(Enter summary)
Abstract: Preference elicitation --- the process of asking queries to determine
parties' preferences --- is a key part of many problems
in electronic commerce. For example, a shopping agent
needs to know a user's preferences in order to correctly act
on her behalf, and preference elicitation can help an auctioneer
in a combinatorial auction determine how to best
allocate a given set of items to a given set of bidders. Unfortunately,
in the worst case, preference elicitation can require
an exponential... (Update)
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2.7: On Polynomial-Time Preference Elicitation with Value Queries - Zinkevich, Blum, Sandholm (2003)
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, and Tuomas Sandholm. On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 176--185, San Diego, CA, 2003. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/zinkevich03polynomialtime.html More
@misc{ zinkevich03polynomialtime,
author = "M. Zinkevich and A. Blum and T. Sandholm",
title = "On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries",
text = "Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, and Tuomas Sandholm. On polynomial-time preference
elicitation with value queries. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 176--185, San Diego, CA, 2003.",
year = "2003",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/zinkevich03polynomialtime.html" }
Citations (may not include all citations):
441
Queries and concept learning (context) - Angluin - 1988
97
Learning read-once formulas with queries
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69
Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice
- Parkes, Ungar - 2000
40
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions: Extended a..
- Conen, Sandholm - 2001
34
Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
- Conen, Sandholm - 2002
32
anonymous-price combinatorial auction (context) - Wurman, Wellman et al. - 2000
26
Learning arithmetic read-once formulas (context) - Bshouty, Hancock et al. - 1995
23
Linear programming and Vickrey auctions
- Bikhchandani, de Vries et al. - 2001
13
An algorithm to learn read-once threshold formulas
- Bshouty, Hancock et al. - 1994
5
ectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctio.. (context) - Hudson, Sandholm - 2002
3
erential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auction.. (context) - Conen, Sandholm - 2002
3
cient allocation problems (context) - Nisan, Segal et al. - 2002
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