team agent structure allows agents to capture and reason about team agreements. We achieve collaboration between agents through the introduction of formations. A formation decomposes the task space defining a set of roles. Homogeneous agents can flexibly switch roles within formations, and agents

Abstract Global games are games of incomplete information whose type space is determined by the players each observing a noisy signal of the underlying state. With strategic complementarities, global games often have a unique, dominance solvable equilibrium, allowing analysis of a number

Network researchers have argued that both relational embeddedness—characteristics of relationships—and structural embeddedness—characteristics of the relational structure— influence firm behavior and performance. Using strategic alliance networks in the semiconductor and steel industries, we build

The strategic role of human resource management (HRM), and specifically, the influence of a firm's HRM system on its financial performance, has generated considerable interest within the academic and practitioner communities. This paper reviews the theoretical foundations for a HRM

generating successor state axioms, given only a set of effect axioms and a set of state constraints. This is a special version of what has been traditionally called the ramification problem. To our surprise, we found that there are state constraints whose role is not to yield indirect effects of actions

The resource-based view of the firm has not been systematically applied to strategic alliances. By examining the role of firm resources in strategic alliances, we attempt, in this paper, to put forward a general resource-based theory of strategic alliances, synthesizing the various findings

associated with "full spectrum dominance " in information warfare by providing new and innovative technologies for advanced distributed processing. The definition of information technology as it applies to BM/C is provided, as well as our vision for the future of distributed processing and its role

We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents, which must encourage players to honestly report information. Specifically, we show that the recent notion

The critical role depot level maintenance plays in our national security strategy has never been more apparent. The requirement to rapidly reset the equipment of units redeploying from Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated the need for a Depot Maintenance Enterprise that is agile, effective

to be better understood. Second, the economic efficiency of various classes of reputation mechanisms needs to be quantified and compared to that of alternative mechanisms for building trust. Third, the robustness of those mechanisms against boundedly rational players, noisy ratings and strategic manipulation