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Results 1 - 10
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158
Frugal path mechanisms
, 2002
"... We consider the problem of selecting a low cost s − t path in a graph, where the edge costs are a secret known only to the various economic agents who own them. To solve this problem, Nisan and Ronen applied the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which pays a premium to induce the edg ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 119 (2 self)
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problem, which is to design a mechanism that selects a path and induces truthful cost revelation without paying such a high premium. This paper contributes negative results on the frugal path problem. On two large classes of graphs, including ones having three node-disjoint s − t paths, we prove
An Improved Simultaneous-Revelation Resolution Procedure that Induces Truthfulness
"... Alternating-offer bargaining protocol is the most predominant way for solving bilateral bargaining problem in daily life. However, alternating-offer consumed more time and caused a lower efficiency in some cases. One proposed solution is called simultaneous-revelation resolution by which both partie ..."
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. The paper designs a truthful mechanism for simultaneous-offer bargaining negotiation. In this mechanism, a rule manipulator can induce buyer and seller both to reveal their real prices by introducing suitable adjustment functions. And we show the honest revelations are in Nash equilibrium.
Computational Criticisms of the Revelation Principle
, 2003
"... The revelation principle is a cornerstone tool in mechanism design. It states that one can restrict attention, without loss in the designer's objective, to mechanisms in which A) the agents report their types completely in a single step up front, and B) the agents are motivated to be truthful. ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 45 (11 self)
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The revelation principle is a cornerstone tool in mechanism design. It states that one can restrict attention, without loss in the designer's objective, to mechanisms in which A) the agents report their types completely in a single step up front, and B) the agents are motivated to be truthful
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games
, 2009
"... This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously and noncooperatively with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms which, although they do not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, do facilitate the characterization of the equ ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 8 (2 self)
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of the equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in applications. We then show how these mechanisms can be put to work in applications such as menu auctions, competition in nonlinear tariffs, and moral hazard settings. Lastly, we show how one can enrich the revelation mechanisms, albeit at a cost
Unbundling Truthful Revelation when Auctioning Bundled Goods∗
, 2015
"... We study truthful revelation when a seller auctions bundles of goods and is interested in learning the buyer’s valuations for each individual good. We generalize the auction rules for the Becker-Degroot-Marschak mechanism and the Vickrey auction to induce truthful revelation. ..."
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We study truthful revelation when a seller auctions bundles of goods and is interested in learning the buyer’s valuations for each individual good. We generalize the auction rules for the Becker-Degroot-Marschak mechanism and the Vickrey auction to induce truthful revelation.
Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle
, 1998
"... This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in whichthemechanism designer cannot fully committothe outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the convent ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 13 (1 self)
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This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in whichthemechanism designer cannot fully committothe outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast
Flexible Double Auctions for Electronic Commerce: Theory and Implementation
, 1998
"... We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of val ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 160 (22 self)
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We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation
Patents, search of prior art, and revelation of information
, 2003
"... Abstract The recent deliverance of "business-method-software" patents has been strongly debated. Examiners of the Patent Office (PTO) are accused of granting patents to non-deserving innovations. This failure is mainly due to the lack of prior art. Innovators are liable too, as they do no ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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, it requires a limited commitment power on the part of the PTO and, on the other hand, it induces truthful information transmission on the part of innovators.
Inducing forecast revelation through restricted returns. Working
"... We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier selling through one retailer who faces a newsvendor problem. There is a positive probability that the retailer is capable of gaining improved demand information through costly forecasting. The supplier would like to induce the retailer to forecas ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 12 (0 self)
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We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier selling through one retailer who faces a newsvendor problem. There is a positive probability that the retailer is capable of gaining improved demand information through costly forecasting. The supplier would like to induce the retailer
Judging transitional justice: A new criterion for evaluating truth revelation procedures. Journal of conflict resolution
, 2006
"... Truth revelation procedures are evaluated according to various normative criteria. The authors find the concepts of false conviction and false acquittal more adequate for such evaluation than the conformity with the rule of law and apply a useful classification of truth revelation procedures into in ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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Truth revelation procedures are evaluated according to various normative criteria. The authors find the concepts of false conviction and false acquittal more adequate for such evaluation than the conformity with the rule of law and apply a useful classification of truth revelation procedures
Results 1 - 10
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158
