
"... We describe a parallelizable blockcipher mode of operation that simultaneously provides privacy and authenticity. OCB encryptsandauthenticates a nonempty string M # {0, 1} # using #M /n# + 2 blockcipher invocations, where n is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Additional ov ..."
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Cited by 204 (24 self)
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We describe a parallelizable blockcipher mode of operation that simultaneously provides privacy and authenticity. OCB encryptsandauthenticates a nonempty string M # {0, 1} # using #M /n# + 2 blockcipher invocations, where n is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Additional overhead is small. OCB refines a scheme, IAPM, suggested by Jutla [20]. Desirable properties of OCB include: the ability to encrypt a bit string of arbitrary length into a ciphertext of minimal length; cheap o#set calculations; cheap session setup, a single underlying cryptographic key; no extendedprecision addition; a nearly optimal number of blockcipher calls; and no requirement for a random IV. We prove OCB secure, quantifying the adversary's ability to violate privacy or authenticity in terms of the quality of the block cipher as a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) or as a strong PRP, respectively. Keywords: AES, authenticity, block ciphers, cryptography, encryption, integrity, modes of operation, provable security, standards . # Department of Computer Science, Eng. II Building, University of California at Davis, Davis, California 95616 USA; and Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Science, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai 50200 Thailand. email: rogaway@cs.ucdavis.edu web: www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway + Department of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, California 92093 USA. email: mihir@cs.ucsd.edu web: wwwcse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir # Department of Computer Science, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada 89557 USA. email: jrb@cs.unr.edu web: www.cs.unr.edu/~jrb Digital Fountain, 600 Alabama Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 USA. email: tdk@acm.org 1
Compact Proofs of Retrievability
, 2008
"... In a proofofretrievability system, a data storage center must prove to a verifier that he is actually storing all of a client’s data. The central challenge is to build systems that are both efficient and provably secure — that is, it should be possible to extract the client’s data from any prover ..."
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Cited by 197 (0 self)
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In a proofofretrievability system, a data storage center must prove to a verifier that he is actually storing all of a client’s data. The central challenge is to build systems that are both efficient and provably secure — that is, it should be possible to extract the client’s data from any prover that passes a verification check. All previous provably secure solutions require that a prover send O(l) authenticator values (i.e., MACs or signatures) to verify a file, for a total of O(l 2) bits of communication, where l is the security parameter. The extra cost over the ideal O(l) communication can be prohibitive in systems where a verifier needs to check many files. We create the first compact and provably secure proof of retrievability systems. Our solutions allow for compact proofs with just one authenticator value — in practice this can lead to proofs with as little as 40 bytes of communication. We present two solutions with similar structure. The first one is privately verifiable and builds elegantly on pseudorandom functions (PRFs); the second allows for publicly verifiable proofs and is built from the signature scheme of Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham in bilinear groups. Both solutions rely on homomorphic properties to aggregate a proof into one small authenticator value. 1
Analysis of an Electronic Voting System
, 2003
"... Recent election problems have sparked great interest in managing the election process through the use of electronic voting systems. While computer scientists, for the most part, have been warning of the perils of such action, vendors have forged ahead with their products, claiming increased security ..."
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Cited by 186 (16 self)
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Recent election problems have sparked great interest in managing the election process through the use of electronic voting systems. While computer scientists, for the most part, have been warning of the perils of such action, vendors have forged ahead with their products, claiming increased security and reliability. Many municipalities have adopted electronic systems, and the number of deployed systems is rising. For these new computerized voting systems, neither source code nor the results of any thirdparty certification analyses have been available for the general population to study, because vendors claim that secrecy is a necessary requirement to keep their systems secure. Recently, however, the source code purporting to be the software for a voting system from a major manufacturer appeared on the Internet. This manufacturer’s systems were used in Georgia’s statewide elections in 2002, and the company just announced that the state of Maryland awarded them an order valued at up to $55.6 million to deliver touch screen voting systems. 1 This unique opportunity for independent scientific analysis of voting system source code demonstrates the fallacy of the closedsource argument for such a critical system. Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts. We highlight several issues including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography,