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375
Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible
"... Abstract. We formalize the definition of symmetric auctions to study fundamental properties of incentive compatible auction protocols. We characterize such auction protocols for those with a fixed number of items to sell and study some important properties of those with an indefinite number of sales ..."
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Abstract. We formalize the definition of symmetric auctions to study fundamental properties of incentive compatible auction protocols. We characterize such auction protocols for those with a fixed number of items to sell and study some important properties of those with an indefinite number
Dynamic price sequence and incentive compatibility (extended abstract
- ICALP 2004, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
"... Abstract. We introduce and study a new auction model in which a certain type of goods is offered over a period of time, and buyers arrive at different times and stay until a common deadline (unless their purchase requests have been fulfilled). We examine in this model incentive compatible auction pr ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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that negation of our assumptions would require market distortions to some extent. Our protocol may not ensure that one item must be sold everyday. Imposing such a market intervention, we show an impossibility result that deterministic incentive compatible auction protocols do not exist. With randomized
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
- In TARK 03
, 2003
"... This paper deals with multi-unit combinatorial auctions where there are n types of goods for sale, and for each good there is some fixed number of units. We focus on the case where each bidder desires a relatively small number of units of each good. In particular, this includes the case where each g ..."
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Cited by 112 (13 self)
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good has exactly k units, and each bidder desires no more than a single unit of each good. We provide incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions for the general case where bidders are not limited to single minded valuations. The mechanisms we give have approximation ratios close
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
- Theoretical Computer Science
"... � � � � � � � � �Æ � � � � � �� ..."
Incentive-Compatible Online Auctions for Digital Goods
- In Proc. 13th Symp. on Discrete Alg. ACM/SIAM
, 2002
"... Goldberg et al. [6] recently began the study of incentivecompatible auctions for digital goods, that is, goods which are available in unlimited supply. Many digital goods, however, such as books, music, and software, are sold continuously, rather than in a single round, as is the case for traditiona ..."
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Cited by 58 (4 self)
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for traditional auctions. Hence, it is important to consider what happens in the online version of such auctions. We de ne a model for online auctions for digital goods, and within this model, we examine auctions in which bidders have an incentive to bid their true valuations, that is, incentivecompatible
Spectrum Sharing for Unlicensed Bands
- in IEEE DySPAN 2005
, 2005
"... We study a spectrum sharing problem in an unlicensed band where multiple sys-tems coexist and interfere with each other. Due to asymmetries and selfish system behavior, unfair and inefficient situations may arise. We investigate whether efficiency and fairness can be obtained with self-enforcing spe ..."
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Cited by 302 (4 self)
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the optimal operating point, efficient, fair, and incentive compatible spectrum sharing becomes possible. We present examples that illustrate that in many cases the performance loss due to selfish behavior is small. We also prove that our results are tight and quantify the best achievable performance in a non
Brief Announcement: Incentive-Compatible Distributed Greedy Protocols
"... ABSTRACT Under many distributed protocols, the prescribed behavior for participants is to behave greedily, i.e., to repeatedly "best respond" to the others' actions. We present recent work (Proc. ICS'11 ) where we tackle the following general question: "When is it best for ..."
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for a long-sighted participant to adhere to a distributed greedy protocol? ". We take a game-theoretic approach and exhibit a class of games where greedy behavior (i.e., repeated best-response) is incentive compatible for all players. We identify several environments of interest that fall within
Incentive Compatibility on Multiple Internet Auctions
, 2002
"... Agent-mediated electronic commerce has recently commanded much attention. We envision a future in which many people trade their goods by using a bidding support agent on Internet auctions. In this paper, we formalize a situation in which people are trading their goods on Internet auctions and employ ..."
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and employing bidding support agents. Then, we prove that in the above situation all participants need to submit true bids. This means that, as a whole, this situation can be viewed as an incentive compatible mechanism.
Incentive compatibility
"... theoretical conclusion is that licensing by means of royalty is never the optimal policy for the innovator. In particular, royalty licensing is inferior to other policies like auction or charging only a fixed fee, and it is In practice, licensing contracts of technological innovations take various d ..."
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theoretical conclusion is that licensing by means of royalty is never the optimal policy for the innovator. In particular, royalty licensing is inferior to other policies like auction or charging only a fixed fee, and it is In practice, licensing contracts of technological innovations take various
Results 1 - 10
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375
