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413
What memory is for
, 1997
"... Let’s start from scratch in thinking about what memory is for, and consequently, how it works. Suppose that memory and conceptualization work in the service of perception and action. In this case, conceptualization is the encoding of patterns of possible physical interaction with a three-dimensiona ..."
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Cited by 396 (5 self)
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Let’s start from scratch in thinking about what memory is for, and consequently, how it works. Suppose that memory and conceptualization work in the service of perception and action. In this case, conceptualization is the encoding of patterns of possible physical interaction with a three-dimensional world. These patterns are constrained by the structure of the environment, the structure of our bodies, and memory. Thus, how we perceive and conceive of the environment is determined by the types of bodies we have. Such a memory would not have associations. Instead, how concepts become related (and what it means to be related) is determined by how separate patterns of actions can be combined given the constraints of our bodies. I call this combination “mesh. ” To avoid hallucination, conceptualization would normally be driven by the environment, and patterns of action from memory would play a supporting, but automatic, role. A significant human skill is learning to suppress the overriding contribution of the environment to conceptualization, thereby allowing memory to guide conceptualization. The effort used in suppressing input from the environment pays off by allowing prediction, recollective memory, and language comprehension. I review theoretical work in cognitive science and empirical work in memory and language comprehension that suggest that it may be possible to investigate connections between topics as disparate as infantile amnesia and mental-model theory.
Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
, 2003
"... The mentalizing (theory of mind) system of the brain is probably in operation from ca. 18 months of age, allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states. Between the ages of 4 and 6 years explicit mentalizing becomes possible, and from this age children are able to explain the mi ..."
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Cited by 296 (13 self)
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The mentalizing (theory of mind) system of the brain is probably in operation from ca. 18 months of age, allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states. Between the ages of 4 and 6 years explicit mentalizing becomes possible, and from this age children are able to explain the misleading reasons that have given rise to a false belief. Neuroimaging studies of mentalizing have so far only been carried out in adults. They reveal a system with three components consistently activated during both implicit and explicit mentalizing tasks: medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporal poles and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). The functions of these components can be elucidated, to some extent, from their role in other tasks used in neuroimaging studies. Thus, the MPFC region is probably the basis of the decoupling mechanism that distinguishes mental state representations from physical state representations; the STS region is prob-ably the basis of the detection of agency, and the temporal poles might be involved in access to social knowledge in the form of scripts. The activation of these components in concert appears to be critical to mentalizing. Keywords:mentalizing; theory of mind; medial prefrontal cortex; anterior cingulated cortex; temporal poles; superior temporal sulcus
A cognitive developmental approach to morality: Investigating the psychopath.
- Cognition,
, 1995
"... Abstract Various social animal species have been noted to inhibit aggressive attacks when a conspecific displays submission cues. Blair (1993) has suggested that humans possess a functionally similar mechanism which mediates the suppression of aggression in the context of distress cues. He has sug ..."
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Cited by 142 (6 self)
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Abstract Various social animal species have been noted to inhibit aggressive attacks when a conspecific displays submission cues. Blair (1993) has suggested that humans possess a functionally similar mechanism which mediates the suppression of aggression in the context of distress cues. He has suggested that this mechanism is a prerequisite for the development of the moral/conventional distinction; the consistently observed distinction in subject's judgments between moral and conventional transgressions. Psychopaths may lack this violence inhibitor. A causal model is developed showing how the lack of this mechanism would explain the core behavioural symptoms associated with the psychopathic disorder. A prediction of such a causal model would be that psychopaths should fail to make the moral/conventional distinction. This prediction was confirmed. The implication of this finding for other theories of morality is discussed.
The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest for a common mechanism
- Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond., B, Biol. Sci
, 2003
"... It has been proposed that the capacity to code the ‘like me ’ analogy between self and others constitutes a basic prerequisite and a starting point for social cognition. It is by means of this self/other equivalence that meaningful social bonds can be established, that we can recognize others as sim ..."
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Cited by 137 (21 self)
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It has been proposed that the capacity to code the ‘like me ’ analogy between self and others constitutes a basic prerequisite and a starting point for social cognition. It is by means of this self/other equivalence that meaningful social bonds can be established, that we can recognize others as similar to us, and that imitation can take place. In this article I discuss recent neurophysiological and brain imaging data on monkeys and humans, showing that the ‘like me ’ analogy may rest upon a series of ‘mirror-matching ’ mechanisms. A new concep-tual tool able to capture the richness of the experiences we share with others is introduced: the shared manifold of intersubjectivity. I propose that all kinds of interpersonal relations (imitation, empathy and the attribution of intentions) depend, at a basic level, on the constitution of a shared manifold space. This shared space is functionally characterized by automatic, unconscious embodied simulation routines.
Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture
, 1994
"... Core architecture and domain specificity ..."
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The ‘‘shared manifold’’ hypothesis: from mirror neurons to empathy
- Journal of Consciousness Studies
, 2001
"... We are social animals. We share this feature with many other species. A complexity and sophistication that we do not observe among ants, bees or wolves, however, characteristically define the social life of primates. This complexity and sophistication is epitomized at its highest level by the social ..."
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Cited by 129 (16 self)
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We are social animals. We share this feature with many other species. A complexity and sophistication that we do not observe among ants, bees or wolves, however, characteristically define the social life of primates. This complexity and sophistication is epitomized at its highest level by the social rules our conduct in everyday life is supposed
Evolutionary origins of stigmatization: The functions of social exclusion.
- Psychological Bulletin,
, 2001
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The undoing effect of positive emotions
- Motivation and Emotion
, 2000
"... Positive emotions are hypothesized to undo the cardiovascular aftereffects of negative emotions. Study 1 tests this undoing effect. Participants (n = 170) experiencing anxiety-induced cardiovascular reactivity viewed a film that elicited (a) contentment, (b) amusement, (c) neutrality, or (d) sadness ..."
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Cited by 106 (6 self)
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Positive emotions are hypothesized to undo the cardiovascular aftereffects of negative emotions. Study 1 tests this undoing effect. Participants (n = 170) experiencing anxiety-induced cardiovascular reactivity viewed a film that elicited (a) contentment, (b) amusement, (c) neutrality, or (d) sadness. Contentment-eliciting and amusing films produced faster cardiovascular recovery than neutral or sad films did. Participants in Study 2 (n = 185) viewed these same films following a neutral state. Results disconfirm the alternative explanation that the undoing effect reflects a simple replacement process. Findings are contextualized by Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions (B. L. Fredrickson, 1998). Positive emotions feel good. Plus, the balance of people’s positive and negative emotions contributes to their judgments of life satisfaction (Diener & Larsen, 1993). Beyond this, however, positive emotions may also be useful, pointing to reasons for the pursuit of happiness beyond intrinsic enjoyment. Existing evidence suggests that positive emotions reliably alter people’s thinking and actions. Together with this past work, the experiments described in this article suggest that one reason positive emotions are worth pursuing is that they can help regulate negative emotions. EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE EMOTIONS Negative emotions can be viewed as evolved adaptations that aided our ancestors’ survival in life-threatening situations. The adaptive value of negative emotions
Pretending and believing: issues in the theory of ToMM
- Cognition
, 1994
"... Commonsense notions of psychological causality emerge early and spontaneously in the child. What implications does this have for our understanding of the mindlbrain and its development? In the light of available evidence, the child’s “theory of mind ” is plausibly the result of the growth and functi ..."
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Cited by 99 (5 self)
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Commonsense notions of psychological causality emerge early and spontaneously in the child. What implications does this have for our understanding of the mindlbrain and its development? In the light of available evidence, the child’s “theory of mind ” is plausibly the result of the growth and functioning of a specialized mechanism (ToMM) that produces domain-specific learning. The failure of early spontaneous development of “theory of mind ” in childhood autism can be understood in terms of an impairment in the growth and functioning of this mechanism. ToMM constructs agent-centered descriptions of situations or “metarepresentations “. Agent-centered descriptions place agents in relation to information. By relating behavior to the attitudes agents take to the truth of propositions, ToMM makes possible a commonsense causal interpretation of agents ’ behavior as the result of circumstances that are imaginary rather than physical. Two early attitude concepts, pretends and believes, are discussed in the light of some current findings. Dedication: This article is dedicated to the memory of Daniel Roth, my student, collaborator and friend who tragically lost his long struggle against cancer on April 17, 1993. This paper has undergone a long gestation, various parts having been presented to the BPS
