### Table 1 shows that each institution has added both full-time faculty and management staff beyond the initial Program Chair/Executive Director.

"... In PAGE 2: ... It was further agreed that course and faculty development would be a shared responsibility. Table1 : The UMUC/UNI OL Model of Collaboration (as of Fall 2002) ... In PAGE 4: ... Third, these operations provide employment opportunities, which allow the university to sustain a knowledge base in an operational area which is likely to expand (cf. Table1 ). 5.... ..."

### Table 3: The Choice of Weights

2002

"... In PAGE 29: ... 9. The Choice of Weights Table3 shows the results of applying the iterative procedure described in the last section to the choice of voting weights in the IMF. The iterative procedure (which has also been used in Leech [21]) was applied here using the algorithm for the Banzhaf index described in Leech [22]; full convergence was achieved with a simple sum of squares distance function and a stopping rule which required it to be less than 10-15.... In PAGE 30: ... As before the results for the two bodies are broadly similar. Table3 about here For ordinary decisions, the voting weight of the United States should be reduced to under15 percent, and the voting weight of the other member countries increased slightly .in order to achieve the levels of voting power given in the appendix to the IMF Annual Report for 1999: United States 17.... ..."

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### Table 3: The Choice of Weights

"... In PAGE 28: ... 9. The Choice of Weights Table3 shows the results of applying the iterative procedure described in the last section to the choice of voting weights in the IMF. The iterative procedure was applied using the algorithm for the Banzhaf index described in Leech [19]; full convergence was achieved... ..."

### Table 3: The Choice of Weights

"... In PAGE 28: ... 9. The Choice of Weights Table3 shows the results of applying the iterative procedure described in the last section to the choice of voting weights in the IMF. The iterative procedure was applied using the algorithm for the Banzhaf index described in Leech [19]; full convergence was achieved... ..."

### Table 1 provides a summary statistic of the board structure variables and the control variables. For both high growth and low growth firms (and for the sample as a whole), the median number of directors is 7.12 The difference in means and medians between high and low growth firms is not statistically significant. However, the difference in the composition of the board between these two sub-samples is statistically significant. Table 1 shows that high growth companies have an average of 3.86 executive directors (#ED) compared to 4.07 for low growth firms, resulting in a lower proportion of non-executive directors (NED %) of 42.1% compared to 44.4% for high growth firms. The differences in means and medians in the number of executive directors and the proportion of non-executive directors are statistically significant, suggesting that, on average, low growth firms have more executives on the board than high growth firms. 13

2002

"... In PAGE 9: ...ompared to 44.4% for high growth firms. The differences in means and medians in the number of executive directors and the proportion of non-executive directors are statistically significant, suggesting that, on average, low growth firms have more executives on the board than high growth firms. 13 Table1... In PAGE 10: ... The differences in means and medians in NeChair are not significant suggesting that low growth firms are not more likely to appoint a non-executive director as a chairman. The rest of the results in Table1 indicate that high growth companies have the same managerial ownership, block ownership and size (as measured by year-end market value of equity) as low growth companies. The average managerial ownership of about 15% and the median of about 7% are slightly above the 13.... In PAGE 10: ... Finally, as expected, high growth companies have significantly higher Q, adjusted Q and market-to-sales ratio than low growth firms. [Insert Table1 here] The statistical difference in the board composition between high and low growth firms may be due to size differences (the median total assets and sales are higher for low growth firms) and industry factors which are not accounted for in Table 1. I correct for these potential effects by running a set of logit regressions designed to highlight the board structure differences between the two sub-samples after accounting for size, leverage, ownership, value and industry factors.... In PAGE 10: ... Finally, as expected, high growth companies have significantly higher Q, adjusted Q and market-to-sales ratio than low growth firms. [Insert Table 1 here] The statistical difference in the board composition between high and low growth firms may be due to size differences (the median total assets and sales are higher for low growth firms) and industry factors which are not accounted for in Table1 . I correct for these potential effects by running a set of logit regressions designed to highlight the board structure differences between the two sub-samples after accounting for size, leverage, ownership, value and industry factors.... In PAGE 14: ... Data on NeChair is not available. I replicated the results in Table1 to 3 using this new data. The results, not reported in full for space reasons, are summarised below.... In PAGE 14: ... The results, not reported in full for space reasons, are summarised below. The summary statistics ( Table1 ) indicate that the average (median) number of directors of high growth companies of 7.... In PAGE 14: ...rowth companies (t of differences in mean is 3.68 and Mann Whitney p- value is 0.00). However, in contrast to the results in Table1 , both groups have the same number of executive directors of 4, but the difference is due to the higher number of non-executive directors in high growth firms (3.... In PAGE 14: ...rowth firms (3.46 compared to 2.96, t of differences in mean is 4.13). As in Table1 , the proportion of non-executive directors in 1998/99 of high growth firms of 45% is significantly higher than that of 42% of low growth firms. There is also evidence that high growth companies in 1998/99 have lower block ownership and higher market value of equity than low growth firms.... In PAGE 14: ... There is also evidence that high growth companies in 1998/99 have lower block ownership and higher market value of equity than low growth firms. The remaining results in Table1 are qualitatively similar. The replicated Table 2 using the 1998/99 data indicated that high growth companies have a higher number of directors (t = 2.... In PAGE 20: ...20 Table1 : Summary statistics. The sample includes 1444 UK non-financial companies with year-ends in 1996/97.... ..."

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### Table 7 Regression analysis of the change in other Fortune 1000 directorships The table presents estimates from regression analyses of the abnormal change in other (not including the target) Fortune 1000 directorships for single-seat and multiple-seat directors. Abnormal change is the actual change minus the change for a cohort of nontarget directors matched on age and starting number of directorships. Most of the variables are defined in Table 5 and the legend to Table 6. Unexplained Retention is based on the results of the probit models in Table 6 and adjusts for the endogeneity of the retention decision. Those models attempt to explain whether a director remains on the surviving board, either of the new, merged firm, or of the still-independent target, following the contest. The Unexplained Retention variable is equal to the error from the probit in Table 6 predicting retention on the surviving board. In the inside director specifications, Remains Employed is a dummy variable set equal to one if the director is still listed as employed, either with the original or merged firm, or with a different firm, in the Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives two years after the end of the takeover event. When a coefficient has a predicted sign from the settling-up hypothesis, it is given in the Pred. Sign column.

2001

"... In PAGE 26: ... If retention decreases the director apos;s time or desire to seek other board seats, the coefficient will be negative. Further, the endogeneity of retention requires a note of caution for interpreting the coefficients in Table7 . The predictions given in previous sections and summarized in the column in Table 7 labeled predicted sign are predictions for the structural coefficients.... In PAGE 26: ... Further, the endogeneity of retention requires a note of caution for interpreting the coefficients in Table 7. The predictions given in previous sections and summarized in the column in Table7 labeled predicted sign are predictions for the structural coefficients. What we observe in Table 7 are the ... In PAGE 26: ... The predictions given in previous sections and summarized in the column in Table 7 labeled predicted sign are predictions for the structural coefficients. What we observe in Table7 are the ... In PAGE 28: ... The observed reduced-form coefficient is positive and the indirect retention effect is predicted to be negative (and was estimated to be zero in the probits of Table 6), this inference is unaffected by the reduced-form problem discussed above. The last column of Table7 presents an overall estimation for all inside and outside target directors. Likely due to combining all types of directors into one specification, the explanatory power of the model is weak.... In PAGE 30: ....6.2. Alternative specification: group means Many of the independent variables in the Table7 regressions are the same for all directors of a target firm. For example, the outside directors specifications include, as four separate observations, four outside directors from the same target firm.... In PAGE 31: ... Given the results presented in Table 4, overall, it is unlikely that the direct financial impact of the merger provided enough outside directors with a large enough inflow to affect their decision to remain active in the directorial labor market. I have re-estimated the regressions from Table7 including the financial impact variable. Its coefficient is insignificantly different from zero in all specifications and the original inferences are unchanged.... ..."

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### Table 3. The director attribute

2004

"... In PAGE 8: ... Also, for some v 2 A0, p(v) is the fraction of tuples in T that contain the value v. Table3 shows an example of a table when A0 is the director attribute.... ..."

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### Table 2 Workforce units for three directorates at JSC

2005

"... In PAGE 10: ... The workforce units are the civil service employees and support service contractors who share work with civil servants. The workforce units for three JSC Directorates, Mission Operations, Engineering, and Space and Life Sciences, are presented in Table2 for demonstration purposes. Directorates provide workforce backlogs and workforce value data.... ..."