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Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
"... In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s sec ..."
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Cited by 232 (3 self)
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In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s
Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms
"... It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms, whose truthfulness can be verified efficiently (in the computati ..."
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It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms, whose truthfulness can be verified efficiently (in
Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions
"... We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj: R → R+. We give a deterministic truthful mechanism, when the valuations are single-minded: when R is a collection of fat objects (respe ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj: R → R+. We give a deterministic truthful mechanism, when the valuations are single-minded: when R is a collection of fat objects
Truthful Mechanisms for Deadline Scheduling
"... Abstract — Truthful mechanism, as a type of mech-anism design is considered a subfield of economic the-ory. It is characterized by formulating rules of a game intended to attain a specific outcome, which is a con-cept born out of the game theory, as well as, solution concept. In deadline scheduling ..."
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Abstract — Truthful mechanism, as a type of mech-anism design is considered a subfield of economic the-ory. It is characterized by formulating rules of a game intended to attain a specific outcome, which is a con-cept born out of the game theory, as well as, solution concept. In deadline scheduling
Beyond VCG: Frugality of truthful mechanisms
- In Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
, 2005
"... We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the field of mechanism design, we assume that the agents are selfish and will act in such a way as to maximize their profit, wh ..."
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Cited by 55 (5 self)
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We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the field of mechanism design, we assume that the agents are selfish and will act in such a way as to maximize their profit
Truthful Mechanisms for Generalized Utilitarian Problems
, 2004
"... In this paper we investigate extensions of the well-known Vickrey[1961]-Clarke[1971]-Groves[1973] (VCG) mechanisms to problems whose objective function is not utilitarian and whose agents' utilities are not quasi-linear. We provide a generalization of utilitarian problems, termed consistent pro ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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problems, and prove that every consistent problem admits a truthful mechanism. These mechanisms, termed VCG-consistent mechanisms, can be seen as a natural extension of VCG mechanisms for utilitarian problems. We then investigate extensions/restrictions of consistent problems. This yields three classes
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
"... In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s sec ..."
Abstract
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In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s
On designing truthful mechanisms for online scheduling
- In Proc. of the 12th International Colloquium on Structural Information and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO), volume 3499 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2005
"... Abstract. We study the online version of the scheduling problem Q||Cmax involving selfish agents, considered by Archer and Tardos in [FOCS 2001], where jobs must be scheduled on m related machines, each of them owned by a different selfish agent. We present a general technique for transforming compe ..."
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Cited by 9 (3 self)
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competitive online algorithms for Q||Cmax into truthful online mechanisms with a small loss of competitiveness. We also investigate the issue of designing new online algorithms from scratch so to obtain efficient competitive mechanisms, and prove some lower bounds on a class of “natural ” algorithms. A
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