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Computational correlates of consciousness
- In S. Laureys (Ed.), Progress in Brain Research (Vol. 150
, 2005
"... Cleeremans: The search for the computational correlates of consciousness ..."
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Cited by 23 (9 self)
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Cleeremans: The search for the computational correlates of consciousness
The conscious, the unconscious, and familiarity
- Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition
, 2008
"... This article examines the role of subjective familiarity in the implicit and explicit learning of artificial grammars. Experiment 1 found that objective measures of similarity (including fragment frequency and repetition structure) predicted ratings of familiarity, that familiarity ratings predicted ..."
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Cited by 19 (6 self)
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This article examines the role of subjective familiarity in the implicit and explicit learning of artificial grammars. Experiment 1 found that objective measures of similarity (including fragment frequency and repetition structure) predicted ratings of familiarity, that familiarity ratings predicted grammaticality judgments, and that the extremity of familiarity ratings predicted confidence. Familiarity was further shown to predict judgments in the absence of confidence, hence contributing to above-chance guessing. Experiment 2 found that confidence developed as participants refined their knowledge of the distribution of familiarity and that differences in familiarity could be exploited prior to confidence developing. Experiment 3 found that familiarity was consciously exploited to make grammaticality judgments including those made without confidence and that familiarity could in some instances influence partic-ipants ’ grammaticality judgments apparently without their awareness. All 3 experiments found that knowledge distinct from familiarity was derived only under deliberate learning conditions. The results provide decisive evidence that familiarity is the essential source of knowledge in artificial grammar learning while also supporting a dual-process model of implicit and explicit learning.
Can musical transformations be implicitly learned?
- COGNITIVE SCIENCE
, 2004
"... The dominant theory of what people can learn implicitly is that they learn chunks of adjacent elements in sequences. A type of musical grammar that goes beyond specifying allowable chunks is provided by serialist or 12-tone music. The rules constitute operations over variables and could not be appre ..."
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Cited by 18 (3 self)
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The dominant theory of what people can learn implicitly is that they learn chunks of adjacent elements in sequences. A type of musical grammar that goes beyond specifying allowable chunks is provided by serialist or 12-tone music. The rules constitute operations over variables and could not be appreciated as such by a system that can only chunk elements together. A series of studies investigated the extent to which people could implicitly (or explicitly) learn the structures of serialist music. We found that people who had no background in atonal music did not learn the structures, but highly selected participants with an interest in atonal music could implicitly learn to detect melodies instantiating the structures. The results have implications for both theorists of implicit learning and composers who may wish to know which structures they put into a piece of music can be appreciated.
Consciousness: the radical plasticity thesis
- Prog. Brain Res
, 2008
"... Abstract: In this chapter, I sketch a conceptual framework which takes it as a starting point that conscious and unconscious cognition are rooted in the same set of interacting learning mechanisms and representational systems. On this view, the extent to which a representation is conscious depends i ..."
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Cited by 14 (1 self)
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Abstract: In this chapter, I sketch a conceptual framework which takes it as a starting point that conscious and unconscious cognition are rooted in the same set of interacting learning mechanisms and representational systems. On this view, the extent to which a representation is conscious depends in a graded manner on properties such as its stability in time or its strength. Crucially, these properties are accrued as a result of learning, which is in turn viewed as a mandatory process that always accompanies information processing. From this perspective, consciousness is best characterized as involving (1) a graded continuum defined over ‘‘quality of representation’’, such that availability to consciousness and to cognitive control correlates with quality, and (2) the implication of systems of metarepresentations. A first implication of these ideas is that the main function of consciousness is to make flexible, adaptive control over behavior possible. A second, much more speculative implication, is that we learn to be conscious. This I call the ‘‘radical plasticity thesis’ ’ — the hypothesis that consciousness emerges in systems capable not only of learning about their environment, but also about their own internal representations of it.
PRIOR FAMILIARITY WITH COMPONENTS ENHANCES UNCONSCIOUS LEARNING OF RELATIONS
"... Prior familiarity enhances unconscious learning 1 ..."
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unknown title
, 2004
"... Abstract: This paper considers two subjective measures of the existence of unconscious mental states -the guessing criterion, and the zero correlation criterion -and considers the assumptions underlying their application in experimental paradigms. Using higher order thought theory 1995) ..."
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Abstract: This paper considers two subjective measures of the existence of unconscious mental states -the guessing criterion, and the zero correlation criterion -and considers the assumptions underlying their application in experimental paradigms. Using higher order thought theory 1995)
For S. Biggs, M. Matthen, and D. Stokes (eds.) Perception and Its Modalities (OUP) Draft: please comment, please do not cite Distinguishing Top-Down From Bottom-Up Effects
"... The distinction between top-down and bottom-up effects is widely relied on in experimental psychology. However, there is an important problem with the way it is normally defined. Top-down effects are effects of previously-stored information on processing the current input. But on the face of it that ..."
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The distinction between top-down and bottom-up effects is widely relied on in experimental psychology. However, there is an important problem with the way it is normally defined. Top-down effects are effects of previously-stored information on processing the current input. But on the face of it that includes the information that is implicit in the operation of any psychological process – in its dispositions to transition from some types of representational state to others. This paper suggests a way to distinguish information stored in that way from the kind of influence of prior information that psychologists are concerned to classify as a top-down effect. So-drawn, the distinction is not just of service to theoretical psychology. Asking about the extent of top-down processing is one way to pose some of the questions at issue in philosophical debates about cognitive penetrability – about the extent of the influence of cognitive states on perception. The existence of a theoretically-useful perception-cognition distinction has come under pressure, but even if it has to be abandoned, some of the concerns addressed in the cognitive penetrability literature can be recaptured by asking about the extent of top-down influences on any given psychological process. That formulation is more general, since it can be applied to any psychological process, not just those that are paradigmatically perceptual. 1
unknown title
"... When knowledge is unconscious because of conscious knowledge and vice versa This paper will offer a framework and a methodology for determining whether subjects have conscious or unconscious knowledge. The implicit-explicit distinction will be related to consciousness using the framework of Dienes & ..."
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When knowledge is unconscious because of conscious knowledge and vice versa This paper will offer a framework and a methodology for determining whether subjects have conscious or unconscious knowledge. The implicit-explicit distinction will be related to consciousness using the framework of Dienes & Perner (1999; 2001a,b,c) and the higher-order thought theory of Rosenthal (1986, 2000). Whether a mental state is conscious or not depends on whether certain inferences are unconscious or not, in a way we will specify; this is the interaction between implicit and explicit knowledge we will consider. The arguments will be illustrated with the artificial grammar learning paradigm from the implicit learning literature.
