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749
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 563 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
Bargaining Solution
, 2008
"... In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patentholding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing the patent. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. We show that (1) royalty licensing is bett ..."
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In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patentholding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing the patent. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. We show that (1) royalty licensing
Bargaining Solutions as Social Compromises
, 1999
"... : We interpret bargaining solutions as social compromises. A bargaining solution is a social compromise if it is metrically rationalizable, i.e., if it has an optimum (depending on the situation, maximum or minimum) distance to some reference point. Metric rationalizations have been discussed in sev ..."
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: We interpret bargaining solutions as social compromises. A bargaining solution is a social compromise if it is metrically rationalizable, i.e., if it has an optimum (depending on the situation, maximum or minimum) distance to some reference point. Metric rationalizations have been discussed
An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution
, 2004
"... I prove that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy ‘Disagreement Point Convexity ’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’. I explain how this improves previous results obtained by Chun (1990) and by Dagan et al. (2002). 1 ..."
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I prove that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy ‘Disagreement Point Convexity ’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’. I explain how this improves previous results obtained by Chun (1990) and by Dagan et al. (2002). 1
Solidarity and cooperative bargaining solutions
 Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Banach Center Publications 70, Warszawa
, 2006
"... In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly unequal production skills and with the possibility of technological innovations, in which resource allocations are determined via bargaining among individuals. We define the Nash (resp. the KalaiSmorodinsky) bargaining solution as the ..."
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Cited by 5 (5 self)
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In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly unequal production skills and with the possibility of technological innovations, in which resource allocations are determined via bargaining among individuals. We define the Nash (resp. the KalaiSmorodinsky) bargaining solution
On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise
, 2002
"... Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size. Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus as in the Nash demand game with noise or remain silent and wait until the surplus was publicly observed. Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy Nash d ..."
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Cited by 5 (3 self)
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demand game results in two strict equilibria, in each of which one player takes almost the whole surplus, provided uncertainty is small. If commitments concern only who makes the first offer, the more balanced Nash bargaining solution is approximately restored. In all cases commitment occurs
Twostage bargaining solutions
, 2012
"... We introduce some procedural considerations in axiomatic bargaining theory. To this effect we characterize a new class of bargaining solutions: those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary relations, which include the Pareto relation, to eliminate alternatives. As a byproduct we ..."
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We introduce some procedural considerations in axiomatic bargaining theory. To this effect we characterize a new class of bargaining solutions: those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary relations, which include the Pareto relation, to eliminate alternatives. As a by
Mediation and the Nash Bargaining Solution
, 2000
"... 1 I Thank Ariel Rubinstein for pointing me toward this problem and an anonymous referee for pointing out some ambiguities in an earlier version. Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University is gratefully acknowledged. This paper analyzes a model of bargaining in w ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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in which two parties use a mediator who sequentially makes random proposals until agreement by both parties is reached. I show that as the cost of delay shrinks to zero, the subgame perfect payoff converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with weights determined by the relative discount rates
A classification of bargaining solutions by evolutionary origin I
, 2014
"... A classification of bargaining solutions by evolutionary origin ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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A classification of bargaining solutions by evolutionary origin
WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions
, 2006
"... The class of bargaining solutions that are defined on the domain of finite sets of alternatives and satisfy Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Covariance (COV), is characterized. These solutions select from the set of maximizers of a nonsymmetric Nash p ..."
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The class of bargaining solutions that are defined on the domain of finite sets of alternatives and satisfy Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Covariance (COV), is characterized. These solutions select from the set of maximizers of a nonsymmetric Nash
Results 1  10
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749